A Note from one of Cloudflare's upstream providers
cluepon.net
cluepon.net
Heh. Nice. Yeah, I expressed skepticism that 300G/sec qualified as "largest ever" - I mean, I personally have been hit by 10G+ attacks, and Cogent mostly shrugged. (I mean, my cogent side was down until the target was blackholed at the cogent border.) I know 10 gigabits is a lot less than 300 gigabits, but I am a nobody compared to the people involved in this little kerfuffle.)
Other than the headline and the reference to the NY Times article, CloudFlares claims and the linked article are pretty much in line.
The exact details vary by network, but here is how Hurricane does it http://www.he.net/adm/blackhole.html
But yeah, you give them /32s to null, and they drop those /32s at the network edge.
It stops the attack, well, almost immediately, but the problem is that it kills the target site completely.
(well, often people have web frontends to this, which, well, work poorly when your pipe is completely full, and for that matter, just getting the bgp data to your peer can take a few tries. but yeah, it's still pretty quick and effective, compared to calling someone to whine.)
What we really need is to get everyone to implement bcp38 anti-spoofing rules. If everyone did that, we'd be able to block the sources of the problem, rather than the destination. But, well, that's unlikely to happen, so for now, you just, ah, finish the job.
Disclaimer: I am no network engineer so don't rely on my reply being factually 100% correct.
That's why I don't advertise any sort of "DoS protection" - I know that attacks that are bigger and badder than my network are fairly common. This is also why I'm not going to take any promises of DoS mitigation from anyone who doesn't have a terrifyingly huge network seriously.
Now, once you have enough upstream port capacity to soak the attack, you then filter the good traffic from the bad. This is a whole 'nother can of "very hard" but it's easy compared to getting the capacity in the first place. Note, this filtering becomes /way/ easier if you have some idea of the sort of traffic you are expecting, but it's still difficult.
There are "clean pipes" services that claim to do this for you, with varying degrees of credibility. The thing is, CloudFair is one of the smaller companies to offer this. I was looking at the offering from level3, (in my mind, considering their network capacity, probably the most credible provider of such a service. Also, their service claimed to work with all traffic, not just http and the like, so it would work for me.) but it sounded like the price was somewhere along the lines of "give us 25% of your revenue, and we'll give you half the cleaned capacity you need." I mean, even the regular level 3 bandwidth is between one and two orders of magnitude more expensive than the cogent/he.net mix that is common in my industry, so uh, yeah. I didn't spend the requisite six months with the salesman to get the real price, but I think "more than I can afford" is a likely guess.
I mean, the idea here, usually, is that the network providing this service is large enough that it has a whole bunch of peering connections and can filter the incoming traffic fairly close to the source. Even if you've got hundreds of gigabits of capacity at one location, if it's all at that one location, it's very likely that something else is going to gum up the works between, say Austria and you. If you've got a giant, global network, though, your traffic from Austria goes to your POP in Austria, where you can filter the "bad" traffic (assuming you figured out how to do that.)
And really, you don't have to filter /all/ the attack traffic, just enough that the target isn't completely overwhelmed. Like spam-filtering or anything else, nothing is 100%.
And that's how most of the low-end hosting world feels about it. The upshot is that we throw out the baby; the small customer who gets hit repeatedly by large DDoS attacks, generally speaking, has to change to a different provider, 'cause they get kicked off. I mean, if you are paying someone $20/month, and your enemies take that service down hard? yeah, after the problem is fixed, you are very likely to need to find a new provider.
But, when the relatively non-technical populous hears 'record changing' a completely different set of emotions are triggered in their brains. Its just like any other overly grandios marketing headline, designed to excite those whom aren't familiar with the topic.
Plus; that was in ASCII. Damn. :)
That said they're interesting articles if you ignore the hype.
Cloudflare differs from most DDOS mitigation companies because of their low-dollar, self-service tier. This gives them a reason to blog, and customers and attacks to talk about. Most DDOS companies only provide bespoke service for $$$, and those contracts usually come with silence requirements.
Akamai is not 2nd on the list of DDOS mitigation companies, BTW. I know a couple companies who left Akamai for DOS Arrest, one of great companies you'll never see mentioned in a NYTimes article (because that's how their customer want it).
