The excuse for the airplane security has been that they can use the plane as a missile. If this is no longer the case, than planes lose their special status as something that needs to be extra protected. If we feel safe getting on a bus without going through a metal detector, a plane should be no different.
Yes, people can do us harm at any time. They could shoot us, bomb us, stab us, burn us with acid, etc. We accept those risks every day, and almost all of us get through life without those things happening to us. That is because the number of people who want to do bad things to us isn't nearly as great as some would have us believe. We don't need more screening to protect us from very unlikely threats.
What about the one that happened yesterday?
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/killed-blast-s...
If you want to argue that near-complete security is infeasible, you're probably better served by acknowledging that attacks on something as pervasive and porous as a bus system are a real possibility. So that's why I thought it was necessary to challenge you on that point.
Yes, and they've all failed. That means we have at least enough security, and we should start thinking about scaling it back.
If a terrorist could bring down a plane by clicking a button on a website, we would see hundreds of planes downed every day.
If it takes a day of preparation, we'd see perhaps a dozen per day.
If it takes a week, we would see another order of magnitude fewer.
If it takes a year of training and preparation by one or more high IQ individuals with several hundred thousand dollars, we'd see almost none. This is why we haven't seen any more 9/11 style attacks even though they were so amazingly effective as a terrorist tool: it's become sufficiently difficult to pull them off after counterterrorism efforts were amped up.
In other words: criminals can still break into my car if they really tried, but I still lock my car doors.
It was sufficiently difficult even before security theater and airline liability reduction measures were ramped up, which is why we didn't see 9/11 style attacks before 9/11.
There is no more incentive for someone looking to cause mayhem to blow up a plane than there is to blow up a shopping mall or any other building with more than ~180 people inside (the approximate number of seats in a 747).
Mainly, though, people feel more vulnerable in a plane, so an aircraft bombing is higher impact.
> If it takes a day of preparation, we'd see perhaps a dozen per day.
Nope. People are deterred by socialization and innate biology. I could take a gasoline bomb to a nearby school or church and kill hundreds of people within the week, for little expense and a good chance of getting off scot free. So could most people. It is not difficulty or risk that prevent mass killings.
A: the number of people radicalized into anti-American terrorists
B: the opportunity that As have to cause damage
I suspect A went up in the late nineties and continues to be high-ish today. B went up with OBL and the Saudis funding the game, but has gone down post-9/11 for a variety of reasons, including decreased Saudi bankrolls, increased airport and aircraft security, tighter restrictions on student visas, and a weakened Al Qaeda.
I for one kind of like the fact they have all failed. I would like to keep this track record up since I spend a lot of time on planes. Just my 2c.
I think we're starting to see some of that sort of benchmarking taking place with the TSA, so that's good, but the incentives don't seem like they're lined up properly for the bureaucracy to shrink significantly, regardless of the true level of risk.
If your hypothetical heroku scenario were a government project, they'd be proposing a "conservative" increase to 23 dynos for next year.
[0]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/excess_automo...