Now make access to the cameras public.
"What's that new box?"
"We can't say."
"Ooohh, I see. Noted."
Watch the watchers watching.
Now make access to the cameras public.
"What's that new box?"
"We can't say."
"Ooohh, I see. Noted."
Watch the watchers watching.
Though, I suppose if a company suddenly had to take down their datacenter video feed for unspecified reasons, that would be tell tale.
You could trivially defeat that by injecting noise.
You could less trivially defeat that by looking for "random" behavior in the datacenter, such as people walking by, vibrations caused by folks moving about, blinking patterns of the ubiquitous network activity LEDs in your rack and other racks, etc.
I think a loop is trivial to detect.
[I despise the fact that I am making a joke like this, and that it's probably true. I'm writing my folks in congress again.]
Or, the government simply says, "You have to say that the new server is a web server".
This is why I'm always skeptical of things like "warrant canaries" and the like. If the government can require you lie to your customers about whether they're being monitored, surely they can control the terms of disclosure about what's going on?
But honestly, this is getting so ridiculous. How would people know that you'd stopped donating? If you had a webpage that said, "We donated this week", the government could just require you keep putting it up. You could give the EFF the ability to disclose your donation - but what, your customers are going to call the EFF every week? The EFF is going to set up a webpage that your customers are going to go to, in order to verify that your donation was received?
Then, let's say you have 500k customers. You get a FISA request or whatever for 1 of them. You stop donations, some webpage somewhere gets updated, and....what happens, exactly?
First off, the customer would have to want to check however mechanism is available, since you certainly can't notify them. So once they check, what do they know, other than someone on the service has received a government request.
Then, now that they know this, what do they do about it? Migrate off? To whom? If all it takes is one request for customer data to trigger the warrant canary, shit, all the government has to do is make one request for every company with a warrant canary. Now there are no available services.
At which point what do your users do? Do you go with an un-canaried provider? Hope that you're not the target of the warrant?
Then, look at it this way, someone, perhaps a less scrupulous provider, will simply lie about not having received a warrant, in order to get the business.
While it's a fun thought exercise, there's absolutely no practical way to do what people are suggesting without using a system that would be so vulnerable to manipulation as to be useless.