Sorry, RSA, I'm just not buying it
gist.github.com
gist.github.com
Given the sort of shenanigans we've been reading about I would not be surprised to hear that someone who was neither a Sun or RSADSI employee said "spike this deal".
[edit: clarity]
(I initially assumed you meant "force this deal".)
1. impale on or pierce with a sharp point.
(of a newspaper editor) reject (a story) by or as if by filing it on a spike. "the editors deemed the article in bad taste and spiked it"
stop the progress of (a plan or undertaking); put an end to. "he doubted they would spike the entire effort over this one negotiation"
historical: render (a gun) useless by plugging up the vent with a spike.
The 'spike' was a nail driven into the barrel, usually perpendicular to the bore.
As a Cold War aside: an AP round from the A-10's GAU-8 cannon could actually spike the barrel of a T-62 tank! But whilst this was demonstrated in controlled environments it wasn't really a practical form of attack...
Cavalry were supposed to carry such equipment but it seems it was rare they did, and rarer they got down off a horse in the middle of a firefight.
So it's (from a minor bit of googling) looking like a tactic more honoured in the breach than the observance. Anyone else?
An interesting HN-like back and forth on this subject is below: http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=233539
Oh and it's driving a steel wedge into the touch hole so the cannon cannot be fired - not, as seems to be implied on this amazingly tangential thread, driven into ridiculously hardened cannon walls.
But you might want to avoid that word 'terrorist'. It tends to give people an excuse to shut off their brains and feel good about it, where convoluted rhetoric like mine tends to serve as an attractive nuisance ("I could give up on this, but then whoever wrote it might look smarter than me") for long enough to get a point across.
You are willing to execute these people based upon logging company hearsay and propaganda.
See, the idea is you spike the trees you want to SAVE and then you tell the logging company you spiked them ASAP so they DON'T CUT DOWN THE TREES YOU ARE TRYING TO SAVE.
Any evidence that these "vicious extremists" have actually killed anybody? As in any at all? Because I can't find any references.
Roofie? Or something else?
They're under NDA and cannot reveal the customer's name. The thread doesn't say how much the customer paid, does anybody know? A friend told me 600k USD last night, but I cannot find any sources that back this up.
$600k is a lot of money to implement an existing standard. That's 4-5 annual engineer salaries. I'm wondering exactly how much work was actually undertook for $600k and whether those doing it (/charging for it/taking the money) felt it was unusual size remuneration.
Not if such a requirement includes things like FIPS validation, which is entirely possible in this case.
Plus, in some cases, these things are done in liu of donations, etc.
I can think of plenty of cases where well known contractors on open source projects have been paid very well simply as a way of showing support for that project.
Why did we implement Dual EC DRBG in the first place?
- ----------------------------------------------------
It was requested by a sponsor as one of several deliverables. The
reasoning at the time (my reasoning and call as the project manager)
was that we would implement any algorithm based on official published
standards. SP800-90A is a more or less mandatory part of FIPS 140-2,
for any module of non-trivial complexity. FIPS 140-2 validations are
expensive and difficult, taking on average a year to complete and we
have to wait years between validations. So, there is an incentive to
pack as much as possible into each validation and our sponsors (dozens
of them) had a long list of requirements they were willing to fund.
We knew at the time (this was the pre-Snowden era) that Dual EC DRBG
had a dubious reputation, but it was part of an official standard (one
of the four DRBGs in SP800-90A) and OpenSSL is after all a comprehensive
cryptographic library and toolkit. As such it implements many algorithms
of varying strength and utility, from worthless to robust. We of course
did not enable Dual EC DRBG by default, and the discovery of this bug
demonstrates that no one has even attempted to use it.
Where did our implementation come from?
- --------------------------------------
The client requirement was simply "Implement all of SP800-90A". Our code
was implemented solely from that standard.
Seems fair enough if a client says "implement all the standard" that they implemented it... it's a bit different than "just add this one algorithm"Additionally, given the trouble Theo's got into on a number of occasions for criticisng bits of the government, it seems fairly unlikely that he would've been comfortable with the project taking NSA money.
Most plausible situation: Corporation said "here's money, implement ALL the things", OpenSSL figured it was a good way to get the useful things paid for plus some stuff that potential future sponsors might find useful in marketing material.
As for whether said Corporation had additional, non-obvious motives, I make no guess either way.
But misdirection does not, frankly, seem appropriate to describe the explanation given, and your scare quotes suggest you're appealing to emotion rather than presenting an actual argument. Do feel free to present one if you have one, though, it's entirely possible I misunderstood.
It had a bug anyways, nobody ever used dual ec with openssl.
Not that it matters much anyway. The result is the same.
1) Were flaws introduced into the technology which potentially reduce the strength of the encryption?
2) Did OpenSSL know about it?
It seems the answers can be yes and no without any real stretch.
If you are, say, the NSA, asking / paying for a whole standard to be implemented (a) gets the bit you want implemented and (b) hides what you're really interested in from anyone wondering and looks less suspicious. Once it's in they could either start pushing for it to become a default, push for people to voluntarily choose it (get people speaking at conferences to recommend it or whatever), or just leave it knowing that a few people would use it and that works for them too.
