Newly disclosed papers give rules for NSA surveillance without a warrant
washingtonpost.com
washingtonpost.com
In the Guardian story[0] it explained it like this: "Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;"
How can they know if it contains usable intelligence, criminal activity, etc. if they aren't examining the contents of the communication?
I think the most outrageous in that list is "make use of ... information on criminal activity". Do NSA spooks get to singlehandedly determine that you're committing a crime? Do they have AI algorithms that sift through millions of records flagging potential criminal activity? If someone is heard saying, for example, that they smoked weed are they added to a federal database of weed smokers? Why is a military program supposedly concerned with terrorism interested in domestic criminal activity?
[0] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-w...
Just as security researchers look for every possible loophole when creating attack scenarios, so the authors of NSA regulations seek to close any possible loophole a target could use to evade intercept. The NSA has to assume that its internal rules will eventually be leaked (as has just occurred) and used against it by a foreign enemy.
Yes, they try to make the rules to close all possible loopholes. No, they shouldn't be the ones making their own rules, since they have a very vested interest in one-sided rules.
Maybe it's a bit of both.
Conversely, if a Prince has good news, and delivers it all at once but with no follow up, people will stop being grateful for what they've gotten, and will start demanding more, which can bankrupt any ruler who tries to comply. Likewise, if there's a steady drip of bad news, minds race ahead, anticipating worse to come and making advance preparations which undermine the stability of the Prince.
This basic psychology works the other way as well. If you have bad news about your adversary, and drop it all at once, they can take the hit and move on. But if you can supply a steady drip of negative stories it becomes impossible to get past the growing sense of distrust, especially when people start imagine the worst, and demand to see proof that their darkest fears are unfounded. This may mean having to prove a negative, which is the epitome of an impossible situation. Reaching this point only accelerates the downward spiral.
Of course, following this strategy means being able to place yourself beyond the reach of retaliatory efforts. It's what Sun Tzu would refer to as selecting the field of battle to play to your strengths while offsetting your weaknesses. If your chosen position also has the inverse effect on your opponent, neutralizing their strengths while amplifying their weaknesses, then it's a double win.
So far, Snowden's strategy has been textbook-perfect.
It's telling that yesterday's document showing Eric Holder signing off on warrantless surveillance came days after Barack Obama reassured us it wasn't happening.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-...
So the way this works is that the NSA will spy on Britons, the GCHQ spies on Americans, and everyone comes together to exchange notes.
"We don't collect data without (general) 'warrants'".
One week later, after another leak - "Oh, we were just being the most truthful, or "least untruthful" as we could when we said that."
It completely destroys the credibility of the government, and it should, because they're lying about it at every turn, or at the very least twisting words to appear that they say one thing, but they mean another.
People who are trusting the government without declassified proof that they aren't lying, are being really naive at this point. I wouldn't trust anything the government says now without showing the declassified documents.
In God We Trust, All Others We Monitor
"Recently leaked documents show that such and such a politicion/official has outright lied/deceived the citizens of this country. Such and such a person said XXX, but the facts contradict his/her statement. The BBC has been served a D-Notice by Some Government Agency that prohibits us from publishing the leaked documents and excerpts thereof because the documents contain information regarding programs of national security. Concerned citizens are encouraged to seek out the leaked documents from foreign news publications who are at liberty to publish the leaked documents."
I think it is also reasonable to believe that the D-Notice in question is specifically referring to the G20 Summit story and the recent GCHQ story. As such it's reasonable to believe that it does not cover stories in the interest of US national security. The BBC should publish our dirt and we can publish theirs.
All 10 released at once, and 8 of them getting lost in the discussion, or releasing 1 bombshell at a time and people like us get to discuss the implications of each?
I think they're doing it right so far.
The rest of it seemed in line with the initial PRISM release, and also (kinda) what they've been saying all along: they nab everything, but only read it if they "reasonably" think you're foreign, and if they're wrong, they keep any "interesting" bits anyway.
