Nokia Admits Giving Misleading Information About Elop's Compensation
forbes.com
forbes.com
What exactly is the benefit of this plan for the Board of Directors? Is it literally the assumption that they were paid far in excess of the money they (I assumed) lost due to the stock tanking.
And finally in a well run market, what is supposed to keep this kind of thing from happening? It seems like having the Board of Directors essentially scuttle a company for their own payoffs is not in the markets best interest, so i assume some mechanism is in place to try to reduce the likelihood of this occurrance.
A fiduciary duty[3] is the highest standard of care at either equity or law. A fiduciary (abbreviation fid) is expected to be extremely loyal to the person to whom he owes the duty (the "principal"): he must not put his personal interests before the duty, and must not profit from his position as a fiduciary, unless the principal consents.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/dole-food-sharehold...
Not a penalty but the beginning of getting one.
I guess it seems to me one can buy a company not for the price of the valuation, but for the price of the board of directors.
He tries to frame the decline of Nokia, its sale, and the market responding positively to that sale, as an "unusual" sequence of events. And therefore explainable only by an internal conspiracy, not the failure of Nokia's business. But when you factor out the ominous tone, there's really nothing unusual about that sequence.
Nokia was already in trouble when they brought on board Elop. He was their hatchet man. It shouldn't be that surprising that they incentivized him to handle the sale of the company well if it came to that.
Seriously, these events are things many of us saw as soon as he put a foot on Nokia. We have been calling him a Trojan Horse since then, and with Nokia bought and Elop back at Microsoft as Head of Devices with a juicy check who can say we were mistaken? I even bought a Nokia N9 last year considering it my farewell to a once great company destined to be a part of Microsoft. And I'm hardly a clairvoyant.
I'm not exactly a gigantic Elop fan but Nokia was in trouble long before he came on board. Consider this headline from his hiring in 2010: "Nokia Hires Microsoft's Elop as CEO to Reverse Losses to Apple". A top Nokia shareholder said, "Earlier management grossly underestimated the challenges related to moving from a hardware-driven business model to software." And Elop: "My job is to take the organization through a period of disruption..." [1]
That's what's at the core of this, a kind of denial about Nokia's condition pre-Elop. Fans want to pretend everything was hunky-dorey and make the hatchet man the scapegoat.
But really, Nokia fumbled their chance to build a smartphone platform several years ago. And one could definitely argue that Elop's bet on Microsoft's platform was a better shot at a profitable strategy than competing with Samsung in the Android space. (Have you considered that's why the board brought him on in the first place?) Didn't work out so well but probably neither would have becoming yet another Android player.
[1] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-10/nokia-hires-microso...
I acknowledge Nokia's situation in 2010, but I think you are taking the other extreme of considering Nokia already doomed by that time. By the time Elop entered Nokia it still was the largest mobile phone maker in unit sales and Samsung had just entered the smartphone sector a year before. And though a promising entrant, Samsung wasn't that big of a threat until much later.
Look at the article you linked, or Elop's memo, they don't even mention Samsung or Galaxy phones (just Android in general terms). At that time Android was low-hanging fruit to be put on their phones and leverage their market leadership. The first Galaxy phones weren't exactly a paramount of excellence. I don't think it's very unrealistic to think that they could have competed with Samsung in more or less equal terms for Android dominance.
And I'm telling this without being exactly an Android fan, but at that time it was the most sensible course of action (IMHO). They could have even tried both Android and Windows Phone (something Samsung did) and see what sticked.
Instead, they chose to stop Symbian and Meego and took the strange decision of betting the future of the company on the all new Windows Phone 7, something which can only be described as an enormous gamble. Those first phones couldn't even be upgraded to Windows Phone 8 when it came out afterwards, and I'm not even mentioning the incompatibilities between those two. Talk about a burning platform.
Finally Strike Four is that they bet the company on Microsoft delivering products in a timely fashion and maybe letting them be first. Except what is MICROSOFT's incentive to DELIVER a compelling product when they really want your price to fall so you are cheap to buy.
