Enough people using strong encryption (both for data over the wire and data at rest) makes big-data collection (can't dedupe random noise) and processing/datamining prohibitively expensive if not impossible.
Nobody is getting in trouble for moving their data and services offshore.
Aside from that? I'd suggest finding a few friendly people in various countries and establish a constant /dev/urandom | ssh | > /dev/null stream when your internet connection is idle.
But if you start talking about a movie, where they plan to detonate a dirty bomb in Times Square or something...
Emacs automates this with M-x spook:
morse War on Terrorism encryption Forte Blowpipe LLNL John Kerry Albright Kh-11 22nd SAS ANC Semtex SEAL Team 6 smuggle CIA
Also, everyone here from the US has placed a phone call to their representatives to politely, succinctly, and clearly state their opposition to this stuff, right? Ultimately, a political solution is best. False positives make them waste their time, and there are a lot of them who probably really do care about catching genuinely bad people who want to do bad stuff. Just that they need less secrecy, more focus, and much more oversight.
Hmm.. here's a silly idea.
A peer to peer network, let's go with a cool web-2.0-ey name like Chaffr, that assigns you a GUID and establishes a stream of truly random (or pseudorandom) data which is propagated out via a P2P system kinda the same way Tor nodes communicate with each other.
This stream of noise is generated and runs 24x7. Might require a hardware dongle of some kind to keep the entropy pool full enough.
This data is random for the most part, but if you have the GUID of another user, you can send them messages which will be encoded into the stream and received by the other person either immediately, at a set time, or at a random time inside a given window.
Garbage, uncompressable, unusable data for the snoops (and the nature of the system as explained in the Snowden leaks will require them to store every useless byte), an anonymous, decentralized communication network for everyone else.
Here was my output:
national information infrastructure Ceridian INSCOM supercomputer AIEWS Afghanistan Blowpipe chameleon man sweep M-14 hackers Roswell lock picking codes spies
second time:
world domination cracking Operation Iraqi Freedom IRA Reno analyzer M-14 David John Oates electronic surveillance pipeline INS security Tony Blair national information infrastructure ASLET
""" spook is an interactive compiled Lisp function.
(spook)
Adds that special touch of class to your outgoing mail. """
; Variables
(defgroup spook nil
"Spook phrase utility for overloading the NSA line eater."
:prefix "spook-"
:group 'games)
(defcustom spook-phrases-file (expand-file-name "spook.lines" data-directory)
"Keep your favorite phrases here."
:type 'file
:group 'spook)
(defcustom spook-phrase-default-count 15
"Default number of phrases to insert."
:type 'integer
:group 'spook)
Looks like it'd be a good idea to update and expand the spook.lines file.
Sending packets to all contacts at random is a form of introducing white noise, vulnerable to signal processing techniques known and used from 1950s.
E.g. in case of biasing the method towards time of day, the attacker likely can filter it out using fairly basic statistical methods. Generally any kind of pseudo-randomization would render the method vulnerable; at least to the caliber of mathematicians which work at NSA.
If there's messaging system's own statistical analyzer, that learns your communication patterns and adjusts false messaging to rectify that, it could work. However the other messaging clients have to play along, which makes it fairly challenging problem.
> Pond doesn't transmit messages as needed because that would disclose when messages were being sent. Instead it transmits messages at random, whether there's anything to be sent or not. When there's a real message pending, it has to wait until the next randomly timed slot, which could be many minutes.