Open Letter From UK Security Researchers
bristolcrypto.blogspot.co.uk
bristolcrypto.blogspot.co.uk
I think we need a legal solution, but if the tech community refuses to participate in corrupting the technology, it puts the spooks in a worse position. I'd sign a pledge saying I will never work on any apparatus (software, data centers, anything at all) that are used for mass surveillance. That's pretty easy for me to do though... the money government throws at some companies and people for this work is more tempting than the One Ring.
http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/politics/surveillance.pdf
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announce...
More like this couldn't hurt.
Anybody that ever worked on Hadoop could not sign such a pledge.
Anybody that ever worked on Linux could not sign such a pledge.
Anybody that ever worked on solr could never sign such a pledge.
And so on. You get the idea, it is not possible to contribute to open source projects that have applications in large scale data storage, mining, generalized operating system work and so on without as a side effect making the apparatus of mass surveillance possible.
The only safeguards that will really work are very strict legal ones, transparency and accountability. As long as the last two are not present the first is meaningless (which is the situation we are currently in).
(This is not a serious suggestion)
If I make something that gets co-opted for use in surveillance, fine. But if, for example, I accept a grant from the NSA or GCHQ to improve Hadoop in some specific way, I've crossed a line.
I'm not going to say anyone who ever worked on designing a computer is complicit, but I don't think it's unreasonable to avoid working for companies that supply tons of computers for surveillance. Like I said, it's a tough sell to people who have families to support, but I don't think it's crazy to quit working for certain companies based on the revenue they get from the NSA and related agencies.
There was a time in my life that I would have contracted for the NSA or Booz Allen, I'm fairly sure. Given the revelations, and also given my current financial circumstances, I would not today.
Software that blocks access to adult material for school networks, spam filtering software, any sort of contextual advertising software, web analytics, all of these have many traits of, or are, surveillance software, but I allow myself to be monitored by them all, knowingly.
I don't see a problem with schools and offices filtering inappropriate material, reading email for certain purposes, tracking users, etc, as long as users are aware of these practices, and are willing to trade that element of their freedom for the service being provided. The only practical way forward with any anti-surveillance movement is to focus on legislation, and tools to detect (and under appropriate circumstances) evade surveillance - e.g. I might use Tor at home, but would allow my work email to be read if required.
> Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.
Which people usually assume includes the US. Well... I guess you could argue otherwise now. It was demonstrated that even encrypted data is not protected while sending it to the other side. Can we start referring to the DPA every time some storage of the UK personal data is done in AWS, or similar hosting?
Technically there is some kind of agreement about data security, but it's absolutely worthless. If the NSA comes knocking on Google's door and asks for complete information about UK citizens interaction with the UK government web presence then Google is going to cough up everything. What choice do they have? Larry Page isn't going to martyr himself over what would be a totally legal NSA request.
> (2) Subject to subsection (4), a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that exemption from all or any of the provisions mentioned in subsection (1) is or at any time was required for the purpose there mentioned in respect of any personal data shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
Also such certificate is not a secret and can be challenged. IANAL, so correct me if I got this wrong.
I feel that to feel really protected against the NSA in the future we'll need something like that, along with starting to demand open source firmware from all hardware vendors. In the meantime we can use ECDHE to encrypt all sessions.
[2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8EGA834Nok&feature=youtu.be&...
Bruce Schneier recommends against ECC in [1]:
> Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems
> over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have
> constants that the NSA influences when they can.
> I no longer trust the constants. I believe the
> NSA has manipulated them through their relationships
> with industry.
Second, the CurveCP "constants" aren't NIST derived; they're Bernstein's Curve25519, which is derived transparently from first-principles math.
Third, there are standardized NIST curves (over binary fields) that are also derived transparently from first-principles.
Fourth, the curves that aren't totally transparent are still derived from a SHA hash of random string, per the method in IEEE 1363 (which in 1363's context makes perfect sense, since you can't really generate "fresh" curves for applications from first principles without everyone ending up with the same curves). The backdoor scenarios here are... convoluted.
The more you learn about the situation with NIST ECC, the less likely an overt backdoor seems. Maybe academia has missed something big, and all of ECC is broken; if that's the case, I think you should kiss conventional IFP and DLP crypto guby too.