Https URLs posted in private Skype chats visited by Microsoft
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There is a reason why we had strict regulations (a dirty word on HN, I know) for "old fashioned" mail and telephone. To eavesdrop on people's private communication was considered a disgusting practice that belonged in totalitarian regimes, and an unacceptable violation of people's rights.
Modern online services have circumvented such regulations, but that doesn't make what Microsoft, or Facebook, or Google are doing any more ethical or socially desirable.
All of this casual disregard for basic ethics can't continue without a serious backlash. And such a backlash won't just hit Microsoft e.a., but our entire industry.
It's time we stopped considering ourselves to be untouchable just because the law hasn't caught up yet, or because the majority of the people haven't figured out what the fuck we're doing.
Some changes through technology are unstoppable. This however, isn't one of them. It's a choice.
Back before it could be tracked and recorded? When it was analog and switchboards?
Even if we had strict regulations, it would be all but impossible to prove impropriety of the snooping variety.
I think this is a problem we've always had that is being magnified by technology that allows us to realize that it is occurring.
http://www.ted.com/talks/raghava_kk_what_s_your_200_year_pla... around 09:00.
I think we need to make a distinction between automated services and humans eavesdropping. I'd feel weird if someone was snooping in on my conversations and clicking my links, but on the other hand I very much appreciate the little bot that sits in my IRC channel and displays the title of any page linked. Both monitor the chat and access links, but I value one and feel weird about another. I don't think there's a way to truly make a distinction between the two though, and I think saying, "nothing is ever allowed to access your communications" removes the possibilities for a lot of added functionality (the link bot being just the base camp of the mountain of things that are possible). I think the better choice here is to ensure that the public has a way to communicate securely, and that our mental model of "trust usually, distrust as the exception" needs to move to "distrust usually, trust as the exception". This is similar to how sudo works in a way - we maintain a lower level of security usually for the convenience, then escalate only when needed.
2. Joining/forming another IRC channel is cheaper than creating a competitor to Skype.
3. MS looking at your messages implies that they have the ability to do so. If the conversation were entirely secure, only the other end of the conversation would be able to.
4. MS eavesdropping at all means that when law enforcement comes knocking, they can do so too. Law enforcement is not always your friend. More so in some countries than others.
5. The 'link bot' can be implemented in the client, rather than by a middle-man.
6. Such 'beneficial processing' could be opt-in at the client level. The message is encrypted between clients. Once a client has it, the message can be processed locally or sent off for processing. Sure this adds delay, but it's a trade-off for privacy.
Intent: A irc bot that provide titles do so to translate machine readable URL's to human readable Title's to benefit both the one who writes it and reads it.
Intent: A eavesdropper tries to extract meaning out of being in a privileged position between two speakers.
Context: An irc is a public forum or at least a forum for invited participants. Expectation of privacy is low.
Context: A private communication between two parties is private. Expectation of privacy is high.
Result: An IRC bot that do what everyone in an irc channel is aware of is good. People feel happy by the increased value.
Result: An eavesdropper makes people feel scared, insecure and angry. It makes society worse, causes physical damage to people, and are destructive.
It really doesn't matter if its an automated or a human that does the eavesdropping. intent, context, and result do.
We don't need to make any distinctions. Private conversations are private.
And gentlemen don't read each others mail. Automated or otherwise.
Honestly I don't know what to think of this matter. All I know is that the capabilities of a malevolent intelligent individual are skyrocketing frankly.
As a dictator once said: Wish for sunshine, but build dykes.
The visibility and lack of expectation of privacy creates a very different situation. If this "MS bot" showed up in your conversation and said "hi, I'm going to visit every URL you post unless you kick me off this conversation", it'd be a very different situation.
>I think the better choice here is to ensure that the public has a way to communicate securely and that our mental model of "trust usually, distrust as the exception" needs to move to "distrust usually, trust as the exception".
I can't square this with your previous stance easily. This would for me imply that private communicates should have end-to-end encryption. And that another party couldn't intercept URLs unless they were explicitly transmitted out of band by the client (which I would guess isn't the case here).
