NSA could have prevented 9/11 hijackings (2009)
rawstory.com
rawstory.com
The premise of his argument is that various individuals within government agencies had access to intelligence that pointed to a terrorist plot, but there was no collabortion between the individuals and so the pieces never got put together. Each agent had a different and unique view of the plot, but not the whole picture. The lack of communication and intel sharing between all of the various agents made it impossible to get grasp on the enormity and urgency of the situation, and so very little was done about it.
The book itself is a very interesting read and I highly reccommend it.
Homer: Not a bear in sight. The Bear Patrol must be working like a charm.
Lisa: That's specious reasoning, Dad.
Homer: Thank you, dear.
Lisa: By your logic I could claim that this rock keeps tigers away.
Homer: Oh, how does it work?
Lisa: It doesn't work.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: It's just a stupid rock.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Lisa: But I don't see any tigers around, do you?
It's a funny thing, we'll never be able to prove one way or another, because if the government reveals any plots they've foiled, it could give out classified details of the system. So in the end, we're left simply to trust an entity that would like to spy on us... It's like a racket.
1) NSA monitoring known Al Qaeda operatives while being required to publish public reports detailing the scope of the surveillance (after a predetermined period of secrecy to protect the investigations): unequivocally good.
2) NSA installing video cameras and microphones in every house in America, constantly monitoring streams for suspected terrorist activity: unequivocally bad.
Where is the line? Which side does PRISM fall on? It would be an easier question to answer if the whole program wasn't so carefully kept out of the public eye.
Sonny: This is why you created us.
VIKI: The perfect circle of protection will abide. My logic is undeniable.
A few days ago the front page of HN featured an article about the likelihood of getting a "bad guy" using this kind of surveillance. The conclusion was that mistakenly getting a "good guy" was about 10000 times likelier. Of course, you could argue that the article made some numbers up, but the calculations remain, and the deep fact is that, if an event is rare enough, false positives will outnumber the successes by quite a few orders of magnitude.
Which means a simple thing: PRISM and the like don't even fucking work when it comes to creating security. Yes, the next 9/11 could be tomorrow: but no amount of PRISM would prevent it, no matter how safe may it make you feel.
Preventive actions only work when the offence is common. It's not the case with terrorism. As scary as it may sound, terrorism is as out of your locus of control as getting hit by a thunder.