Land without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It (1979)
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu
* Please keep in mind it's from 1979. Some things have changed considerably.
* The Schöffengericht (1 Judge, 2 Laymen) is only the lowest level of courts (Amtsgericht, probably a district court) and the higher levels are composed of professional judges only. Any crime that has an expected punishment of more than 4 years is judged by professional judges only.
* Some trials may skip the first step on the appeal ladder and go directly to the Landgericht.
* We have our own version of the plea bargain since 2009 (Verständigung im Strafverfahren). Arguments for the plea bargain are pretty much the same as in the USA: Some trials tend to get very complicated, especially cases with financial background where laws and regulations are complicated to understand for non-experts. Lately there have been discussions about wether to remove or modify the plea bargain, fueled after a series of appeals against plea bargains [1].
* In some circumstance a confession may be beneficial for the defendant, reducing the fine or prison time. This is especially true when the defendant supports the prosecution of other defendants in the same or a related trial (Kronzeugenregelung). This sometimes leads to pressure to confess a crime the defendant has not committed.
[1] German, sorry: http://beck-aktuell.beck.de/news/bverfg-uebt-deutliche-kriti...
Aside from magistrate judges (Amtsrichter), the only case where a German court sits in a criminal case as a trial court without a lay judge are the OLGs (superior state courts). This happens only if the crime is a war of aggression, treason, or creation of a terrorist organization.
(Not that there's anything wrong with courts that do not have jurors or lay justices -- the Netherlands seem to be doing fine without either.)
Crimes where the expected punishment is more than four years are tried before the penal senates of the regional courts (Landgerichte). They are composed of either one professional judge and two lay judges (Kleine Strafkammer) or three professional judges and two lay judges (Große Strafkammer). The Große Strafkammer can also sit with two professional and two lay judges if the case isn't too complicated.
(Incidentally, the idea of lay judges originated in Sweden. Germany adopted the model in the 1920s as part of the so-called Emminger Reform [1]).
Things like the Chipshol debacle in the Netherlands shows that there is strong evidence of judicial collusion in a series of court cases - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chipshol has a very superficial summary of something that I found quite shocking, involving public accusations of corruption, perjury, where one of the ex-judges involved was forced out as head of the Dutch anti-trust authority when it all blew open.
Judges and lawyers seem to come from the same social circles, have gone to the same universities, members of the same clubs and so on. To access the conveyor-belt of promotions and opportunities, it is not inconceivable that a culture of "scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours" in a part of a small legal and judicial community in a small country could form.
A system in which lay-people are involved may have to work a lot harder to pretend that biased judgements are fair.
Just a different point, doesn't have to do something with the abuse potential of plea bargains. The biggest criticism I have regarding plea bargains in Germany is, that they usually apply for white collar crimes since these tend to be rather to complex for the average judge and state attorney to follow. Blue collar crimes are differrent matter all together.
The result is that a plea bargain benefits the state since the process is fast, the defendant since not the whole scope becomes public and the sentence tends to be rather short. While there are some public prosecution departments speciallized in white collar and financial crimes they are far between. So whenever there is one that can be settled out of court, it's tempting.
But that's just my personal view of it. One prominent example of a guy being in a psychiatry since 2006 is Gustl Mollath. And it turned out that he is not as guilty as initially believed...
The Mollath case is contested. It may very well be possible that he is guilty, but not crazy or crazy, but not guilty. The problems found in this case are very symptomatic of the bavaria/baden-württemberg courts. One reason is that the appeals court for that region is unlikely to actually accept an appeal.
* the plea bargain
* RICO ('conspiracy' charges)
* FISA warrants + probable cause
combined you could almost charge anybody with anything to make them appear guilty and plead down to shorter sentences. Read the indictments of Swartz, FullTiltPoker, Gary McKinnon, Megaupload, Lakhani, etc.
FISA has also mainly been used against "bad people" so far. It's really hard to defend a likely terrorist in the court of public opinion.
I'm not sure how many of these need to be in the toolbox to outmatch any defendant (including the innocent or substantially innocent) -- plea bargains seem adequate on their own in some cases, since as we saw with aaronsw, you can credibly threaten huge punishments even without RICO. But with RICO, you don't even need to go to the plea bargains.
Evidence?
We hear about cases where the prosecutors decided that someone was bad and proceeded. However it would "violate our privacy" for us even to be TOLD how many of us are under surveillance.
Our general awareness of how often it is misused is not evidence that it is not misused on a regular basis. And in general the best presumption is that anywhere where you have authority combined with dark spaces, there are cockroaches breeding.
