When Google (Chrome) oversteps its authority

Safebrowsing's malicious download detection uses a large number of factors to attempt to determine if something is dangerous, but the full analysis by necessity takes a bit of time. So, for a new unknown download, all it can do immediately is check for best-practices that can include: a valid code signature, a known software publisher, secure file delivery, and source site(s) reputation. Even failing this, the warning for an unknown executable is not that it's malware, but that it "is not commonly downloaded and could be dangerous."

So, a cursory look shows that the installer referenced in this blog post has no signature and isn't being served securely. That means the user (and SafeBrowsing) have no way of knowing if the correct file is even being served, or if it was (for example) replaced by a man-in-the-middle attack. That hurts a file's initial reputation, and since Safebrowsing hasn't had a chance to fully analyze the file, it's pretty much indistinguishable from malware at this stage. However, once the file works its way through the pipeline and has a chance to establish reputation, a safe file will eventually be marked as such.

For anyone who wants to eliminate latency with Safebrowsing, the solution is really just common best-practices for software distribution: sign your packages, serve them securely, and maintain a safe site. For the safety of your users in general, this is stuff you really should be doing anyway.