But they likewise understand that this kind of thing is controversial, and so (either out of an attempt to limit the impact or deflect blame) they want to make sure that everyone internally knows what they're doing and that it's not quite kosher.
Lots of folks here are programmers: occasionally you need to commit some horrible design affront in the name of expedience, right? Do you hide it or do you call it out in comments and commit messages with a big "HACK HERE" message? I know I do. It's the same impulse.
no. It is to cover their asses. Like in the case of torture - if they just go and torture it would be one thing, instead they have been doing it according to the rules reviewed and approved by government lawyers, who declared the torture is legal. Thus people have been tortured, yet nobody can be punished for performing it. Nor people who only wrote the [illegal] rules, nor people who only followed the [illegal] rules. Using such responsibility deflection schema government can do anything as long as it follows "the rules" [which it wrote itself] and even the people with moral compass can look in the mirror easy because they only doing their job and follow the rules.
(another example - recent public outcry about drone killing of Americans was easily put down by switching attention to the alleged fact of existence of the "strict designation and targeting rules" the government follows without even publishing the rules, just a mere statement of their existence)
So the person doing the torturing had to be really fucking sure that this person was "guilty" and further that torturing would actually work (which is "not often"). The kind of operative doing this work was strongly personally committed to our country and extremely aware of their own personal investment.
Instead, we now have state-sponsored, legalized torture, and so any and all sociopaths can happily try their hand at torture just for the jolies, at no personal risk.
Spying must be illegal. A nation still needs to do it, but the brave few who do it, are braver still for doing it at personal risk.
As a technical U.S. citizen, Anwar_al-Awlaki had due process rights. Therefore, the relevant inquiry was: what process is "due" (M-W: "owed," "capable of satisfying [an]... obligation," "required or expected...")? It's a foundational principle of Constitutional law that "due process" does not necessarily require a jury trial. So the legality of al-Awlaki's targeted killing depends entirely on the issues you dismiss out of hand. The fundamental question is whether the designation and targeting rules are sufficient "process" (meaning "legal procedure") in context.
Far from being a "responsibility deflection schema" it is a good faith attempt to stay within the bounds of the law while still following through with an important governmental objective: bringing to justice an enemy of the United States. It's no different than when any person or company asks their lawyer "can we do this?"
Because here is the thing: not everybody agrees with you (you, VladRussian2 personally). Lots of people think your ideals are stupid and dangerous.[1] Outside the echo-chamber of this website, lots of people have no problem with torture in the course of war, lots of people think supposed "Americans" who take up arms against the U.S. can't claim the protection of their Constitution. Is the government just supposed to go by principles? If so, why your principles instead of other people's principles? It's not a workable system. That's why we instead follow rules, rules we all agreed to. In the course of following those rules, we often have to make judgment calls about exactly what those rules do and do not allow us to do. And sometimes, we're on the edge of that boundary and make good faith attempts to stay on the right side.
[1] I remember as an undergraduate in Atlanta in the lead-up to the Iraq war, lots of people seriously suggested turning the middle east into a "glass parking lot" as a solution to the problems in the region. You may not like those people (and I personally found those comments tasteless), but they are as much a part of our body politic as you, and their principles carry just as much weight as yours.
The entire system of checks and balances was created because of this distrust of the "moral compass" of any single individual or signle in-group. When an individual or in-group can unilaterally monitor the communications of other individuals or in-groups with out due process, it all starts to fall apart.
There should be no secret court. There should be due process. There should be court appointed warrants not rubber stamps. This is all more important than what any one individual thinks is necessary for them to do what they think is their job. Their job isn't to catch terrorists. Their job is to catch terrorists without violating that principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. If they are doing the former at the cost of the latter they are failing at their job.
Mormonism is the only major (ish) religion that's homegrown and culturally they're mostly WASPs or close to it. Above average chance of getting clearance and of wanting a career in a TLA. The NSA is not special in this way. The DEA, FBI etc. will show the same pattern. Difficult to prove seeing as I doubt US agencies keep records on employees' religion though.