But the fact that OpenSSL probably weren't complicit doesn't change the fact that elements of the product need to be considered potentially flawed.
1) the mailing list post states that OpenSSL wants to be comprehensive, even when that means providing implementations of algorithms that you probably shouldn't use. The inclusion of weak, or even broken, algorithms does not undermine the product as a whole given this mission. It has no impact on the effectiveness of other, stronger algorithms in OpenSSL.
2) OpenSSL knew that one of the algorithms in the standard was weak, but thought it was still valuable to implement the standard. again, the comprehensiveness goal means it's up to the end users to utilize OpenSSL in a manner consistent with their use case.
I believe you need to be compliant with everything in the spec to be validated.
I don't think you can tar the OpenSSL folks with this without much better evidence.
I wonder: is the client which paid for the non-functional implementation, which if I understand correctly is now scheduled for deletion rather than fix, entitled to a refund?
"Our product is compatible with all of <impressive sounding standard>" may, indeed, have been worth the money to the customer even if the value was marketing rather than technoloogy
> 1979 - Present, DES: The Data Encryption Standard was altered by the NSA to make it harder to mathematically attack but easier to attack via Brute Force methods. The original version of DES, called Lucifer, used a block and key length of 128-bits and was vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis. NSA requested that the already small DES key size of 64-bits be shrunk even more to 48-bits, IBM resisted and they compromised on 56-bits11. This key size allowed the NSA to break communications secured by DES.
http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/70646748808/a-brief-hist...
This is why any known NSA employee from security standards groups (including IETF and Trusted Computing Group [1]) must be forbidden to participate in the making of that standard. Their role there can only be seen as to facilitate weakening of the standards, either by weakening the algorithms themselves, or if that's too hard and/or obvious, to convince everyone else to use a weaker version of it (which NIST kind of tried to do with SHA-3 recently, too).
As long as there's any chance of NSA being involved even remotely in a security standard, I'm going to lose faith in that whole standard and the group.
[1] - http://www.securitycurrent.com/en/writers/richard-stiennon/i...
There were loads of people - members of the general public, security researchers, government watchdog types, privacy advocates, crazy conspiracy nuts, etc. - who very strongly suspected, for good reason, exactly what turned out to be going on.
ECHELON started in the 1960s. Rumors about it were everywhere by the early 1990s. It became so famous it was featured in pop-culture movies, TV shows, and video games.
There was at least one good book (note 2005 publication) that showed how it was possible to piece together some pretty good guesses about what was happening from unclassified information:
http://www.amazon.com/Chatter-Dispatches-Secret-Global-Eaves...
In short, that book argues the NSA was expanding its eavesdropping capabilities so enormously, so quickly, that the only reasonable target for it was "everything." There simply weren't enough top-secret, diplomatic, or encrypted messages to justify the infrastructure devoted to the task; the NSA had to be developing the ability to listen to absolutely anything it wanted to.
Also, note that "the NSA is backdooring American crypto" has not always been considered a likely proposition.
(Of course, all of the above is bad/wrong; it's just not that much worse than you'd expect. "That much worse than you'd expect" is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Security#Security_breach.)
It's also exactly the sort of request you need to stay well shut of if you want credibility as a crypto provider to business and consumers. Any interactions with agencies like the NSA taint you, regardless of the intent. By their very nature they are suspect in this context.
NOW it makes perfect sense to see how terrible this is, but we haven't always just blatantly assumed the NSA was out to get us. They used to not have the worst reputation in the world in the security community, right? I'm not the best authority for this, but from what I could gather they played a kind of spooky-but-helpful role prior to the Snowden leaks in the intelligence community - that is, you could generally trust they were thought to have the community's best interest at heart, even if they couldn't say why.
> So, yes, it is possible that, in 2004, nobody at RSA had any articulable suspicions about Dual EC. They may have taken it on faith that this was another DES situation where the NSA knew it was better but couldn't disclose why. Okay. Is that fair? I think that's fair.
> If that were the end of the story, I would be standing here saying “poor RSA! How cruelly the NSA mistreated them!” But, guess what, it isn't. In 2007 the possibility of a backdoor was made very public, and after that “everyone knew” not to use it. None of us knew for sure it was backdoored (even if some people retroactively pretend they did) but that was kind of a crazy risk to take when there were other RNGs to pick from with no known risks and were faster to boot.
I just don't see how the RSA is supposed to realize the NSA is evil before the Snowden leaks.
You don't have to have any bad guys to have conflicts in purpose and incentive, and this has clearly been true for the entire existence of such interactions.
I'm surprised at this interrogation. I've classes in schools talking about economic/state intelligence methods. The responsibility of a big corp is to secure itself from outside threats and visible links to state agencies will be analyzed by observers.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#NSA.2...
The whole point is that this didn't come out of no-where. This algorithm was already regarded as being suspect, and RSA knew that they had been paid to make it the default in their cryptography library.
This isn't like the DES situation, where there was never any real evidence that the changes made by the NSA had made DES weaker (and as we later found out, they'd actually made the algorithm stronger whilst at the same time ensuring that the key-space was small enough that they could crack it).