Personally, I find this disgusting as well, and I agree that the lack of ethics in our profession is a huge problem, though fueled by user ignorance and apathy, but as much as I'd welcome an healthy backlash, I shudder to think of the lobbies that would "inform" the regulators when drafting such laws.
I would argue that the reason had to do with the fact that you couldn't encrypt, and you couldn't choose your provider. In a time when people could encrypt everything if they just cared, and when there are a ton of mostly independent ways to contact people and it's even easy to host your own, I wouldn't say that such regulations would be a good idea.
My friend "Alice" (a Chinese national studying in the US), recently sent a present to her friend "Bob" in the Chinese army and talked about it on Skype.
The Chinese Army found out that Bob was receiving a gift from the US and tracked down the relevant Skype conversation. Bob was interrogated about Alice and what the gift was for.
Microsoft complies with all governments' legal requests, as it should. I have no doubt the US government has made similar requests of MS.
Skype's original protocol made eavesdropping harder, but not after the changes Microsoft made.
[0]: http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/skype-replaces-p2p-s...
Your story is all about China. Skype for China is "special": https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2012/dec/china-listening-skype...
For governments from the set of countries that Microsoft has a presence in, or just from governments in general? I can't imagine they respond to DPRK requests, nor should they.
Even in our "western" democracy, the right to vote is limited (whether age, residency, prisoner-status etc). In the USSR, only members of the Soviets (worker's councils) could vote, as the Soviets represented the people. In ancient Athenian democracy, only male citizens could vote. According to Plato, that was too wide-spread and only philosophers should vote, as they were the only people wise enough to make serious decisions.
But all of those forms fall under the name "democracy" - it just depends who you define as "the people".
Microsoft can make such requests pointless if they choose to do so, by not having unencrypted data of people's private conversations in the first place.
Disclaimer: work for Microsoft in China but clueless about how Skype works here.
Not sure if this is still the case for Skype but, I just tested on FB again and they pulled the whole video...
It would be vast overkill to download a whole video just to present a thumbnail, and the user experience in the delay while the whole file is downloaded and processed would render the feature fairly useless.
Which leaves the question of why Facebook would do this open... It might just be really bad practice and an under-/non-optimized crawler.
Wouldn't help you with new material, of course.
http://petapixel.com/2012/11/25/facebook-removes-risque-phot...
Automatic detection of child pornography - http://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf/60/
our approach can achieve a prioritization of
content (equal error 11 – 24%) to improve the
efficiency of forensic investigations of child
sexual abuse
at least not in the context of this discussion of fully automated solutions.It's good to prevent the re-sharing of child pornography, but a lot of companies don't like to talk about the systems because they're very much the same systems that the same companies are busy telling the content industry that they can't build to enforce copyrights. So they're generally kept pretty hush-hush by a kind of gentleman's agreement.
I think general copyright is actually a thornier problem and this secrecy is unnecessary. CP is just something you can block if you see it. Tracking down exactly which uses of a copyrighted work are intended to be allowed and which are not is really much harder. And I think that's a legitimate argument, especially because it recasts the copyright debate in terms of compromises that make sense: if clearing a bunch of rights is confusing, maybe certain types of compulsory licenses are more attractive. But that debate is for another thread...
| I think general copyright is actually a thornier
| problem and this secrecy is unnecessary
1. When we talk about 'detecting copyright infringement' there is an implicit assumption that we're talking about the IP of major corporations. No one is going to bend over backwards to prevent copyright infringement of 'the small guy'[1].2. Even if you detect that a video contains copyrighted material, there is no central registry for you to determine if the person (or entity) has permission to distribute/use that material. Even if there was such a registry, how do you link it to an online id on some random website?
3. There is no middle-ground for fair use. Fair Use is something that is usually only definitively determined after a court battle. If restrictions are too strict, then the only way for one to exercise their Fair Use rights is a court battle. This effectively means that Fair Use would be dead for all but some rich, motivated people (at least on large content networks, e.g. YouTube).
[1] Unless it wins brownie points with the public for getting a system in place to protect the 'big guys,' who are obviously the only ones that matter.
I was supposed to meet with a Scandinavian vendor a few years ago that provides a service where you can match SHA hashes of files against known illegal content. I recall the pitch deck said that they had millions of records to match against, which I found incredibly depressing.
