The Banker Who Said No
forbes.com
forbes.com
http://www.math.unt.edu/~mauldin/beal.html
BEAL'S CONJECTURE: If A^x +B^y = C^z , where A, B, C, x, y and z are positive integers and x, y and z are all greater than 2, then A, B and C must have a common prime factor.
> "This is the opportunity of my lifetime," says Beal. "We are going to be a $30 billion bank without any help from the government." (A slight overstatement: He is quick to say he relies on federal deposit insurance.)
And he pays for it, too (premiums, y'know). That's not "help" as we usually mean the word; that's a purchased service. Now, as for the bailouts -- which Beal is not getting -- that is "help".
I think we need a new class of corporation for banks and possibly insurance companies. A class that recognized they are hybrid entities, and not the same as a typical private company. It turns out we sort of do have this class (there are lots of hoops to jump through to become a bank). But this class is built on top of the normal rights and privileges of the standard corporate entity.
Does your corporation have to abide by all of the banking rules? Of course not, you're a regular corporation. If you want to be a bank, start one. It's a pain in the ass but can be lucrative.
Mine can't loan out money at 26 times my deposits. Can yours? Of course not, your not a bank.
...oh kay.
A class that recognized they are hybrid entities, and not the same as a typical private company
Umm. You seem to be getting at GSEs, a standard corporate form.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government-owned_corporation
Generally, this doesn't seem to work out too well with financial companies, see Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac (which weren't GSEs, but close enough...) The truth is, the vast bulk of banks were perfectly healthy and responsible. Almost all the trouble came from a few gigantic ones, and the reasons for their behavior were many.
Banks are hybrid companies in the sense that FDIC insurance means they are basically conduits for lending to the government. If I deposit $100 with my local bank, I don't care whether the banker keeps it in cash, invests it in penny stocks, or spends it on whores -- no matter what, the government backs my deposit.
This is for other promises from companies. E.g. if I pay someone $100 now for $100 worth of lawn care over the next five years, I make damn sure I can trust that person. If I pay the bank $100 for a CD maturing in five years, I don't.
This gives all banks an incentive to take undue risk, balanced by government regulation, which gives them a secondary incentive to find clever ways to take big risks (which they do by hiring clever people who would otherwise do more socially useful stuff).
> This gives all banks an incentive to take undue risk
Actually, you've just demonstrated that FDIC insurance gives you an incentive to take undue risk. You'll deposit your money at any bank without regard for whether said bank is trustworthy.
BTW - It's curious that you seem to believe that better rules will help since you also seem to believe that "clever people" can always get around the rules.
As to whether a govt-run bank would do any better, feel free to point to the fraction of govt enterprises which are run as well as you'd require of govt run banks. Which states' DMV is "good enough"? How about the post office?
I was talking about how the FDIC creates bad incentives. I don't think I said anything about how new regulations would help, since the bit you quote is about how the difference between good regulations and bad regulations is in what kind of talent is misallocated.
Edit: Perhaps the part about being 'balanced by regulations' threw you off. What I meant is that the government writes rules to keep people from doing what the FDIC gives them an incentive to do. Those rules, of course, do not work.
And I'm pointing out that the bad incentives affect depositor behavior. Thanks to FDIC, you have little incentive to find a trustworthy bank. Instead, you judge entirely on other criteria.
Majority-Scandanavian states seem capable of lots of things that other states can't manage. Since the majority of US states are not majority-Scandanavian, we can't use the majority-Scandanavian ones as a model.
The extent to which banks are conduits for lending to the government is independent of FDIC insurance. FDIC insurance is pretty much normal insurance, in that it is funded by premiums charged to policyholders, rather than, say, tax money. Banks are conduits for lending to the government in the sense that they maintain much of their reserves in US Treasury bonds.
Your comment gives the appearance of someone commenting vehemently on a topic about which they know very little. I mean, it's hard for me to remember that there are people in the world who know even less about banking than I do, but it sounds like you're a member of that elite group.
You're way too optimistic, IMO. 21 US banks have failed so far this year, and many more are going to fail. Many commercial real estate and development loans are going to default in the next couple of years, mostly provided by many small and medium local and regional banks.
In my suggestion to recognize banks as something different than a normal private corp, I'm not thinking of GSEs as you link to. I'm thinking more about transparency and liability issues being different for banks than for a normal private corp.
