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So, one additional way to secure your bitcoins would be to have a "deadman's switch" machine with a copy of your wallet. If you don't enter a passphrase into the machine by a certain date, then it will transfer your wallet's contents to another "bugout" wallet. This invalidates the seized copy of your wallet. Companies that offer this service should also offer a feature that causes "anonymous donations" to appear in your legal defense fund.

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> Companies that offer this service

You can't possibly trust any company with this kind of service. This is something you need to [learn how to] build yourself.

The concept of "deadman's switch" has an implicit component of "trust no one", IMHO.

> You can't possibly trust any company with this kind of service.

That's a good point. However, the Swiss made a lot of money offering comparable services for many years. (Numbered bank accounts.) Also, there's a big difference between simply building such a service and having such a service that is well tested and reliably and securely hosted. It's also a relatively simple matter to test such a service with a small amount of money.

Such services seem highly valuable, but may require practical homomorphic encryption/computation schemes to be themselves practical.

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