I'm somewhat skeptical of CloudFlare's low-cost approach to DDoS mitigation. Going for volume on low MRC clients means that you have a lot of potential targets on your network. And attacks against any one customer can always impact every other customer, which puts you constantly at risk, even if you yourself are not attacked all that often.
In my mind, this is similar to an antivirus company saying "hey look at all these nasty viruses out there, but we find and destroy them effectively."
This really just seems like effective case-studying on CF's part. It's arguably their job to hype it as much as possible (though of course they are responsible for the inaccuracies).
Akamai has been around since 1998.
Cloudflare since 2009 (both according according to crunchbase which jives with the date the domain were registered iim).
Consequently the established company has more to lose and less to gain from the publicity then the newer company.
For a newer company any publicity is good publicity even if it's over a negative event because you have less to lose and more to gain add: and people become familiar with your name.
Taking this to an extreme example (to make a point) let's say you start a new hamburger restaurant. You have no customers. On day 5 some people get sick (just sick not deathly sick). All the sudden you are in the local paper with a headline and a story that people just skim but they see your name. Almost guaranteed you will pick up business from the mention. Even though it's bad PR all the sudden down the road people will remember you and either forget or not care about the negative story they read 6 mos. prior (add: assuming they even read the story and didn't just see the headline).
Remember Akamai is the Oracle of the CDN world. They're in a bit of a shuffle right now as their competitors have long caught up and offer the same for less, minus the legendary Akamai-arrogance.
Akamai sees their market shrink from both ends. At the top-end companies like Netflix start building their own networks because they want more control, less reliance on a third-party, and the cost savings. At the low-end you have pseudo-CDNs like Cloudflare eat into their snake-oil business, and commodity-CDNs like Cloudfront grab the longtail.
Connectivity in US/EU has also gotten so good on average (and bandwidth so cheap) that the body of mid-range sites that feel a genuine need to enter an expensive conversation with a "traditional" CDN is evaporating. And this is doubly true for Akamai where that conversation tends to be particularly unpleasant.
Akamai and friends are of course well aware and have long shifted their focus to the emerging markets (asia, africa) and mobile. Time will tell for how long that can keep them afloat before they are marginalized.
I'd upvote such an article if it had the technical depth/layman readability of a Cloudflare puff piece.
That's my new quote of the year.
End rant, but at least there's more of an awareness of good network folk with things related to this sort of story. Not that it's the ideal path, but still.
One of my local major media outlets has sacked ~600 writers and editors recently, all the while advertising voraciously for tech staff for its real estate and travel websites…
It seems the way now that press releases can turn into articles.
TCP/IP and Internet topology are different things. Think of it this way, internet topology is the highway, and TCP/IP is a vehicle that travels the highway (along with UDP, ICMP, etc).
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Internet_exchange_point...
LOL for 1 minute...
Also: don't post if your business DSL stops working. Or your ISP. But maybe if you find your BGP from your upstream is poisoned/severely b0rken.
He really gets into how, with traceroute, you can get a glimpse of how everything fits together, beyond just "oh, this hop and now that hop". Also, Andrew Blum's book Tubes is a good casual look into how the world of data centers, IXPs, carriers, etc all fit together.
don't know if that is what you were looking for but it does a pretty good job explaining that part.
I like his map of US peering as well:
http://drpeering.net/white-papers/shared_images/USInterconne...
"When the attackers stumbled upon this, probably by accident, it resulted in a lot of bogus traffic being injected into the IXP fabrics in an unusual way, until the IXP operators were able to work with everyone to make certain the IXP IP blocks weren't being globally re-advertised."
It's pretty fascinating and I think most of the HN audience, myself included, would be able to understand the actual technical detail.
I have to smile when people are praising you for the plaintext writeup whose purpose was to link from facebook. It's like saying you finally got your house fully off-grid using your hand made windmill that generates power so you can watch the Kardashians. ;)
Isn't this talked about in CloudFare's write-up?
As large as Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc is on the web, the major telcos have to be even larger (in terms of network size, capacity, amount of fibre, switches, datacentres) in order to carry the traffic.
The closer we get to living "in the cloud", the more our traffic can be seen as a window into operations taking place within and between cloud services.
My second reaction is that of "bring-it-on". Basically this is an impulse for improvement, and as with any major threat you either stand your ground or get run over.