RSA have seriously let down their customers & not for the first time. If I was an RSA customer I'd be taking a good hard look at dropping them as soon as I possibly could.
And it doesn't change the rest of the post's point - after Dual EC was determined to be backdoorable, RSA didn't say anything.
"...
"It's old news."
I'm loosely quoting a source I can't remember, but I think it was ridiculing a repeated tactic of some candidate. It's a dynamic that seems to play out a lot if you know to look for it in issues that involve a lot of public relations games.
I think you are right to emphasize how little we remember when we learned what. That's why the above tactic works so well. It lets politicians' dance around their tactical mistakes and change positions without undermining their own base. It is also how disingenuous people can now able to talk about "welcoming debate" and have a large portion of the population perceive this as advocating some reasonable middle ground.
"...
"It's old news."
Anyone older than 22 or so who doesn't recognized that as a time-worn and common tactic hasn't been thinking critically.
People unfortunately think a well spoken response is the same as a truthful response. If the PR flack or representative or CEO seems otherwise calm and unflustered - smooth - then that serves the "reasonable response and explanation" part of that scenario's script.
We are very, very easily lead.
"It's not true. It's not true. It's not true.
"...
"It's old news."
This also sums up how the underhanded defense of the status quo by hiding behind Hanlon's razor has worked in much internet discourse, including HN discussions, on mass surveillance and cryptography so far.Of course, it's not going to work any longer.
Pick one.
I apologize for discussing a technical topic in whats likely to be a political crypto-rage flamewar, but I've been digesting some thoughts about this and the figure of merit of processing required per bit of randomness is probably interesting, in that for a given set of professional grade RNGs (not algorithms implemented by idiots) the more processing required to generate a bit of randomness, the more likely it is someone's sticking a nasty backdoor in.
Or rephrased the more time you spend sticking magic "nothing up my sleeves" constants into a bit, the more likely something unpleasant is getting stuck in there.
(edited to add I'm talking about "real" RNGs not implying the worlds simplest shortest LFSR is magically better than a real RNG just because its really fast... I'm talking about more "in class" performance comparisons than joke vs real.)
I can't wrap my head around why that would matter for a PRNG, but it sometimes does have value.
There are plenty of slow random number generators. They're easily built from cryptographic hash functions [1]. Heck, use something like Bcrypt as your hash and you can get as many seconds per number as you like. The reason we don't use them even though they work perfectly well is that they are too slow.
The challenge is making a fast PRNG that can maintains the properties of cryptographic randomness. That's why everyone was so confused with dual EC.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function#Use...
What I have to wonder is the implications for all of the other random generators.. The NSA has been studying symmetric crypto far longer and far harder than the public. Symmetric crypto is both sufficient for state security (hierarchal+opsec), and breaking it is sufficient to snoop on the public's communications (the bulk encryption and PRNGs).
On the other hand, academics love neatly defined problems, so their interest is heavily skewed towards studying asymmetric crypto where foundations of open mathematical problems and implementations based on nice closed-form number theory.
The same backdooring approach may have been applied to other NIST generators (which would be sufficient for the NSA to preserve its dragnet snooping and still secure against other attackers), and we simply don't have the analytical tools to see this (what is the entropy diminishment of a nothing-up-my-sleeve-number when the explanation is chosen a posteriori?). Dual_DC_DRBG comes across as so ham-fisted only because we have the ability to analyze it.
Deciding what is responsible is likely a coordinated effort. I think the same argument applies. Do we think someone might be being irresponsible here? Sensationalism, or real problem?
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131223/02311625673/rep-mi...
http://utdocuments.blogspot.com.br/2013/12/questionsresponse...
For example, Bruce Schneier helped to make the news articles around the tor network by going through the NSA documents.
They gave up on that and chose to focus instead on stealing the keys
It wasn't just a matter of one "back door" but a matter of knowing that (1) people usually use codes incorrectly or screw up the key management and (2) if you give them a little help the key management will always be screwed up.
Let's briefly assume that the RSA issue is just a tiny piece of a giant EMC public-private pie. Can anyone knowledgeable on such issues speculate as to how significant profits from intentionally secretive corporate public partnership might be visible or non visible to the public eye?
And even if RSA was standalone, should we expect a major impact on the company's sales? It's not like Wells Fargo is going to stop using RSA keyfobs because of this. Although I admit I don't know where most of their income comes from.
Now that everything is public, would you choose to trust your data to EMC hardware and software?
And something RSA did before EMC bought them doesn't really have any impact on EMC or VMWare anyways.
This seems like a reasonable position to me, but I'm not in the field. Can someone tell me why it's not reasonable, in the face of all sorts of theories and suspicions being thrown about, to rely on the leading standards body as to whether the algorithm is flawed?
Was it? Before it was revealed to be the BSAFE default I was going around saying that no one would have chosen to use it anyways, so it was probably a pretty ineffectual backdoor except if it ever was option for a downgrading attack.
http://gist.io/8101758 (the OP's content, but nicely formatted for reading on any size screen, and with attention to typographic detail.)