If the gigantic banks that are currently the focus of such various problems would have had to have more open financial liabilities, the risk _should_ have spread less.
You might have a point there. I guess the question (regarding whether my point was valid) is whether federal deposit insurance is underpriced. I suppose there is a good chance that it is.
Also, if you increased the price of FDIC insurance, banks would need to make greater interest rates, and therefore would need to make riskier loans. You could make FDIC insurance contingent on taking less risk, but that sort of regulation always seems to backfire. (Of course we already have such regulation, the article even alludes to it. But increasing the strictness of risk-taking regulation would just solidify the major players.)
> Mine can't loan out money at 26 times my deposits. Can yours? Of course not; you're not a bank.
Actually, I think that if someone loans a hypothetical non-bank US corporation money, it can legally loan out 100% of that money, without retaining any of it as a reserve. This is probably not a good idea, since it means it won't be able to pay any of its bills next week, but it's not illegal.
What you wrote makes it sound as if, when depositors loan a bank $100 000, the bank can then loan out $2 600 000. That is not the way fractional-reserve banking works. The actual amount the bank can legally loan out in that case is more like $90 000. A non-bank corporation would be able to loan out a larger amount (up to $100 000) in that case, not a smaller amount, as your post suggests.
To be more precise: The effect of banks, in aggregate, on the money supply results in a multiplier, which today runs at, in average, 26 times deposits.
Here are a few overviews: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractional-reserve_banking http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserve_requirements http://economics.about.com/cs/money/a/reserve_ratio.htm
Yep, he's a hacker.
Beal, for his part, took a mathematical approach, at one point running millions of computer simulations of various poker problems, in search of an edge against the pros, who rely on an uncanny intuition honed by thousands of hands
http://www.amazon.com/Professor-Banker-Suicide-King-Richest/...
Most things are linear to a first approximation anyway.
In other words you get the most bang for your buck. This is not to say that a linear approximation might not be very inaccurate on important parts of the problem domain, but the variance that a higher order model would describe would be less, perhaps much less, than the portion the linear part describes.
In my limited statistical experience, the problem with higher-order models is not that you get less bang, but that you need more buck: that is, there are too many free parameters. But in your second quote, you seem to be talking about higher-order models that have as few parameters as a linear model, i.e. one parameter, plus one per independent variable. What kind of higher-order models are you thinking of?
I meant that the additional amount of variance described by a more complex model beyond that described by a linear model is much less than that described by the linear model in the first place. Obviously the total amount will be more, or else your model is both complex and wrong. :-)
Consider:
Model A - 1 degree of freedom - 60% of variance
Model B - 2 degrees of freedom - 75% of variance
That extra DOF has gotten you 15% better description of the variance, but at the cost of complexity. Perhaps that is worth it, perhaps not. As has been noted above, that complexity has a real cost that can manifest itself as overfitting, instability, and lack of generalization. The curse of dimensionality is very real.All that I meant was the linear model will probably capture the most variance per unit complexity. Which gets back to my original point that most (all?) problems are linear to a first approximation. It's not just that people are lazy.
Wouldn't that be like a 1999 startup being investigated because they didn't have exponential growth projections in the IPO prospectus?
I'm not surprised he was investigated; Massively different investments, raising money without buying anything apparent, and not trying to cash in whenever possible do point to an anomaly -- possibly even a fraud -- happening.
So long as he's not wrongfully convicted, I don't have a problem with investigations.
Yeah, that's the point...that it was extraordinary to behave sanely (as opposed to "consuming the fraudulent crap coming out of Wall Street").
I have always respected a man who drives his cars hard and plays a mean game of backgammon -- and actually makes money while doing it. Upvoted.
If anyone is interested in learning more about Andy Beal's million-dollar poker games with the best players in the world in 2001, you should check out this book: "The Professor, the Banker, and the Suicide King: Inside the Richest Poker Game of All Time", by Michael Craig. It's got a pretty complete profile of Beal, and tells all about the games.
Supposedly everyone wants to get rid of these things and is desperate for cash, which makes it seem like a decent opportunity for buyers. If I had $10,000 I could afford to lose (and was willing to take a long shot with) is there some market where I can buy those sort of assets?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accredited_investor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_investor
Ask your broker if they've got any they want to unload.
