Building a "where will this rdrand go?" backdoor is harder than building a backdoor that just trawls through load addresses for various common kernels looking for the symbol table so it can poison the entropy directly.
Building a "where will this rdrand go?" backdoor is harder than building a backdoor that just trawls through load addresses for various common kernels looking for the symbol table so it can poison the entropy directly.
>Presumably using the same skynet tech it uses to look ahead and see where the rdrand is going to be xored into.
There is no such tech. That's why this is not 'checkmate'. A poisoned random number that generates numbers in a predictable manner is orders of magnitude easier to implement and less possible to detect than a magical processor that changes memory it thinks might be entropy for some operating systems it has been pre-programmed to look for under the assumption that kernel will never change ever. Get real.