The second nit with AES-GCM is that, as integrated in TLS, implementations are free to use a random nonce value. However, the size of this nonce (8 bytes) is too small to safely support using this mode. Implementations that do so are at risk of a catastrophic nonce reuse after sending on the order of a terabyte of data on a single connection. This issue can be resolved by using a counter for the nonce but using random nonces is the most common practice at this time.
I don't know how do you integrate AES-GCM with TLS, but I have to say
1. The secure AES-GCM supports 96-bit nonces. It's 12 bytes, not 8 bytes mentioned in the article.
2. Nonce is nonce. It shouldn't be chosen at random (as random IVs). As long as nonces are not reused, GCM should be secure.
3. I don't believe implementing a secure random number generator is more efficient than maintaining an incremental counter.
Edited for typos