Exposing a security flaw doesn't get you expelled. He had to have taken it one or more steps too far. I'd like to see the facts.
Exposing a security flaw doesn't get you expelled. He had to have taken it one or more steps too far. I'd like to see the facts.
A few days after reporting the flaw, he got caught using http://www.acunetix.com/ (web vulnerability scanner) on their network. He says he was checking to see if they fixed the flaw. I don't think he was intentionally being malicious, but his explanation doesn't jive with his actions.
I still think it sucks that they expelled him. But I am unable to logically see how he didn't break the rules.
Especially if a students' information had been previously exposed and the attacker had access to everyone's personal information / passwords!
-- Edit : after reading his expulsion letter, it seems he supposedly injected SQL on both occasions. One imagines they strictly forbid him from doing so again. Sure, he probably should have asked for a sandbox system if he wanted to do ad hoc security research, but it is still quite a logical leap to actually expel him.
Nevertheless, I'm afraid they might do just that.
I think it's perfectly congruent. An entity has your data as well as information on many other people. You come across and report a vunerability. You check that something was done about it. I see no holes in this (aside from the ones in Montreal college's security).
If he found the vulnerability without using Acunetix, why did he have to use Acunetix later to check if the same vulnerability has been fixed or not?
Couldn't he re-check using the same way that he initially found the vulnerability?
To be honest anyone using Acunetix isn't looking to hack into anything. It's an enterprise scanner that looks for general web app issues rather than something that's typically used to conduct actual attacks. You'd expect an actual attack to be conducted with a tool like Havij, Sqlmap, Burp or Zap proxy.
However the vendor offered him a job and a scholarship, so it seems like it's the university's over-reaction.
But that doesn't make the scanner any less stressful or detrimental to the system
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/560325-al-khabaz-expu...
On Sept 21st our site was vulnerable to a simple SQL injection attack. On Sept 22nd you documented this information for us.
On Oct 26th our site was STILL vulnerable to a simple SQL injection attack. On Oct 29th you again documented this information for us.
On Nov 12th we expelled you for our discovering our abysmal security.
In particular the letter claims that the student has in fact attempted to exploit the SQL injection to gain unauthorized access, and that both notifications to the IT department were made after they detected him and blocked his account.
So it seems you are the one twisting the facts for reasons unknown.
---
[1] "Al-Khabaz immediately alerted the head of information technology for the school about the breach in the Omnivox software used by the college. At first he was thanked for the discovery." -- http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1318163--montreal-studen...
[2] "they discovered that by exchanging other student numbers in the encrypted links, they could easily obtain information such as the social insurance numbers, home addresses and phone numbers of more than 250,000 students. Al-Khabaz said he informed the school’s head of information technology immediately after discovering the vulnerability in the school’s Omnivox software and was congratulated for the discovery." -- http://www.cbc.ca/m/rich/canada/story/2013/01/21/montreal-da...
Read point 3: "On September 22, you admitted to these attacks in writing."
Compare the dates. According to the letter, his disclosure came after the account was suspended. Implying that they did detect the attack before he admitted to it.
You're using uncorroborated dates in a document that's clearly worded to paint the student in the worst light possible to infer a 'detection' which it doesn't mention and for which there is no evidence. You're then sharing your inference as documented fact. That's a smear.
The letter doesn't say that. No other sources say that. You're the only one saying that.
I never said that it was not a case of responsible disclosure. I simply don't know, the evidence at this point seems insufficient to support either conclusion.
The first application of the IT Policy is the interesting one here, as it lays the foundation for - or undermines Hamed's case as a white hat.
Unless you're at a minor Canadian trade school which wants to bury that they knew about the security flaw for months and did nothing about it.
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> He had to have taken it one or more steps too far.
First he told them about it.
Then he waited a couple months, and tested to see if it was still there, with some free online security scanner; it was.
So he reported it again, and this time contacted the vendor.
The school freaked out, decided that he was hacking them without permission, and expelled him over "code of conduct."
They absolutely refuse to explain, though they keep pretending that there was a law broken. The student went to the RCMP; the RCMP disagrees. So does the original vendor, who has challenged the school, and given the kid a scholarship.
http://www.cbc.ca/homerun/2013/01/21/dawson/
This is just a terrible administrator doing new damage trying to bury his own failure.