Austrians argue that predictions can't, as a matter of epistemology, be made.

Of course, humans do that all the time. What's missing from the original Austrian concept in Mises is allowing for imprecision -- making accurate predictions with error bars for variability below the threshold of detection.

What von Mises didn't like about this and what Rothbard hated about it is that such predictions are statistical and probablistic in nature. They aren't deontological, they can't be nutted out a priori from first principles.

They have a real bee in their bonnet about it. It's a shadow (ha!) of Platonist/Aristotelian bunfights.

Out here in that's-nice-but-I-have-shit-to-do land, grownups accept that models are wrong. But even if the map is not the territory, most of the time it's still good to have a map.