Comment by gruseom | Hacker News Reader

Comment by gruseom | Hacker News Reader

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This comment is contentless. It doesn't address a single specific thing the article says. Instead it offers woolly generalities ("Japan was threatened on many fronts and made the best choice it could. That much is clear") and platitudes ("all of the actions, taken together, were the reason for the war to end. Yes, Stalin played a big role. But it's not an either-or situation"). It sounds like it's saying something; indeed, it sounds like it's saying something wise and avuncular. But I've read it three times and can't find a single part that is saying anything at all, other than where it repeats exactly the bromide about how the Pacific war ended that the OP is critiquing ("dropping the bombs on Japan saved millions of both Japanese and allied lives. It served as a quick end to a long war")—ironically, right after it says "Nobody is finding comfort in simplistic stories". If you're going to respond to a critique, shouldn't you answer what it actually says?

It's unfair to put the article in the same bucket as "UFO stories". No one who has read it (and is being fair) would describe it as "speculation". It isn't anything like counterfactual fan fiction. Almost the entire piece does nothing but cite facts, such as: the dropping of the nuclear bombs does not figure significantly in historical records of the Japanese leadership's discussion about surrender; the Japanese war council decided on August 8 not even to discuss the Hiroshima bombing; damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not out of scale with the earlier fire-bombings of other cities; Japanese leaders had expressed a willingness to sacrifice their cities if necessary; Japan's war strategy was predicated on the Soviets staying neutral; and so on. Are these wrong? If so, how? Are there other, more important facts omitted? If so, what are they?

The negative responses to this article so far are so insubstantial that they form a defense of it by omission. I'm very curious now to hear a credible counterargument. Surely there is one?

I agree with your feeling. Reading through this thread of answers and seeing so many poorly written comments, all supporting the "official patriotic version of American History of the World" is pretty sad.

For those who disagree with the article, why don't you ask Japanese what they think, instead of speculating about these two bombs ending the war? It was clearly obvious that these two bombs were, just like the article said, just another two drops in a long history of bombing on Japan that has destroyed most of the largest cities. Come to Japan and see from yourself how little is left of Old Japan. All cities are built of concrete here, because there was nothing left of what they were before. And check Japanese litterature of the time - there was ample suffering and hardship without even talking about the atomic bombs.

There's nothing "revisionist" about these claims.

I find it frustrating that someone so prominent in their field to merit an audience at the UN and British Parliament and to be published in Foreign Policy is able to be so easily dismissed on Hacker News as not "a serious historian."

To be fair, he's being dismissed as such by people who are not serious hackers.

The last section of the article actually argues against the article's stated conclusion, and it supports the statement you've replied to. This section, in particular:

> Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

Logically, this section asserts that the atomic bomb, though not successful in doing physical damage, actually created a political situation that allowed graceful surrender, and it aligned with the Japanese government's desire to preserve Japan's culture and forms of government. It's very difficult to speculate what the Japanese response would have been at this point had Hiroshima and Nagasaki been destroyed with conventional weapons. However, their way of life would have been more at risk without a clear way to appease the enemy, which we have evidence to suggest was on their minds.

It's important to note that the entire last section is speculation and offers no facts at all to support the claim that Japan consciously blamed the atomic bomb with these goals in mind. Yet, this is the crux of the article -- the idea that the atomic bomb won the war singlehandedly is a myth supported in part by the Japanese government's desire for self-preservation.

I think that's what the original reply author means when he says "all taken together." The atomic bomb clearly did not put a dent in the Japanese leadership's attitude, but, according to the article's speculation, it did allow them to make a life-saving decision more easily.

The article presents the bomb as being a useful excuse for both the Japanese and the US after the decision to surrender. E.g:

> 'During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japan's top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germany's leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews "Japanese officials... were obviously anxious to please their American questioners." If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?'

>"Think for a minute about what this essay is asking "What if action X did not end the war in the Pacific?"

I think it was addressing the overall idea of speculation in historical events.

Which is essentially dismissing the entire subject of history. How can arguing about things that happened seventy years ago not be speculation? History is not hard science. We speculate, we argue, but we never reach perfect certainty.

What meaning of speculate do you mean? There are two that are nearly the opposite of each other (making this an almost-Janus word):

1. To meditate on a subject; reflect. 2. To engage in a course of reasoning often based on inconclusive evidence.

If you mean 2., the article doesn't do anything of the sort. It lays out specific pieces of evidence based on observed historical fact and draws specific conclusions from them. On the other hand, the top-level comment above is pretty vague in its rebuttal.

In talking about causality, the article makes two counterfactual claims: had the Soviets not invaded Manchuria, Japan would not have surrendered and had the bombs not been dropped, Japan would have surrendered. (In my opinion, the first claim is well-defended, the second less so). Since the bombs were dropped and the Soviets did invade, any discussion of these possibilities is a little speculative.

This seems reasonable—thanks. Can you quote where the article actually claims those two things? I'm curious, and I don't disbelieve you, but I really don't want to have to go back and comb through the whole thing again :)

This section, primarily, argues that the atomic bomb created a political out for the Japanese government:

> Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan's interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

It basically argues, yeah, both Stalin AND the bomb likely contributed to a surrender. This part is not cited as well, however. It relies on implication based on the dissonance between records before the surrender and statements by the Japanese government after the surrender.

Sure, but that passage is about the political uses of the causal argument that happened to win (and that the OP thinks is incorrect). It makes no counterfactual claims.

dspeyer's point is a good one if (but only if) the article actually does make the two claims he mentioned. Does it? I don't remember.

Agreed, and thank you for your posts. The amount of knee-jerking visible in this discussion is astounding and disappointing.

>I'm very curious now to hear a credible counterargument.

Well, Hirohito himself mentioned the bomb and its 'incalculable' destructive potential in his formal announcement of surrender.

So at the very least the bomb played a very substantial role in ending the war in the Pacific.

Thanks. It would be interesting to hear Ward's take on that; he must surely address it in the book the article was taken from.

On the other hand, according to [1], Hirohito also cited the Soviet invasion when convening the council to discuss surrender.

[1] http://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/u6qqo/there_h...

At the end of the article the author describes how (assuming his previous arguments are true) Japan's leaders would still have publicly cited the bomb as a strong reason for their surrender as it "served to deflect blame" from themselves.

Yes, and the question is, how can you really separate these things out? But now that I think of it, there may be a way to actually test this. Did the Japanese leaders' private deliberations diverge significantly from their public statements? If we have access to them and they did, that would be evidence in favor of the face-saving interpretation.

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