I ended up bailing on the meeting... it's a subject I don't want to learn more about.
I know they've got lots of money but really, are they wasting bandwidth and memory so badly as to download terrabytes of video they don't need?
MS download and you've got them on copyright infringement for which there is no apparent excuse outside of wilful negligence.
What's the multiplying factor the MPAA use for copyright infringement, something like 1000 times the regular licensing fee.
...
4) Profit
"Bob, if you should ever need to delete 100% of the content that I've created for you, you would follow this URL. Let me be clear, it will destroy USD $1,000,000 worth of goods."
Methods can also have the property of "idempotence" in that (aside from error or expiration issues) the side-effects of N > 0 identical requests is the same as for a single request. The methods GET, HEAD, PUT and DELETE share this property.
"In particular, the convention has been established that the GET and HEAD methods SHOULD NOT have the significance of taking an action other than retrieval. These methods ought to be considered "safe". This allows user agents to represent other methods, such as POST, PUT and DELETE, in a special way, so that the user is made aware of the fact that a possibly unsafe action is being requested."
The document section also makes a distinction between "safe" and "idempotent" methods. That's not the same thing.
A less naive implementation would also include a crumb to mitigate CSRF as well as unintentional access.
Never rely on your environment to differ between the various HTTP methods for you.
1. There is probably something in the EULA for Skype that MS put in there to cover themselves with respect to this.
2. If there is not, it might be more effective to try and bring a multitude of small claims court cases against them. A tactic that worked against Dell in at least one instance: http://consumerist.com/2006/12/13/man-sues-dell-and-wins-by-...
The machine excuse is inoperable - the agreed mode of operation of such machines is to refuse to follow links in a robots.txt file. If the machine has been programmed to ignore this de facto regulation then there's mens rea to go with actus rea performed by the machine for and at the behest of those who programmed it.
I can't program a tank to drive me on to your land and then claim that I haven't committed the tort of trespass, same goes here.
IANA(IP)L either, but sometimes I play one on the internet.
Also, mens rea (i.e., "guilty mind" or colloquially, intent) is a criminal law concept that has no relevance in the civil/tort law realm. It doesn't matter whether the machine has been programmed to ignore robots.txt because no law requires a software program to obey robots.txt.
If that line holds then the corollary appears to be that programming a robot to duplicate linked content deny-ed by robots.txt is certain copyright infringement.
Copyright law is a weird one, it sits in a sort of limbo between tort and crime hence it seems relevant to not only consider the balance of probabilities and the test for tortuous infringement but also the criminal considerations. Moreover in various jurisdictions it's a crime to access a part of a computer system without authorisation, this would appear to apply to MS's directorship in this case; such laws might "require" obedience to established protocols for determining if access is authorised [would be interested if anyone reading can cite caselaw to support/discredit this line of thinking].
you don't need to run it through translator.
"A spokesman for the company confirmed that it scans messages to filter out spam and phishing websites. This explanation does not appear to fit the facts, however. Spam and phishing sites are not usually found on HTTPS pages"
From the very next story down from the same publication:
http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Trojans-conceal-t...
"The company has reported that, since 2009, some malware has been concealing its data traffic by mimicking known instant messaging protocols or, to avoid detection, trying to camouflage its data traffic as HTTP or HTTPS. To achieve this, these trojans copy at least the header of the instant messaging protocol, leaving the remainder of the packets to carry the trojan's encrypted communications."
Looks like they're contradicting themselves here to score some click-bait headlines.
Am I misreading the word 'camouflage'? I read it as 'pretends to be' not 'actually uses'.
Even if the trojan is using HTTPS, that is still not a reason to scan HTTPS URLs. The command and control network is completely orthogonal to the links given to users to try to infect them.
It's not like they could make a ton of money by monitoring the chats, and even if they did, they shouldn't be doing that anyway. At least with e-mail they have an excuse for not using local encryption (it gets too complicated for the end-user), but they can't really use that excuse for chatting.
So why isn't OTR enabled like yesterday in Gtalk, Skype and Yahoo Messenger? (by default of course, otherwise 99% of the users won't use it).