That just seems blatantly unfair to me. It's the government setting up a different set of rules for the rich.
>That just seems blatantly unfair to me. It's the government setting up a different set of rules for the rich.
Those rules are set up to protect you from unsafe investments, scams, and the like. After all, you need to have enough money to keep paying taxes....
There was one VC here that mentioned how someone emailed him about also investing in 3 of the companies that he had invested in, and how he couldn't let the person do it because the person didn't fit the requirements to be an "accredited investor" then he mentioned what three companies they were. They were all money pits with no path to profitability. I believe the "accredited investor" bit helps people from having there life's savings thrown away on a unregulated bad investment. The ultra rich either inherited money or built a real business from the ground up and sold it. I would suggest one of those paths instead :)
The general markets are down 45% from their peaks. Why should submillionaires be denied the chance to put 55% of their portfolio in T-Bills, and 45% in highly-risky unregistered private securities? That wouldn't have done any worse than the public stock market... and might do a lot better, if you understand the private companies involved.
And if submillionaires are such easy marks, why not any limits on how much they can gamble in casinos or even state lotteries?
The 'accredited investor' limits are silly; a phony security blanket at best, an unfair impediment to broad-based entrepreneurship and investing at worst.
$10,000 is too little -- for agency MBS, $15,000 is the minimum purchase size, and I think the rules are similar for non-agency bonds. Most of the high-end brokerage firms can help you, though. I know Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns Private Client Services (now a division of JPM) deal in mortgage bonds for individual investors.
And I believe that through some accounting tricks, most bulge bracket banks are still overvaluing their securities. And in some cases once the securities are correctly valued, the banks will be insolvent. That is one problem the bailout money is for, to enable banks to correctly value securities.
So I believe that if a bank actually sells any CDO's at a fair price, there will be major problems with keeping the rest of the securities overvalued.
And from the way I understand it, most of these over valued securities are based on multiple assets, so one CDO is going to track other CDO's, you can't pick a CDO that is solely based on correctly valued assets.
Compare it to a local bank that is insolvent.And this bank has overvalued their assets. So I am looking to buy a house, and see that the bank has called the loans on two houses that would be in my price range. Except one of the houses has been used as a meth house, and the owner would have to pay an extra 60-70k to make the house habitable. Well, it would be an easy choice for me, I would want to buy the other house for less than the value of the loan. Only in this comparison that doesn't work. See, the bank found out that if they grouped the mortgages together, they could sell overpriced pieces of the mortages. So I would not be able to buy anything from the bank that would give me legal ownership of property. And the mortgages are grouped together, so for every dollar I invested in one property I would be investing a dollar in that meth house.
Nobody really knows what the CDO's will be worth in 10 or 15 years, but I do know that the banks don't have a strong desire to price CDO's low enough to actually sell them.
"Beware of geeks bearing formulas" - Warren Buffet 2008
In any case, everyone loves a good contrarian.
Sorry for the Buffett fanboyism, but he's the man.
> Berkshire Hathaway acquired 10% perpetual preferred stock of Goldman Sachs at $123[40] only for it to fall to below $60. Furthermore some of Buffett's Index put options (European exercise at expiry only) that he wrote (sold) are currently running around $6.73 billion mark-to-market losses.
Warren Buffett tarnished as Main Street oracle http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/604619
Buffett suffers big losses at Berkshire Hathaway http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2009/02/28/buffet-suffers-big-...
(d Berkshire's net worth dropped a whopping $10.9 billion in the final three months of 2008.
Berkshire's shares have fallen 44% since the end of February 2008. )
etc...
And like I said, the stock went down with the market. Yes, at one point his stock was down 44%, but so was everything else. And if you look at the fundamentals, they have a small leverage ratio, close to zero actually if I remember correctly, lots of cash, and are one of a handful of companies still rated AAA.
The guy in the article keeps saying if only he had access to more cash he would be making piles more money. Well Buffett has the cash, and he's going to rake it in when the market rebounds.
Also, the financial press loves to take pot shots, even though Buffett repeatedly and thoroughly explains that Berkshire's stock price will go through severe beatings from time to time.
A classical interview question / challenge would be to invent a new card game and ask the interviewees to devise an optimal strategy for that game.