Look at Microsoft's history in mobile: Orange? Danger Sidekick? Kin? and several others... Microsoft kills its partners. Was the Nokia board so foolish to think it wouldn't happen to them. This is as entertaining as Taylor Swift dating John Mayer and watching everybody cry from"broken hearts" when the cheating starts... It's not like you knew who you were getting in bed with.
Just found this money quote from Elop:
For Elop, it was all about standing out from the crowd, and he admitted that Nokia couldn't do that with Android. "The single most important word is 'differentiation,' " he said. "Entering the [Android] environment late, we knew we would have a hard time differentiating."
Source: http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57559620-94/nokia-on-the-ed...
Instead of the popular and proven OS with many apps they chose the unpopular and unknown one with just a few. And in the end, what's the advantage of the Windows-only strategy when Microsoft gives licenses to Samsung and HTC to produce phones with the exact same OS? They haven't differentiate themselves at all from the competition, just cornered themselves.
I sense a possible flaw in that logic.
That's huge leap of logic. Android has a larger market share. Android vendors don't automatically get more market share. They still have to outcompete the other vendors.
Given how commodified the Android space is, it's not surprising they saw the Windows hail mary as a relatively more differentiated approach. Obviously not as differentiated as a proprietary approach, but given they couldn't pull that one together in time, they didn't exactly have a plethora of awesome options. Become yet another commodity Android vendor, or try to be the "Samsung of the 3rd platform" so to speak.
Too bad that 3rd platform didn't work out. It was a risky bet, but probably the only shot at a sustainable business. Really their fate was sealed a long time ago when they missed the shift towards sophisticated software platforms.
The market's big enough for another android player, especially if it can provide the kind of hardware that Nokia provides.
There's a reason why all the Lumia commercials have focused on hardware rather than software. The technical merits of Windows Phone 8 aside, it doesn't seem to have much consumer appeal compared to iOS or Android.
It seems awfully strange that Nokia's board would incentivise the decline of their own company, but I disagree that the sequence of events that played out was unlikely: Nokia was way behind Apple and Android when Elop joined, and the devastating fall in market-share and share price, followed by acquisition, is more-or-less the same thing that's played out with Blackberry.
In US: [1] http://www.businessinsider.com/android-versus-iphone-smartph...
Global: [2] http://bgr.com/2011/05/19/android-grabs-53-of-global-smartph...
I couldn't find BRICS-specific numbers or I would post them too, but I'd like to see any reputable source that they had anything close to a 60% marketshare in a non-dumbphone category.
Edit: Found this link for China. Hard to believe the the other countries would swing the shift so dramatically. http://www.phonearena.com/news/In-China-Android-is-blowing-a...
Also remember that mid-2011 Symbian manufacturing stopped (thus all new sales at the end of the year were of old phones already shipped).
Yet from your own link, it states that Symbian still was ahead of iOS.
Anyway, I DO have numbers from Brazil: http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/03/android-smartphone-sales-le...
(some other numbers I had were also from Kantar, unfortunately their site is TERRIBLE)
Note that in 2012 Brazil STILL HAD 22% of new Smartphones being Symbian.
Also, several other countries in 2011 still had some good Symbian numbers (like first or second place).
Suddenly stopping selling Symbian to switch to WP7 made no sense, even worse when claimed it was to make it different (when other manufacturers ALSO made WP7 phones).
I just wish I could find the 2010 and 2011 numbers for all the BRICS again, but today that is seemly very hard :(
Plus, did you ever use an actual Symbian smart phone? I used this one for a bit (http://reviews.cnet.com/smartphones/nokia-e7-dark-gray/4505-...) and it was just terrible. And it was probably one of the top 5 best Symbian models!
We really liked them... Powerful enough to play a J2ME port of Counter-Strike but affordable.
iOS is still beyond 90% of the population income or somehing like that.
But to say that Elop sank Nokia is to ignore the trend of the company's financial performance leading up to that point.