In order to comply to requests from law enforcement agencies, end-to-end encryption is not used by public companies offering communication services.
The govt comes by with a subpoena (secret, classified, or public) and requires Microsoft or the customer company to produce communication records that exist in a form that may be used as evidence. Failure to do so is best contempt of court and worst obstruction of justice. No 5th amendment privilege for other people's crimes. So everyone who chooses to store or process messages makes it so the encryption is reversible and they can honor court requests. Nothing is private as a result.
EDIT: I should make it clear I don't agree with the current status quo. Let me answer two very good questions.
> Would they also do that if logging failed during the period requested?
If it can be shown that there is a willful neglect of collecting logs then the govt in the past has gone after companies for some form of conspiracy (most famous: MegaUpload, but Microsoft customers have had their fair share for accounting and securities fraud) or criminal negligence. There is a prevailing theory that companies are responsible for employee actions, and failing to log is seen as unacceptable.
It's only recently (within the last year) that the courts have ruled whether compelling passwords is protected by the 5th amendment, and most systems in place were designed and built using previous assumptions from 10 years ago.
> If this is true, why is OTR offered at all?
It's a checkbox feature required for HIPAA, PCI, and similar. "Must have encryption" -- the standards and IT departments don't say how the keys are managed.
But if you're referring to Google's "Off the Record" feature, that's not OTR encryption. They just don't save that conversation in your logs. But they still have access to it themselves.
That seems wrong. Would they also do that if logging failed during the period requested? Or if they simply neglected to log in the first place?
Edit to your Edit: I don't see how the 5th is involved in the slightest. If party A has a secret, and the courts subpena party B, then party B's inability to comply has nothing to do with pleading the 5th. They simply do not have the information requested, and in fact never possessed it in the first place. Furthermore, party B cannot possibly be said to have been negligent. The courts subpenaed the wrong person.
The example is incomplete. In messaging systems, Party A uses Party B to send messages, which may be useful for a court case. The government may reasonably subpoena Party B to produce Party A's records since they may not want to alert Party A that it is under investigation.
If Party B (the service provider) has any feature that makes use of the content of Party A's secrets (read: url-checking, auto-loading thumbnails, indexing for search, some types of routing, etc), then there is little ground for Party B to argue it can't decrypt Party A's records for the subpoena. Further, Party B may become a co-conspirator if it keeps incomplete records or destroys records too quickly. Even if the co-conspirator charge is remote and hard to convict, most service providers would prefer to avoid the publicity of such a court case and add decryption anyway.
Think PGP + Gmail, except that unlike usual, Google provides you with download of PGP.
The court could subpena Google, and Google could give the courts my PGP encrypted communications. However they would be unable to give them my private key and declaring them to be in contempt of court for that would be a massive miscarriage of justice.
PGP is a pain in the ass to use. However we have more streamlined technologies currently available that provide the same properties in this scenario. What is upsetting to people in this discussion is that companies like Skype are not employing such systems. We know Skype is not because they are employing one such "feature" that you mention (url-checking). They are therefore employing a system that does leave them open to having private information subpenaed.
You're absolutely right in describing the theory behind PGP (or GPG for the purists :), but unfortunately there is not yet a way to build a messaging service that has both features AND privacy. The should in your statement "Party B should be constructing their service" implies and expects a capability that is not (yet) possible to build. The point of my posts were to illuminate the reasoning companies make it easy to decrypt for the US government due to their exposure from in-demand content-aware features and fear of legal action.
Like you said, PGP+Gmail sucks for all parties included on a chain. Clients stop working. Non-users can't read the emails. Gmail spam filtering, ads, search indexing, and labeling all break. The same is true for PGP+Exchange, and most corporate customers much prefer Exchange features to the privacy offered to individuals with PGP.
I'm also not aware of 'more streamlined services' that offer true privacy -- please illuminate them if they exist. Services like Voltage suffer from the same root cause of reversible encryption.
So, customers have to choose: use a service with content-aware features OR use a dumb service that (currently) does not have the features. Most people choose features, and I would venture in this case Microsoft opted for features over pure privacy.
