I don't know that he would agree with me, but EY's argument seems to me to boil down to: without a formal specification of goals, we won't know how to predict a system's actions, and not knowing how to predict a system's actions when that system is better at reaching its goals than you are is very likely to make any bug a (literally) fatal one.
Humans have a vast network of shared implicit goals and norms, such that we know that satisfying a goal of "end poverty" doesn't justify "kill all the poor". It's easy to wave your hands and say that by the time we approach human-level AI it will necessarily have all the features of human intelligence, but what if it doesn't?
Sometimes various people have referred to "optimization process" rather than "intelligence" to try to get this point across. What if it's possible to build an optimization process that is better, or far better, at solving problems than humans? Planes are much better at flying fast and far than birds, but often don't bother with some of the things that all birds have, like movable wings and feathers. I believe that Eliezer thinks that the things that make us human are feathers, analogously.
Even if you think there's only a small chance of this, the chance that a program more intelligent than humans will have things that humans consider bugs is very high, and the consequences are an existential risk.