Fisa court oversight: a look inside a secret and empty process

Does #3 say what I think it does? That the NSA thinks it has a right to record and disseminate my email if I talk to a coworker about our servers' security?

Edit: For context, "domestic" communications in this paragraph is defined as communications 100% within the US: "Those guidelines specifically address what the NSA does with what it calls "domestic communications", defined as "communications in which the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition."

Second to last paragraph of the section, Warrantless interception of Americans' communications.

The highlight:

> When it is time for the NSA to obtain Fisa court approval, the agency does not tell the court whose calls and emails it intends to intercept. It instead merely provides the general guidelines which it claims are used by its analysts to determine which individuals they can target, and the Fisa court judge then issues a simple order approving those guidelines. . .Once the NSA has this court approval, it can then target anyone chosen by their analysts, and can even order telecoms and internet companies to turn over to them the emails, chats and calls of those they target. The Fisa court plays no role whatsoever in reviewing whether the procedures it approved are actually complied with when the NSA starts eavesdropping on calls and reading people's emails.

It appears we may have been mistaken to assume the court deliberates on and grants an order for each request. It appears the court gives a general approval for guidelines, and then NSA analysts request whatever they want from companies without meaningful oversight.