I would be among the first to welcome a way to accomodate both pure privacy and features in a service, and I encourage all to find a way. Please build it!
But making HEAD or GET requests, whether it's HTTPS or not, shouldn't be a problem — those HTTP methods are not allowed to have any significant side effects.
Scanning of URLs is useful for such service that is often abused to send spam, phishing and exploits.
Don't trust it if you can't encrypt it with a private key.
I think it's pretty well documented at this point that Skype is not a secure video/chat product. But for the 99.9% of users outside of the "never read my data" echo chamber, it seems to be working fine for them. Use what works for you.
eg KDE (old) http://drupal.org/node/24398
http://image-upload.de/image/4f96S5/4af43ed70c.png
I suspected Skype was used, because it would be the most effective way to spy citizens.
Today Skype, Facebook and Gmail are valueable resources for a Orwellian Surveillance Government.
These Skype Security articles are worth reading:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skype_security
http://www.ossir.org/windows/supports/2005/2005-11-07/EADS-C...
http://cryptanalysis.eu/blog/2011/12/28/encrypted-traffic-mi...
You, basically, send an email with a link to someone in Europe only to see it being accessed from some random US IP that doesn't even have a PTR record. With some effort this IP can be traced back to SmartScreen, but what's strange is that it sometimes takes hours for the URL to get hit from such IP. This doesn't make any sense whatsoever, because SmartScreen is supposed to be a pro-active defense against phishing and malware, so it should really be scanning new links in real-time, upon reception. This scenario is arguably even more troublesome than Skype's snooping, because it's not possible to predict beforehand if the mail will end up getting SmartScreen'd.
Microsoft says they are logging and pulling the content of links shared via Skype for spam and malware prevention. This certainly falls under the umbrella of "cybersecurity". Under CISPA, this "cybersecurity" information can be freely shared with the U.S. government without fear of liability, and can be further shared among all government agencies.
This sharing is probably happening already. But CISPA would allow it to be brought out into the open and, particularly, for evidence so acquired to be used in court proceedings and as supporting evidence for search warrants.
The web is open, putting credentials in urls is stupid, and complaining about spider hits is too.
If you think your URLs are safe because no one KNOWS about them, you are simply doing it wrong. Hopefully your URLs are not changing any server side resource, otherwise you have a bigger problem than a spider.
Have you considered those spiders might be verifying that you are not spamming your friends, e.g. your computer could be infected and MS is trying to help your friends?
Case in point: I regularly bring up test web servers on my home server on weird ports, and Googlebot regularly finds them; I don't particularly care - anything I want to be private I password protect, but these are sites that are linked from nowhere. But there's any number of acceptable way it could find them: Some of the tools I use have default setups of Google Analytics that'd leak any urls I visit on them; I often click through links to other public sites from them, and any of those sites might leak the referrer.
So I agree with you that you should expect that URLs stay private.
But you can still have privacy expectations about the exchange of a public URL. E.g. someone might not like the thought that there is potentially a record that they're visiting certain embarrassing sites.
The reason there is a shitstorm over this is not that Skype is necessarily or even likely doing anything nefarious with the URLs, but that people had an expectation of privacy about their conversation that they then found out clearly is not being met.
If Skype/MS wants to scan every link, or retrieve them and put the contents on billboards in public spaces, there's nothing inherently wrong with either option. What is wrong is not realising that the actions they are taking are at odds with peoples privacy expectations and making sure to communicate what their actual expectation should be to users.
As long as a government is not doing it, I don't really any problem. But if american companies sell those tech to other countries, maybe there's a problem. Aren't there laws that prevent US companies to sell spying tools to some countries ?
I really think that as time pass, the world will want more and more p2p or pseudonymous/anonymous techs to evade such problems.
It's a good honeypot.
Access happened from 65.52.100.214 about 6hrs 40 minutes after I shared it in skype. There were 4 http requests, while I shared the link with 2 people.
Unfortunately the server logs are not detailed enough to understand what exactly been requested, given the page was under basic http authorization (with credentials NOT in URL).
All the team use Gmail and one was using Chrome.
I remember a storm in a teacup about MS doing this via their browser toolbar.
