<form action="https://www.paypal.com/de/cgi-bin/searchscr?cmd=_sitewide-search" method="post">
<input type="text" name="queryString" value="xss code" />
</form>
Then, just as the page loads, submit that form and you're executing JS on a paypal.com page. This would work great for phishing or session hijacking.This link can be embedded on a different site, or sent via email, and because the link itself points to paypal.com - it is much more likely to be trusted by unsuspecting users.
Doesn't seem like that is the case here. The bug is in the search form, which is POST only. It wouldn't be enough to share the link to the search page, you'd need something that does the search on your behalf.
Note that _if_ the form is already CSRF-protected, then attackers won't easily be able to POST from a different domain either, which would drastically reduce the attack surface.
I didn't test this, but I'm not sure the form is fully CSRF protected though. I tried to explain the potential exploit from this discovered vulnerability. Perhaps I should have stated more clearly that this is more a general comment, and not specific to this particular case.
Once the form has been submitted on behalf of the user, you have javascript execution in the context of paypal.com, and can do pretty much anything. Send the contents of your account to another address, shut down the account, exfiltrate past transaction data, etc.
It seems quite possible that CSRF checks could have been omitted in not expecting this to be a source of woe. Just goes to show... :P