Eventually someone has to trust someone to execute correctly. Unless there's some voting system I'm not aware of that doesn't require humans and is easily verifiable at the point of voting by the average voter.
Eventually someone has to trust someone to execute correctly. Unless there's some voting system I'm not aware of that doesn't require humans and is easily verifiable at the point of voting by the average voter.
Later, after the votes were tallied, the voter could verify that their ballot was (1) counted and (2) counted towards their chosen candidate. But crucially, all they could verify was that the vote counted towards position 1, or position 2, or position 3, ...
The point is that since the voter couldn't prove to a coercing party that the position they voted for was (or was not) the candidate the coercer wanted them to vote for, they were immune to coercion. They could prove that they voted for position 2, sure. But which candidate was at position 2?
The voter knows the truth because they saw the position list. However, until we have mind-reading technology, a coercing party could only take the voter's word.
[2] http://documentation.heliosvoting.org/verification-specs/hel...
[3] http://www.iacr.org/elections/eVoting/finalReportHelios_2010...
[4] http://www.iacr.org/elections/eVoting/heliosDemo.pdf
[5] https://vote.heliosvoting.org/helios/elections/1df69264-0a48...
How many people can verify a digital check-sum?
In contrast regular people usually have the mental capabilities to count votes.
[1]: http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en...
1) Observers at polling stations.
2) Sealed ballot boxes.
3) Observers from many parties and neutrals at counts.
4) Physical votes retained and recountable.
It isn't going to be completely secure but if you measure the systems security by how few people you could rig an election with it is an order of magnitude harder [edit: to rig].