What Gladwell is Missing: Institutional Memory
billmill.org
billmill.org
The whole point of the article is that in areas of competition or warfare, very often, one side lives (and sometimes dies) by obeying rules that don't actually exist. Goliath thought that, win or lose, the battle should happen hand to hand and David knew to use a sling and a rock to his advantage.
When one side is playing by a certain set of rules that the other side doesn't have to acknowledge, then the side with fewer rules has an advantage. That's the point.
What he is essentially saying is that in any two team dynamic system you can gain a short term advantage by playing the suboptimal strategy. In this case it's not going to work next year, because most teams will train how to beat it.
It's like telling your military to charge the opposition. This may surprise them, and you might win, because the opposition isn't expecting it. But next time don't expect it to work.
The other example Gladwell referenced was of a naval simulation primarily played by people well versed in military strategy. While most players used traditional strategies seen throughout history, one player found that the optimal strategy was something that would never work in real life, but was totally feasible within the rules of the game. The other players cried foul because he went against the "spirit" of the game, despite not breaking any rules.
Again, the point of the article: The best way to win is to not limit yourself by rules that don't exist.
[edit] I realize we're talking about two different things. I don't really have an opinion either way in regards to running the full court press more often at other levels of competitive basketball. I still think people are missing the point of the original article, and Gladwell isn't helping himself by going on about the full court press thing.
- rules that competitors limit themselves to despite the fact that they aren't explicitly laid out
- don't train to defend against the suboptimal strategy
While the correct answer may be the first, logic suggests it's the latter, as it's much simpler.
I think that in jumping from his evidence to his conclusion he missed the point.
Mill criticizes the article by saying that no team has made it to the NBA championships by using the full court press. It seems that Mill has missed the whole point of the article: if you are going to lose, do something different. You can beat the incumbents by introducing disruptive technology.
Rather, I say if you're going to lose, build for the future. Don't optimize for seventh instead of ninth place, try to win the championship a few years from now.
In something like business, or in Gladwell's example lower level sports, this is not the case. Small schools will always be small, they will always have fewer kids to pick from for their team and thus need to get unorthodox to gain an edge.
In the business world, if I'm competing with 20 people vs 20,000 people I need to get unorthodox to shake things up, even if my solution isn't perfectly optimal.
Nonetheless, I think my point in the conclusion holds: if a company is not optimizing what you think they should be optimizing, you're more likely expecting the wrong goal than they are failing to optimize for the goal you expect.
Dean Oliver used to write "The Journal of Basketball Studies" (http://www.rawbw.com/~deano/ ), and I recall him making the point that the press basically randomizes games. If you are a poor team, that _will_ help you win more games. But perhaps developing a culture that randomizes games isn't going to lead you to championships.
Not sure I buy the argument, but it deserves more thought, and is certainly better than you are making out.
However, the story of David and Goliath is not one of trying new techniques after failed attempts with old ones, it is the story of an act of God (and possibly technology.)
Additionally his basketball example doesn't work.
I think his point is as simple as: "when what you're trying doesn't work, try something new."
Terrific!
But the objection is with the clarity of his examples.
The basketball team didn't win because it decided to use a full court press.
Reread the story. The kids trained so they could run a full court press the whole game. The other teams didn't have the athletic ability to keep up.
You can't just play the game differently. You have to do what it takes to be successful playing the game differently.
So his argument was unclear?
He says it explicitly.
The guy who trained his girls to do it says it explicitly. "I have them running around for hours" etc. and that other coaches A) don't train their kids to have that level of athletic endurance, and B) don't respond to the use of the strategy by changing their routines.
If people miss it, they are either bad at reading comprehension or deliberately wanting to misunderstand to lampoon Gladwell.
I'm not a huge Gladwell fan. I felt totally ripped off by Blink. But I was pleasantly surprised by the essay.
I didn't think so. Then again, I read the story as written instead of treating it as a basketball lesson and changing the facts to fit my world view.
I've no doubt that a full court press can be broken with sufficient skill and althetic ability and that a broken press is worse than no press. (I suspect that that's why NBA teams rarely use the press.)
However, if your opponents don't have that skill/ability, using the press apparently does put them at a disadvantage. That disadvantage may be sufficient to make up for other advantages that they have.
I find the "optimal" talk somewhat amusing.
We're talking about playing an opponent that has made certain decisions. You can win by taking advantage of those decisions. It doesn't matter what would happen against a different opponent until you run into said opponent.
That's especially true of perfect opponents. The fact that one strategy would fail worse than another against a perfect opponent doesn't matter unless you're playing a perfect opponent. Since they rarely exist and you're going to lose anyway, worrying about them seems dumb.
In some sense, there are no points for approximating optimality.
You're rarely playing an optimal opponent and there are no points for "optimality".