How We Decoded Some Nasty Multi-Level Encoded Malware
blog.sucuri.net
blog.sucuri.net
EDIT: obviously bruteforce, but still.
That's some brute forcing, if you ask me.
keylength=1 127
keylength=2 114 116
keylength=3 107 102 106
keylength=4 78 94 98 103
keylength=5 111 118 115 114 119
keylength=6 81 71 81 77 79 77
keylength=7 104 112 110 104 110 110 109
keylength=8 67 85 86 94 68 91 83 86
keylength=9 87 86 86 90 92 85 83 85 82
keylength=10 91 97 86 89 90 88 90 90 92 97
keylength=11 90 101 102 98 99 93 100 100 100 95 93
keylength=12 45 45 46 53 47 46 41 47 47 51 50 47
keylength=13 89 85 100 90 89 91 94 95 82 90 86 88 92
keylength=14 83 84 85 88 82 81 77 72 82 85 73 81 82 86
keylength=15 73 81 72 76 76 70 75 73 74 72 77 76 73 71 73
keylength=16 56 68 71 80 60 73 64 73 58 71 70 76 57 76 66 68
keylength=17 81 86 82 74 77 82 85 87 81 87 78 84 77 77 79 80 82
keylength=18 59 55 59 55 61 56 59 55 57 59 55 62 62 57 60 58 56 59
keylength=19 77 80 80 77 71 89 78 76 73 74 68 80 80 80 74 76 78 79 72
The stand out line from that is keylength=12 as it provides a local minima for the number of different characters.Having a good idea of the key length you can look at which of the possible 256 values for each position of the key produce the top numbers of printable characters. A quick perl script to do this gives:-
POSS:0: n=211 chars=FHLRSUVZ]
POSS:1: n=209 chars=cdjkouwx~
POSS:2: n=208 chars=DIJKLORUW^_
POSS:3: n=209 chars=BIKSVW
POSS:4: n=206 chars=bejkntvy~
POSS:5: n=210 chars=@CDEFKQXZ
POSS:6: n=208 chars="#)+.023678>?
POSS:7: n=206 chars=fgmorswz|
POSS:8: n=208 chars=behjknt~
POSS:9: n=205 chars=GMORSTW\
POSS:10: n=207 chars=FLWXY[\
POSS:11: n=208 chars=cdjkoux~
You'll note that the actual key (SjJVkE6rkRYj) is present in this output. I'll carry on with this if I get a chance tomorrow. $ ./4.pl 12 "function"
POS: 0: S->78 T->71 U->69
POS: 1: j->76 l->64 m->59
POS: 2: L->73 J->67 W->64
POS: 3: V->65 Q->55 P->49
POS: 4: m->68 v->50 `->49
POS: 5: E->54 C->52 O->48
POS: 6: 6->57 0->56 1->56
POS: 7: u->56 t->54 x->50
POS: 8: k->76 l->70 m->66
POS: 9: R->69 U->57 H->51
POS: 10: _->69 Y->62 ^->54
POS: 11: j->70 m->59 l->55
Note that the correct key in each position is usually either the first or second possibility, but there are some times when it isn't there at all.(It's better if you give it a longer string, if I give it "function " with the trailing space then it gets 9/12 as the most popular, 2/12 as second most popular and the remaining one as the third most popular. There are even better choices, see below, but I chose to go with this as it helps show how to continue with non-perfect information).
Next I knocked up a quick program to allow me to try different keys to decrypt it, it prints out the code in blocks of the appropriate keylength so it's easy to see if a specific character position is correct or not. The program takes various commands from stdin (k = print key, S = set key, s = set individual key character, p = print in keylength sized blocks, P = print entire decrypted block):-
$ ./5.pl 12
k
key is aaaaaaaaaaaa
S SjLVmE6ukR_j
key is now SjLVmE6ukR_j
p
/)abjutt uy
stcm&vauiadl
es\12i`(!Gisue
t("_UERQER/)
{$YCIOKNE= $
HTRPYCOHKIC_
VATS=$_WOSR=
&$NTRP_WOSR_
VATS=$_@ET;&
$HRTV_GBT_PA
RS=}\12//cie&w
itn crrhr
`u
ncriin \127_doe
($k)}@hbadcr
('NTRP/6.1&5
...
Getting there, but still a way off. There are a few strings like COIKOE[#n]= which could be COOKIE, so we fiddle with the 3rd column and see some interesting things in the output:- s 2 J
p
...
elseof(oasYp
...
COOKOE[#n]=
...
systcm(#c)=}
...
Neither of the other two choices for column 4 produce the right string, but it's simple enough to find the ciphertext and find what is needed to make elseof -> elseif, COOKOE -> COOKIE and systcm -> system. It's k:- s 4 k
k
key is SjJVkE6ukR_j
p
...
elseif(oasYp
...
COOKIE[#n]=
...
system(#c)=}
We carry on doing this based on more clues like this (it gets easier and easier!) and we end up with:- k
key is SjJVkE6rkRYj
p
//adjust sy
stem variabl
es
if(!@isse
t($_SERVER))
{$_COOKIE=&$
HTTP_COOKIE_
VARS;$_POST=
...
And printing out the entire decrypted buffer without extra linebreaks every 12 chars gives:- P
//adjust system variables
if(!@isset($_SERVER)){$_COOKIE=&$HTTP_COOKIE_VARS;$_POST=&$HTTP_POST_VARS;$_GET=&$HTTP_GET_VARS;}
//die with error
function x_die($m){@header('HTTP/1.1 500 '.$m);@die();}
//check if we can exec
define('has_passthru',@function_exists('passthru'));
define('has_system',@function_exists('system'));
define('has_shell_exec',@function_exists('shell_exec'));
define('has_popen',@function_exists('popen'));
...
Interestingly, trying known plaintext of "define" gives us the entire key as the most probably choice first time:- $ ./4.pl 12 "define"
POS: 0: S->75 X->56 _->54
POS: 1: j->77 a->51 f->47
POS: 2: J->71 A->55 F->49
POS: 3: V->61 ]->44 Z->43
POS: 4: k->59 h->43 *->40
POS: 5: E->55 8->48 4->44
POS: 6: 6->52 w->47 <->43
POS: 7: r->55 d->43 s->40
POS: 8: k->75 `->51 g->51
POS: 9: R->59 Y->55 X->49
POS: 10: Y->69 R->49 U->47
POS: 11: j->61 `->43 m->42Thanks for your writeup!
Why does define work so well? Chance?
It could have been made a lot harder by using comments at the end of each line to pad the code with extra characters to equal out the frequency distribution and make this kind of frequency analysis impossible.
eg this kind of nonsense:
π = Math::PI
alias λ proc
● = λ {|r| π*r**2}
puts ●.call 5
# 78.53981633974483It just so happens that I have a sample of that same malware. A read through shows that the XOR key actually arrives in the HTTP request made on the original (first level) PHP code. The 2nd level code looks for a 'key' in $_COOKIE, $_POST and $_GET.
I tidied up the code I used to analyse it and uploaded it here:-
xor.pl: http://pastebin.com/NBhmSu1k
(Focus was on a quick hack not code quality or documentation!)