It's worth noting that even Christensen didn't think the iPhone would be a success.[0]
[0] http://stratechery.com/2013/clayton-christensen-got-wrong/
It's worth noting that even Christensen didn't think the iPhone would be a success.[0]
[0] http://stratechery.com/2013/clayton-christensen-got-wrong/
The iPhone (mandated) plan from AT&T was $20/mo for data, including 200 texts.
Even if I didn't prefer the iPhone, that cost differential was a no-brainer to me.
[1]'cheap' initial payment with an expensive mobile contract.
I speak as someone whose first iPhone was a 3G, but I think it's possible that the price drop was part of the plan all along. It was be a smart price segmentation move: get everyone who's unbearably keen to pay a whole lot, then move on to people who are bit less unbearably keen at a slightly lower price.
You already needed to pay for a phone, so the real price compared to a portable was just how much more expensive the iPhone was compared to a standard mobile phone.
Due to the system with 2 year phone contracts in USA, that extra price was low.
The disruption in the iPhone was technical, social, political and economic.
[0] http://reviews.cnet.com/smartphones/at-t-8525/4505-6452_7-32...
The functionality was really already there. The "disruption" was aesthetics, marketing and ease-of-use.
And in the end, it's a phone, not a cultural revolution.
While I think this is mostly true (Nokia fans love to point out that every possible smartphone feature appeared on at least one Nokia product which may have shipped in the 1800s), there is one way in which this simply is not true, and it's a way which really did change everything.
The browser.
The difference in 2007 between browsing on the iPhone and browsing on any other phone was kind of like, well, comparing desktop Safari in 2007 to trying to browse in 2007 with Netscape 4. Maybe not quite that good. Phones often had only one font available to them, had very limited CSS support, often had no Javascript support. Windows Phone and the Nokia Communicator were the best of what had been out before then, and to say "they were for nerds" is an understatement. Only nerds would tolerate them.
Look at articles after the iPhone's introduction about data usage -- it absolutely skyrocketed, and it was all being driven by the browser. For the first time people actually had a real web browser in their pocket, and it really did make all the difference.
It wasn't just a phone by any stretch -- what made it disruptive was that browser in combination with the touch UI (by far the best way to use a browser on a pocket-sized screen). Revolutionary, or evolutionary? You can make a case either way, but the iPhone didn't upend the smartphone market just because it was pretty and had great advertisements.
And the fact that the old windows phones crashed daily. Was riddled with bugs (some never got fixed) and from an accessibility point of view was a terrible piece of hardware. Good riddance.
Apple made the smart phone easy to use, and gave it much needed elegance. Over night it turned the smart phone market into a consumer smart phone market.
Now it seems like "most people" have a smartphone of one type or another. That's a huge change.
The iPhone (and smartphones in general) have disrupted multiple markets: * Photography and video * Portable music players * Email and messaging devices * Phones ... and many others
The thought I ran into many times with many people during this "disruption" period basically went along the lines of:
"I could buy a new camera, a video camera, a new iPod, a netbook, GPS device, etc - or I could just get an iPhone."
The old windows mobile was a complete dog. Let's take just one example, individual processes could only be allocated up to 32 megabytes of RAM. Really. That's one reason why it could never have run a decent browser, or really a decent anything else. That alone rendered it fundamentally crippled compared to iOS full 32 bit preemptive multitasking kernel. Yes iOS is fully multitasking, only user apps are restricted in their multitasking privileges by the sand boxing system, but background services have none if those limitations.
It was limitations like this that meant projects like Courier would never have been able to compete with iOS. It's why Microsoft had no choice but to develop an entirely new OS core for their mobile platform, losing crucial years of competitiveness.
Google was lucky. Although Android was never originally intended to use multitouch gestures or an accelerated UI layer, at least it was based on a Linux core so had the fundamental technical underpinnings to support competitive application level services. This gave Android a few years head start on Microsoft, even though they were a few years behind Apple, just enough for them to occupy the low end of the market and eventually mount a credible challenge in the mid and high end.
In all of Christensen's examples cited in “The Innovator’s Solution”, the incumbents tended to move upmarket at the time the disruption was introduced. In the case of the cellphone industry, the incumbents were moving downmarket.
This is important because it shows that a company wanting to disrupt an industry needs to position themselves at the opposite end of the prevailing market direction.
But simply zagging while the industry is zigging isn't enough - the disrupting company also needs to employ the appropriate strategy at the same time. Hence, if your disruption is targeted to the cheap end of the market, then Christensen's "good enough" strategy is absolutely the correct one. But, if your disruption is targeted to the high end of the market, as Apple's iPhone was, then you better be offering a degree of quality that no one dreamed of offering.
This kind of deflates Christensen's compelling rhetoric somewhat. Before Christensen's books, conventional marketing was that in order to succeed, you should see where the industry is headed, and track in the opposite direction. Position yourself against your competitors, not be like them.
While BlackBerry was guided to omit consumer features from its enterprise buyers, Nokia never secured enterprise buyers of any significance
I wonder if BlackBerry would've prospered by doubling down on enterprise buyers, maintaining their keyboards, and ignoring the consumer market. From what I can tell, BlackBerry haphazardly attacked the consumer market where Apple was the strongest.
[1] To some extent Blackberry did this. While they did launch consumer models, their enterprise sales force remained strong, and new enterprise-friendly features kept shipping.
