The events of the past year have resulted in political pressure to curtail the activities of GCHQ and the NSA.
I expect that this political pressure will be transient, and any legislative measures that are enacted will be either temporary or ineffective. The scope of their activities will probably expand rather than contract over the coming decade, even if this growth is driven by a further expansion in the reach of consumer technologies rather than legislative or procedural changes in the agencies themselves.
On the other hand, the media focus on the NSA and GCHQ has undermined the ability of the State department and the FCO to promote freedom and privacy around the world.
The impact of this can already be seen, as other nations (India, Russia, Nigeria) start to increase the aggressiveness with which they collect and monitor our personal data. This is a bad thing, and a genuine cause for sadness and concern - although it represents a mere acceleration in a race that was already heading towards tyranny, rather than a change in direction per se. The intelligence bonanza offered by the remarkable penetration of mobile and internet technologies into private life was always going to be a prize too juicy to resist; for state intelligence agencies and criminals alike.
In this sense, I expect to see the five-eyes alliance become less exceptional in it's exploitation of signals and electronically gathered intelligence more quickly than might otherwise have been the case, as other states as well as criminal organisations begin to realize the scope of the opportunities at hand. Again, this is the acceleration of an already existing trend, not a change in quality or direction.
If this were a matter of traditional "kinetic" military force, then this change in the nominal "balance-of-power" between states might be a particular cause for concern, but the analysis is inappropriate. The primary and most vulnerable target of mass surveillance is the private individual, not the nation-state. The balance of power we need to be concerned about is not between one state and another, but between states-in-general and individuals-in-general, a balance that was always one-sided and is growing more so at a rapidly increasing rate.
In addition to looking at this problem through the lens of military might, we might also worry about economic and industrial espionage. Again, the distinction between nation-states is a moot point, because any advantage provided by state-sponsored espionage is only ever offered to the largest "national champion" businesses, an activity that disadvantages the majority of individuals and smaller businesses, regardless of their country of origin. In this instance, the conflict is not between different nation states, but between a privileged state-industry compact and everybody else. What is good for Goldman Sachs is not necessarily good for Main Street. Dirty tricks are harmful to the free market, harmful to consumer choice, and bad news no matter which nation state is sponsoring the dirt.
It does not really matter if we blame Snowden for his revelations, or the overreach of the security services themselves, the events of the past year have accelerated some harmful trends that pose a grave threat to us all.
The only positive note to come out of this whole sorry situation is this: Over the coming two to three years, I expect to see an acceleration in the development of privacy-oriented technologies and in the adoption of practices which may eventually (somewhat) blunt the capabilities of GCHQ, the NSA, and other agencies, organisations and groups around the world with an interest in infiltration, surveillance, subversion, manipulation and tyranny.
It is clear that we cannot rely on our government(s) and institutions to protect us. The individuals making the decisions seem to be too far to the right of the APSD spectrum to fully understand the consequences of their actions.
We must, by necessity, defend ourselves.