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18. Mandatory. Enable/Disable Secure Boot. On non-ARM systems, it is required to implement the ability to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup. A physically present user must be allowed to disable Secure Boot via firmware setup without possession of PKpriv. A Windows Server may also disable Secure Boot remotely using a strongly authenticated (preferably public-key based) out-of-band management connection, such as to a baseboard management controller or service processor. Programmatic disabling of Secure Boot either during Boot Services or after exiting EFI Boot Services MUST NOT be possible. Disabling Secure Boot must not be possible on ARM systems.
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0. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/windows/hardware/jj1...
Contrast this closed hw architectures like Nintendo and Apple produce. No consumer freedom but incredible profit margins.
Note that modern macs are in fact PC's with just minor modifications so they profit from the PC economies of scale while still locking their customers into their hardware platform.
In that case it would be a security feature -- another line of defense against bootloader malware and/or adversaries in physical possession of your machine.
(I don't know how technically feasible that is; I know Canonical and others are looking at having their own cert so at least their unmodified kernels can run, but I don't know the mechanism for how that interacts with already-released UEFI machines.)
The point is that technologies like this are a double-edged sword, not evil in themselves. A similar argument is made by Linus himself for sticking with GPL v2 instead of moving to GPL v3, which outlaws certain DRM-related uses; he's more interested in providing a functioning mechanism, and leaving the policy-setting to others.