I'm not an expert so I'll ask here:
Is there an attack vector if you run PostgreSQL locally, no untrusted users are able to create connection strings and do not allow remote access?
It seems to be no but I prefer to be sure ;)
Is there an attack vector if you run PostgreSQL locally, no untrusted users are able to create connection strings and do not allow remote access?
It seems to be no but I prefer to be sure ;)
> How can users protect themselves?
> * Download the update release and update all of your servers as soon as possible.
> * Ensure that PostgreSQL is not open to connections from untrusted networks.
> * Audit your database users to be certain that all logins require proper credentials, and that the only logins which exist are legitimate and in current use.
Who is most at risk:
"Any system that allows unrestricted access to the PostgreSQL network port, such as users running PostgreSQL on a public cloud, is especially vulnerable. Users whose servers are only accessible on protected internal networks, or who have effective firewalling or other network access restrictions, are less vulnerable."
So looks like it's low risk but they're not willing to say no risk.
That means anything that gives local shell as any user that run normal tools, but potentially also a lot of other things.
E.g. any software that can be tricked to try to connect to a local address/port pair and send a suitable string.
That dramatically escalates any minor little hole that might otherwise not be a risk for you.
(That's a reminder to always verify before trusting any hostname/IP a user passes you that it's not a local address or address you have privileged access to, and to also consider internally firewalling connections between your various hosts down to just what you need)
The upgrade (on Debian based systems at least) is for libpq5, postgresql-9.1 and postgresql-client-9.1 . You shouldn't need to do anything else unless, for some strange reason, you actually do have a database starting with "-".
Also, I wish you a fine hike!
(probably commented too late, but I hope you had a nice hike, nonetheless)
Because some folks need to go through a long, drawn out process to upgrade internal software and might already have some place in the pipeline to put the upgrade so it will get tested with everything else.
If its a security issue for your current installation, you go now and hope, but if it can wait for a release then you do that.
It's still important to apply the udates, as I wrote elsewhere, because it's one more way someone can mess you up badly if they have managed to penetrate other parts of our systems, but upgrades no matter how seemingly safe can also cause problems (fore example I test upgraded one VM that refused to come back up again afterwards - not Postgres' fault, but a config change someone had clearly not tested properly).
But in this case, knowing we have blocked the main attack vector means we can take the time to take a copy of each database VM we run, test apply the upgrade and verify everything works correctly before applying it live, instead of rushing it out.
The reason I wanted to not upgrade directly is that access was hard at the moment of posting. Upgrading should never wait too long but this was (luckily) defcon 1 for us.