A Dutch importer, for example, might place an order with a Spanish company. Payments to and from the accounts of the buyer and seller are channeled via central banks, so the Spanish exporter's bank gets a credit with the Banco de España, which in turn has a claim on the ECB. The Dutch importer's bank owes its local central bank, leaving De Nederlandsche Bank with a debit at the ECB.
The idea behind this was that the liabilities within the TARGET2 system would cancel each other out. To everybody's utmost surprise, however, this has not happened. For example, Germany is currently being owed over 650 billion Euros. Needless to say, the countries who owe this money don't have it anymore.
This is a very politically biased and misleading perspective on reality.
Consider an alternative world in which the central banks of the Eurozone would have been consolidated entirely. That is, no more Bundesbank, no more De Nederlandsche Bank, only the ECB. All commercial banks would have central bank accounts directly there.
In this world, everything in the real economy would look exactly the same as it does in our world.
However, this alternative world would not have Target balances in its central bank system, and therefore nobody (including you) would ever even think to write that "goods aren't really paid for".
But how can it be that goods are paid for in this alternative world while they aren't paid for in our world? The answer is that that just doesn't make sense.
Goods are paid for even in our, non-hypothetical world. Yes, there are flow imbalances, but guess what: That happens in every region ever that has a unified currency.
If you don't like that, then please just be honest and come right out and say so. Don't try to cloud your opinion in misleading rhetoric.
So the eurosystem has been in the making for many decades, developed by many central bankers, and you are now here implying all of those central bankers would assume such a thing (it all cancels out) and could not predict that it would in reality NOT?
Of course, over any given time span --a month, a year-- not all trades will cancel each other out immediately. That's exactly why they have accounts and claims as core of the system. To keep track and balance/settle eventually in a stable "supra-national" unit, rather than one wildly fluctuating or politically-manipulated national or another.
Pretty neat if you ask me. Sucks for "notorious net debtors" of course..
Edit: After looking it up, there are 28 countries in the EU and 18 of them are in the eurozone.
Yes.. ..except not as many immigrants from 3rd world countries.
from ex UK colonies -- FTFY ;)
Hence.
Denmark is in a similar situation: the Danish crown is pegged to the Euro since 1999, so in practice Denmark has no real scope for independent monetary policy. Public opinion is still against joining the Euro for a mixture of nationalistic reasons (people like the currency as a symbol of sovereignty) and value put on having an exit option if things get too dicey (one exit option is to peg to the Swedish crown instead; another is to fully float).
For example:
Year 2024: Our currency is pegged at 3.28 to the Euro.
Year 2027: Euros have become too valuable; our peg is now 4.1 to the Euro.I'm not entirely sure what the results would be, but you do lose some of the current benefits if people start believing the exchange rate is no longer really fixed. Currently the large amount of Danish-German cross-border trade effectively ignores currency exchange risk, because they assume the EUR-DKK peg as formalized through ERM is solid enough that it won't change in the forseeable future. So it's "safe" to have liabilities in DKK and revenue in EUR or vice-versa without taking any particular measures to hedge your risk. That was part of the goal of both the Euro and ERM, since being able to ignore exchange risk makes it easier for businesses to treat Europe as a single market. Once you change it once, then it might be a while again before businesses feel comfortable relying on the new peg.