Nokia denies giving deep packet inspection technology to Iran
nokiasiemensnetworks.com
nokiasiemensnetworks.com
We've built an entire cottage industry of "network security tools", many of dubious operational value, that all depend on being able to indiscriminately peek inside of TCP streams. It's easy to justify deployment of wiretap appliances inside of enterprises, who after all own the network connections they're snooping on, and have legitimate reasons to want to inspect what comes in and out.
But note well: when we started designing these tools, the Internet was much less important than it is now. Almost all digital communications happens over IP nowadays. We weren't anticipating a world in which things like Twitter and Facebook would be the key lifelines political movements in repressive countries.
So I have to wonder whether:
* The engineering teams that continue developing wiretap appliances (like SourceFire/Snort, or Arbor's DPI product line) have dedicated real dev cycles to building controls into their products to ensure they aren't abused, the same way "Lawful Intercept" engineers for Motorola and Nokia have to for their products.
* The sales teams for these products have official company guidance on what applications they'll sell their products for; will the EMEA regional sales director for a deep packet company sell wiretap appliances to resellers who aren't contractually prohibited to sell to Iran?
Twitter has been great in getting news out but just as bad at propagating over the top panic myths :(