(minor edit, redundancy)
1. The Meego smartphones were selling well, and could have been continued.
2. Android-based products could have been added to the product line at relatively little cost.
While this is all theoretical, we do know other OEMs, like Sony and LG, have had strong comebacks with Android products, and several other OEMs have broken into the top 10 with Android, all despite Samsung's dominance.
It was in serious financial trouble, but it still ruled the world.
This should be the headline, especially since it's far more insightful than the fact that it was a simple oversight.
Driving Nokia off a cliff or flushing Nokia down the toilet would also be acceptable.
One has to wonder where the line gets drawn between ignorance and malice.
* The board approached Elop to take on a risky position: a failing company losing marketshare.
* Elop says, "Well - I'm willing to give it a shot, but this is pretty bad. I need something in the contract that will allow me to actually make some money in the event that all else fails, and sale is the only option."
The CEO in this kind of structure does not unilaterally make major business decisions. He is advised by the board - in fact he serves at the whim of the board - and they generally can stop anything they don't agree with.
Now if we had a scenario where every board member had asimilar clause, then the idea that he deliberately drove the company into the ground would have more merit. But to me it just seems like a clause that any reasonable person would want before taking the helm of a sinking ship.
If he's being hired to fix the company and has a clause that guarantees compensation if he fails, that would seem to create a perverse incentive. Why does he get paid extra for doing a bad job?
(That's only somewhat a rhetorical question - I believe it's a matter of record with the SEC if anyone cares to look it up. )
I really dont know, but will say seems crazy that Nokia didn't have at least a small team dedicated to making an android OS 'port' for their devices. It seems like even if they thought it was a 1% chance of windows mobile not working out for them the hedge would have been worth it.
But all the terms of those contracts were never revealed. I've seen it mentioned in the press that Nokia can re-enter the handset business in 2016, that Nokia owns part of Jolla, and that Nokia ported Android to several phones, which may have had a role in inducing Microsoft to buy the handset business.
Elop did have such a team working on an Android port.
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/behind-microsoft-de...
http://www.theverge.com/2013/9/13/4728184/microsoft-surface-...
The snarky tone of the author is getting in the way of the message, it is obvious he is a Finn and is emotionally invested in Nokia. Please do some analysis for us, you are writing on Forbes, rather than regurgitating original article, 1) what was the share price drop, 2) How was it accomplished, 3)How the share bounced back and how was it accomplished. It would make the collusion of quid pro quo more obvious. Right now, it can be a mere coincidence too.
WP is a disaster, Nokia is dead, Ballmer is forced out, yet you still believe it is "gaining ground" ? Of course WP ramped up,from 0 ,any product can ramp up. Let's stop the whole PR, WP is a failure, it is time for anybody who invested in WP eco system to acknowledge that fact. This whole enterprise was designed to fail, because nobody wants Windows on his phone.
From http://www.wpcentral.com/kantar-windows-phone-hitting-8-perc...
Kantar Worldpanel - July 2013 Windows Phone Share by country
Germany: 8.8% (+2.6% YoY)
GB: 9.2% (+5% YoY)
France: 11% (+7.4% YoY)
Italy: 7.8% (-0.5% YoY)
Spain: 1.8% (+0.1% YoY)
USA: 3.5% (+0.5% YoY)
China: 2.4% (-2.2% YoY)
Australia: 7.4% (+2.4% YoY)
Mexico: 12.5% (+10.5% YoY)
>The biggest and most impressive individual gains were seen in Mexico (12.5%) and France (11%) where double digit Windows Phone sales figures were finally reached.
They had a headstart with smartphone-like OS. But other than N900, they didn't really use it anywhere.
Still there is no denying that what has happened with Nokia's phone division was a tragedy, and a completely avoidable one at that.
I think the fundamental issue most people are having is that it seems like the board decided that the company should be sold at penny's on the dollar while they felt it could have been sold at nickles on the dollar.
There is nothing unusual in it other than the emotions sparked by the names of the companies involved in the planned sale.
I think the new Blackberry CEO had a similar offer. In case of a buyout, he ges paid.