Computing the Perfect Model: Why Do Economists Shun Simulation? [pdf]
www2.econ.iastate.edu
www2.econ.iastate.edu
How rigorous/sophisticated is the math in research-level econ, really? The econ undergrads I knew went up to basic engineering math (calc 3, linear algebra, diff eq's) at most, and those who did were considered to be really hardcore. Do research economists use higher-level math than that?
Imagine this: prove to me some conditions under which equilibrium exist for prices in a market of consumers and producers with heterogenous preferences and skills, that can only communicate on a network with a cost per interaction. Now introduce time and savings and prove the equilibrium interest rate over time. Now prove the optimal tax rate on capital and labor over the agents lifecycle. Now prove that when skill and preferences are not observable to the government. Now introduce default and unobservable savings. Are there conditions under which the markets unravel when faced with exogenous shocks to productivity or beliefs. What is the optimal interest rate policy?
These are classic questions in economics in a more realistic market that captures heterogeneity, limited information, and locality or search costs.
The central claim is "Our claim is that economists are willing to accommodate mere computation more readily than simulation mainly because the epistemic status of computational models is considered acceptable while that of simulation models is considered suspect." and "We argue that a major reason why simulation is not granted independent epistemic status is that it is not compatible with the prevailing image of understanding among economists." (pages 306-307)
Somewhat surprisingly, they also write "The claim that economists shun simulation for epistemic and understanding-related reasons is a factual one. Our aim is to explain and evaluate these reasons by considering the philosophical presuppositions of economists." (page 306)
These claims make sense from the tradition of philosophy, where the study of meaning and knowledge is central. But, from the perspective of a practicing economist, you have to question how many are conscious of (or aware of) the biases and preferences of economics when it comes to what counts as valid knowledge, experimentation, and reasoning.
In addition to the explanations inside the paper, it is implicitly or indirectly promoting the importance of the field of philosophy of science. Put this way, if economists were more aware and open to their biases, they would be more likely to "break away from ... methodological constraints" (page 326) and escape the constraints of traditional economic orthodoxies.
In particular, I'd be interested to see a survey of economists to see how many have been exposed to the key concepts from the philosophy of science.
I was taking this course in 2009, and we spent much of the course discussing the assumptions that economists make in building their models in light of the economic meltdown of the previous years. The course was heavy on traditional Keynsian-derived macro theory and the many historical assumptions that have eventually been shown to be problematic, but it also included an analysis of economics through diverse methods that included behavioral psychology and game theory, many of which emphasised testable small-scale interactions and the way in which they which may lead to larger-scale emergent patterns. (Tesfatsion is very much into agent-based simulation of markets)
I was coming from a religious liberal arts background and an engineering program which was fairly heavy on the philosophy of science, and I appreciated a well-rounded and diverse approach to the analysis of economic systems. I'm not sure, however, what my peers thought of all of this.
And, indeed, the description of Complexity Economics from Wikipedia reads:
Complexity economics is the application of complexity science to the problems of economics. It studies computer simulations to gain insight into economic dynamics, and avoids the assumption that the economy is a system in equilibrium.
TBH, I'm not an economist (just a computer science guy who's really interested in economics) but from what I have read, Beinhocker makes a pretty strong case that mainstream economics started going off the rails way back when Walras "borrowed" equilibrium based math from physics and brought it into economics in an attempt to establish economics as a science with the same grounding as the natural sciences.
At which point it was subtly suggested to me by senior faculty members that -- if I wanted to graduate and become a "real" economist -- I should really focus on proving things, not on simulating things.
(Shortly thereafter I left the program, although not particularly because of this episode.)
Having been indoctrinated in economics myself (it got better), your experience doesn't much surprise me. The discipline strikes me as largely bankrupt.
Once, I was programming a game and wanted to implement a simple economical simulation in it (how goods are produced and consumed by the population, maybe some price adjustments?.. I did not want anything complex or realistic, very simple linear approximation could be more than enough, I did not want to model agents, I wanted some sort of realistically-looking Production/Consumption/Supply/Demand behavior).
I asked a PhD student to give me an advice. Well, it took quite a lot of time, maybe half an hour, simply to explain the task I wanted to accomplish. Really, the whole idea of simulating things seemed to be foreign to her, and she could not really help me a lot. The economical models seemed to be almost orthogonal to the simulationist perspective. At least, this is how it looked.
It seems that Economics is very much like the laws of conservation in Mechanics. It describes the system from the high-level perspective, but does not really help too much, if you want to simulate individual particles (where you need Newton's laws, for example).
I have the impression that there is, probably, some intellectual predisposition among Economists. Maybe because of the way they are taught.
That's hardly true, the usual macro model is solved numerically using approximate dynamic programming.
Here's my take: the paper would say that solving the AD-AD model with a computational technique with specific choices for parameters would not be considered a theoretical contribution.
I think that is an accurate characterization of economics, based on my experience of what 'theoretical' means. Why? When you use a numerical technique (i.e. not a symbolic manipulation) with particular values for the parameters, few would call that theoretical work. They'll call it applied economics.
(Side note: I can't speak from experience if the AD-AS model is usually solved with dynamic programming.)
I guess the point is to bash economists. And why is this even on HN? From 2007?
Yes, philosophy can be less than useful at times. But sometimes it simply doesn't get credit because other disciplines borrow its ideas, simplify them, and use them on a day-to-day basis. In doing so, other fields often create orthodoxies (e.g. practices where certain beliefs are so baked in that you don't think about them). That's fine for getting stuff done, but it can be dangerous when the ideas really aren't resting on bedrock and need reexamination from time to time. The key point of the paper, as I see it, is to talk about why the field of economics is missing the boat on simulation.