Recently, they started tracking all downloads made on Chrome (for malwares), it includes the filename, the URL, IP and the timestamp. Sucks hard since I love Chrome and the only way to disable it is to disable the website malware checker (which only uses part of the hashes anyway).
For a lot of people spending >$100/year and many hours maintaining it isn't worth it.
edit: the article claims this can't be so because the page only does a HEAD request, though a HEAD request could be useful if you wanted to detect an HTTPS domain with ephemeral pages (which perhaps, could be a good feature in detecting spam domains)
Furthermore they used test URLs containing hypothetical login credentials and showed how skype would get access to these.
The last troubling bit the author points out is that there seemed to be anomalous traffic to URLs shared in a skype conversation, where a microsoft IP seemed to attempt what they call a "replay attack".
It is very common for spammers to break into other websites (using simple well known exploit) and create links redirecting to the site hosting the malware. So a site should not be excluded just because it has SSL.
Edit: "should" -> "should not"
I would be surprised if Microsoft wasnt doing this as it would leave users at risk.
Also, sending login credentials over HTTP GETs? That's a pretty contrived scenario. The HTTP HEAD might be a red herring - it might just be checking to see whether it redirects somewhere else/whether the URL has already been seen. Perhaps this URL didn't set off the spam/malware machine learning models to initiate a full crawl/human review.
"New Skype malware spreading at 2,000 clicks per hour to mine Bitcoins" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5502028
One of the choice top HN comments:
"Why does Skype even have any clickable links in it at all if Microsoft can't be bothered to keep the obvious malware out?"
Another comment:
"Re the conclusion: to protect yourself, don't run an OS that will silently install software just because you clicked on a blue link in a program published by the OS vendor. Steve Ballmer should be jailed as an accessory for allowing this."
Damned if they do, damned if they don't.
https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=cooldeal
Maybe it's not you, but I bet it's happening.
If there is such a team on HN, they're doing quite a shitty job by the looks of it. Even a review of the Surface is routinely flagged off the front page for daring to be on the same page as a new Chromebook announcement.
They're not damned if they don't do this. Not doing this would solve the problem. What's your point?
So, it's not "damned if they do, damned if they don't," from my point of view, they have to do it in the right place. Within Skype itself is absolutely not the right place.
What's wrong with scanning links in chat for malware on the Skype servers so that they can immediately stop such messages from spreading?
Chrome team does a pretty good job of finding malware themselves.
What's wrong with scanning links is the scanning part. A third party has NO BUSINESS in seeing any of the bytes in my conversation.
If I'm a political dissident in a repressive country, I don't want MS to have the OPTION of handing my conversation over to my government.
L.O.L. Warnings are ignored so often they're practically useless.
They could ensure that clicking a link doesn't compromise your system.
There is no inherent conflict between privacy and security here, not like you're making it out to be.
A list of essentially every known malicious link on the entire Internet? I speculate that would be quite a few gigabytes in size, and would only get larger if they wanted to store the links in some data structure that could be scanned in a practical amount of time. And said list wouldn't be complete, either- it would only cover known links that Microsoft had seen before, and would only record their malicious state at the time of the last scan, not now.
> They could ensure that clicking a link doesn't compromise your system.
These sorts of vulnerabilities often come from obscure and surprising places (e.g., their TrueType font parsing code), from blocks of code that have been around for a decade or two without the vulnerability being noticed. Identifying security vulnerabilities is notoriously hard, even when you're not contending with the complexity and scale of Windows and all its associated applications.
There's an argument to be had about the acceptability of the privacy/security tradeoff Microsoft could provide by eavesdropping on your conversations, but your implication that such a tradeoff is mostly or entirely avoidable is untrue.
http://blog.alexyakunin.com/2010/03/nice-bloom-filter-applic...
Instead of worrying about how impossible this idea is, I'd suggest looking at how others are accomplishing it.
Unlike, say, FB messages, Skype has always felt so brittle and unreliable that I hoped it was peer-to-peer, and this news came as a bigger shock.
But I agree that people should be aware, particularly businesses, that Skype is insecure for confidential information.
If phishing and malware was spread thanks to skype, what would people say?