Army restricts access to The Guardian in the wake of NSA leaks

Soldiers have had their mindset irreparably altered and they tend to ally with the institution, even if they don't agree with it - even when their free of it. They have given up most any control they have over themselves or their situation and it pervades their worldview. There are good reasons for this and it makes sense that anything that could possibly chip away at that foundation should be tightly controlled.

    #5 [...] Indignation is reserved for private citizens, so use it on their behalf but don't expect them to rise up in defense of themselves.

...and...

    #7 [...] don't assume that you know better [...] Most rules and regulations are written in blood [...] someone had to die or [...] some major loss of expensive or sensitive hardware [...]

Weighing the difference between the value of inanimate objects and the value of human lives isn't easily quantifiable, but in the military sense the leap is literally made from an ambiguous grey to starkly contrasted blacks and whites. But we're entering into times and places now, where we rely on these inanimate objects to animate themselves according to (sometimes imperfect) artifacts created by people well-removed from the circumstances of a conflict.

In my humble opinion, given the bizarre abstractions that many highly advanced technologies introduce into all spheres of human behavior and activity, and the rapid pace of continued advancement that has transformed how human beings inter-operate in coordinated behavior throughout the world, it feels incredibly dangerous to me, that not just military personnel, but the world at large is disinformed of precisely how decisions to kill and destroy are even made anymore.

Consider that civilian web traffic is being used to indict and adjudicate killing decisions around the world, which would be considered extra-judicial death sentences in the civilian sphere. Consider that the analysis of such web traffic relies on machine learning and algorithms. Consider that even the people that design the machines that govern civilian web traffic can't even instruct each-other on how to exert explicit willful control over these devices, such that no one person can honestly claim that they have total control over a given device resting in the hands of a casual civilian. Consider that we have invasive software designed to sabotage industrial systems, that have accidentally leaked into civilian infrastructure. Consider that no less than a former general and director of the CIA (which advises the pentagon), had his career ended by a political scandal involving gmail.

There's a very complex and disturbing equation emerging here, and as events continue to take shape, I think the more any one person refrains from questioning decisions made at any level in any hierarchy, the more we place all of our lives in jeopardy. This becomes especially true when we have to now question the very nature of some of our so-called "inanimate" objects.

Sorry to be long winded, but certain ideas can't be summed up briefly and easily. Not trying to be an arm chair general, but everyone, including the all military personnel, needs to carefully understand what it means to trust modern electronic devices of any scale or scope, and especially who might be placing trust in electronics, and at what level.

If killing people and breaking things is your bag, then maybe you should go join a motorcycle gang or something. Or move to Somalia, and become a pirate. Just don't expect us to bankroll your activities, and to allow you to keep doing them in our name.

#3 Day job? I don't think there was any such sentiment around me. There are times when grooming standards are relaxed and affordances are made (drinking, for example). But if a soldier held the position that soldiering was a day job they'd be shown the light. Further, I'd like to hear from you regarding the AKO disclaimer that any device connected to the IS is subject to COMSEC monitoring, counterintelligence investigations, personnel misconduct (in particular), and so on. Your personal laptop is authorized for use with AKO. Should your personal laptop be found with Guardian content, as a soldier, you have committed a security violation. You mention in #2 about life becoming miserable. I'm sure you know how hard command can come down on you over a security violation. Linking to the Guardian (tweet, retweet, like, share) constitutes proliferation. In this case, you aren't being protected or helped here. The policy memo and official statement explicitly state that these blocks occur under preexisting filters designed to prevent accidental transfer of classified information to unclassified systems. In other words, the memo states command's classification of Guardian material as classified. I'm pretty certain they class it to the level of the leak. They can't classify by article or it would confirm/deny aspects of the leak. So they broadly classify the Guardian. As you state in #4, reading those documents, reading an article in public domain found on an unclassified system, will fall under UCMJ. Back to the idea of day job, you can't do this on your personal computer at a Starbucks on the weekend, either.

#4 The rules and regulations soldier agree to pertain to classified systems being inappropriate accessed. Soldiers know well the red banner versus the green banner. They don't know they are reading classified information on the Guardian until they are told they are. This is so far removed from what you depict that I do not believe it pertains.

#6 You can go straight to IG but your command won't appreciate not having the heads up. You can go to your congressperson but you had better work through your official channels first. You start with your chain of command. You complain about an overstep of information classification? Senior command explicitly detailed the overstep is lawful. This is no longer open to debate. The congressperson takes counsel on these matters. How many do you suppose would side with a soldier on a classified information matter?

#7 I'm certain your commander would take issue with your characterization that the military exists to kill people and break things. If you voiced something like this during a CA event you'd be reprimanded. My last tour OEF-A began under "find, fix, and finish" ROE. Our patches and kit had skull and daggers markings. Change of command brought change of climate. No more skulls. No more daggers. Consider black roses for symbolism. The new ROE was "find, feel, and understand". You can't make this up. I was combat arms and this was coming from the top. Your sentiment here is out of step despite being sound. I'll tell you a 'rule' written in blood. If you are threatened, engage. If you suspect see a MAM, investigate. If you suspect ordinance, shoot from a distance to prevent trigger. But all of these are violations of ROE. Those rules and regulations weren't written to protect expensive or sensitive hardware. Those were written to protect relations. In many ways they are at the risk to the soldier.

#8 I understand. My points aren't intended to be contentious so much as an illustration of the different set of "BIG PROBLEMS"

So you're saying that because it's classified information, trusted Americans (the soldiers) are going to be prevented access but the rest of the world will be able to read it freely. Yes, that makes perfect sense.

It's still censorship. It's just censorship with a "reasonable" explanation.

Without context it sounds like that phrase describes religious fundamentalists.

Maybe we need to repeat our errors every 3-4 generations to keep them in our society's consciousness.

The government telling people in its employ that they can't read the publication is a different matter from the government telling people they're not allowed to publish.

Why a secret leaked to the public and available to all is still treated as a secret is confusing.

There's an old saying... There's the right way to do something, and then there's the Army way.

    The Department of Defense routinely takes preventative “network hygiene” measures to mitigate unauthorized disclosures of classified information onto DoD unclassified networks.

    We make every effort to balance the need to preserve information access with operational security, however there are strict policies and directives in place regarding protecting and handling classified information. Until declassified by appropriate officials, classified information—including information released through an unauthorized disclosure—must be treated accordingly by DoD personnel.

[...] So everyone in the UK MoD could no longer read what was on WikiLeaks. Problem solved! [...]

As much as I believe governments over-classify massively, and look on most leeks with glee:

Consider that if an audit reveals any documents believed to be classified on an unclassified Army network, they need to deal with it.

That the documents have leaked is relatively immaterial - presumably a lot of auditing is done automatically, and adding exceptions is a lot riskier than simply blanket blocking anything that contains indications that it's marked classified, secret or similar. Even with manual audits, you don't want to give the people doing the audits too much freedom in accepting documents they think have been publicly disseminated, or the extra workload of trying to assess what info is ok.

Even IF all the documents found have already been published, they'd for security reasons still want to track down how the documents ended up on the unclassified network in case the route was via another leak that potentially might have more documents. Or it might even indicate the source of the leaks.

In other words, it's easier and safer for them to just assume that if a document is marked classified in any way, it shouldn't ever be found on unclassified networks - then they don't have to deal with the mess of trying to ensure it's an indication of a security problem.