The essentially feature-free RAZR flip-phone was $600 without a contract and sold like hotcakes.
A disruptive product is one that the public cannot conceive of, such that its introduction alters the standards in an industry.
A better product is the HTC8525[0] over the HTC8500. A disruptive product is the HTC8525 versus the iPhone.
[0]http://reviews.cnet.com/smartphones/at-t-8525/4505-6452_7-32... - The leading WinMo smartphone in Q4 2006, pre-iPhone.
I can go into detail, but the standard ideas for Disruption tend to be technical in nature whereas the iPhone was a profound multi-faceted assault on the world. There are so many elements of this attack, it's hard to know where to begin, but it was certainly more than just a newfound set of components (a lot of the iPhones physical technology was not new).
But, I hear and agree with your point. Guyzero makes a great post above and it's certainly worth reading :).
If you built a hovercraft, it would destroy the car market, and everyone would expect that. But Blackberry did not expect the iPhone to kill them---there were all sorts of business-y feautures it lacked. "Blackberries are fine!" said RIM's customers.
And that is worth naming, I think. We have a whole jargon around the startup ideal of constant, low-level iteration, when that is precisely what screwed Blackberry.
it's an interesting thought experiment to consider if the iPhone would have succeeded if instead of Apple it had been put out by, say, Danger.
1) The ecosystem did not spring into life with the iPhone; a lot of vendors were unsure initially but there was obviously tremendous benefit to Apple due to the iPod industry.
2) Danger would not have been able to launch the iPhone for a multitude of reasons. Even as a part of Microsoft, they couldn't have done it. I could go really in-depth here, but Microsoft is really bad at Art and Politics, which I would argue were the keys to the iPhones success.
3) The iPhone is a triumph for a number of reasons, but I tend to think the social conventions the iPhone destroyed were the most interesting part. I mean, I was working at AT&T when the iPhone dropped.
Before the iPhone:
* Everything was free phone at the low end and $199 at the top end
* Apps were pre-loaded onto phones
* Carriers drove handset manufacturers choice of OS
* No one ever waited for a phone
* Manufacturers did not care about UI/UX
* Phones sold on spec sheets
After the iPhone:
* Most people forget that the iPhone launched at a price point of $499 with no subsidy. They failed but this was Apple's attempt to kill free phones, and they (sort of) did.
* App store (year 2)
* Manufacturers drove handset sales to Operators (and outside of operators)
* People line up for phones all the time
* Everyone cares about UI/UX
* Phones sell by Operating System (And UI/UX)
I could go on and on. There are so many things that changed because of design decisions by Cupertino.
No, Danger could not have done the iPhone. Not because of technical limitations, but because of politics. Wresting that much power out of such a reinforced fiefdom was a herculean effort with commensurate results.
Appreciate the insight though friend :).
* Everything was free phone at the low end and $199 at the top end
One of my friends bought a Palm Phone.
* Apps were pre-loaded onto phones
This may be true.
* Carriers drove handset manufacturers choice of OS
Maybe handset manufacturers, Palm, Blackberry, Nokia had their own OS.
* No one ever waited for a phone
This may be true.
* Manufacturers did not care about UI/UX
I read lots of reviews where people praised the Nokia UI over the alternatives.
* Phones sold on spec sheets
Spec Sheets?
I really don't think this was true for people I knew. People I knew bought phones as Jewelery. They wanted small size, and long battery life.
Those companies had their own OS but their content, schema and layouts were dictated by carriers. Only phones that were sold outside of carrier shops enjoyed true independence and those were few and far between.
People praised the Nokia UI, but where could you buy a high end Nokia phone when they were locked out of US carriers?
Spec sheets sold. Things like battery life were more important than OS. I think we're in agreement here.
I just think we had a different viewpoint on the industry. I sold thousands - tens of thousands of phones in the mid 2000's so I'm really familiar with the market at that time, but the view from my position is not a consumer viewpoint.
From the book, via Wikipedia:
"Generally, disruptive innovations were technologically straightforward, consisting of off-the-shelf components put together in a product architecture that was often simpler than prior approaches. They offered less of what customers in established markets wanted and so could rarely be initially employed there. They offered a different package of attributes valued only in emerging markets remote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream."
So the canonical example would be PCs disrupting the market for mainframes or minicomputers. Or as described in the book, less powerful hydraulic excavators disrupting steam-powered excavators. It's a good book, anyone who is interested in the business of technology should read it.
The contradiction is that disruptive products are usually much worse products than the ones they eventually replace. No one who owned a VAX or a mainframe looked at the first IBM PCs and thought that the PC was a "better" product. But the PC started cheaper, stayed cheaper and got better fast enough to displace minicomputers while at the same time opening up an entirely new market for computers that didn't exist before.
So much of this hinges on how you define what "disruptive" means. There's an argument to be made that the iPhone started the trend of phones & tablets disrupting the entire desktop PC industry, starting as "worse" products that eventually replaced the "better" product. I personally don't think you could really say the iPhone "disrupted" Blackberry per se - their relationship is more like early Compaq to IBM where Compaq/Apple put out a much better product that broke down barriers holding the original product back (e.g. Compaq decoupling bus speed from processor speed allowing them to ship a faster computer with an ISA-compatible bus for expansion cards).
Instead, it was obsoletive, like PC vs typewriters - the PC was way more expensive, but could do so much more, and once you had a PC it didn't make much sense to have a typewriter too.