Tor is really shitty against the NSA. Tor offers almost no protection what so ever against a globally passive adversary who can see all packets going into and exiting the Tor network.
You better believe the NSA can do this
You better believe the NSA can do this
Regardless, even if the hidden service is a node itself, a passive observer can still do traffic correlation attacks. It just requires more resources.
[0]https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en [1]https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
You are correct that a HS node doesn't have to be a bridge, etc. But it is a good idea to mask the traffic.
The keylength is a "known weakness" to the developers and, while the plan is to eventually shift to longer keylengths, I don't believe there is any goal or deadline for that to happen.