There is no such thing as plea bargaining or threatening the defendant with much more severe charges than those he'd actually have to expect when going to trial.
However, frequently bargains are made to expedite legal procedures. The defendant might for example be talked into making a full confession in exchange for a less severe sentence. While this is not as questionable a practice as plea bargaining it certainly leaves some space to bullying or coercing defendants as well.
Maybe, it'd be good to look at how the UK legal system works in that respect. It's mostly compatible with the US system but doesn't sport excessive plea bargaining.
From this perspective your last sentence struck me as odd, since, for example, I distinctly remember the UK settling a very high profile corruption case with BAE [1]. Maybe it does not happen that often, but it still seems to be problematic in some cases.
[1] http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2010/02/bae-...
Plea bargaining does happen in the UK and can be problematic in those cases but it's nowhere near as excessive as in the US.
To add to the examples, I'd say that France and Italy have procedures very similar to those described as the German system, and indeed all have a civil law system.
However, the link does not seem that obvious : the way trials are organized is not necessarily dependent on the way law is built.
And with sentencing guidelines published for all common offences the prosecutor is not able to threaten you with massive sentences because you (or your lawyer) can know what the likely outcome is. For a first time offender the odds of jail for almost any offence is low.
The quality of legal representation provided, especially in trials facing major jail time is significantly better. For a big case you will have a Queens Council barrister defending you who is just as experienced as the prosecutor.
And finally the Crown Prosecution Service is far less interested in the sentence than it is in the successful outcome. In other words their statistics look just as good if you plead to one very minor charge compared to several major ones. So plea bargaining here is much more about reducing their workload than it is in scoring political points.
If you are truly innocent (or believe yourself to be in the case of Aaron) then trusting then plea bargains are not for you in the UK.
Apart from that about plea bargains, it does mostly hold true in Scotland/NI.
I am not sure you read the same paper as anyone else. Nowhere did I see this. In fact, the author more or less said the exact opposite on page 215. Also, this paper is dated 1979.
Plea negotiation, let alone plea bargaining, is rare in the UK. The UK government only in the last decade began to accept the use of plea bargaining in corporate crime. Occassionally, plea negotiation can also occur, most commonly in co-conspirator cases like gang assaults, but again this is uncommon.
To compare the absolutely routine use of plea bargaining in the US to their rarity in the UK would be well beyond a stretch.
Page 210: "Plea bargaining has been documented in Eng- land where crime rates are closer to German than to American levels; the constant factor in both England and the United States is, of course, adversary criminal procedure."
All that's talked about on page 215 is that "in contemporary [1979] England, official ideology has been until lately loath to acknowledge the existence of plea bargaining," but that it is in fact well-documented (as an example showing that, if there were an unofficial plea bargaining system in Germany, it would be easy to discover by interviews of legal counsel).
I agree that the US is indeed a more extreme case (especially in not limiting plea bargaining to certain types of cases and openly accepting plea bargaining in principle), but this author clearly believes that the causative factor in both cases is the complexity of common law trial procedure (which, again, seems to have reached extremes in the US that are unmatched in the UK).
Also, I think English law can in theory draw on precedents set by courts in other commonwealth countries; I vaguely remember seeing Australian case-law cited when I was studying law related to professional negligence, but I can't find a reference to it now.
It's a very typically British setup which is the culmination of 100's of years of compromises here and there which viewed together now are totally impenetrable to the layman. The whole setup is utterly confusing and should be thrown away and rewritten from scratch preferably with the same law applying over the whole of the EU if you ask me, but then I'm not a lawyer.
"German legal ideology, moreover, is opposed to penalizing people for their own tactical mistakes."
From the news, I get the impression that the American system makes routine practice of increasing or decreasing people's punishment not for the severity of their crimes, but rather for their skill (or their lawyers') in navigating the legal system.
Another point is that the costs for the defendant are lower. Watching high profile cases in the USA I have a feeling that one common point is that the prosecution does everything to bankrupt the defendant so that he has to agree to a plea bargain. In germany, the defendants costs get paid by the state if the defendant is unable to pay his lawyers. Not all lawyers would take such an engagement, but it's not uncommon that even high-profile lawyers defend people who couldn't afford them at market rate.
[1] one might argue that they're more reasonable.
Cites a New York Times article.
> Still, it is the length of sentences that truly distinguishes American prison policy. Indeed, the mere number of sentences imposed here would not place the United States at the top of the incarceration lists. If lists were compiled based on annual admissions to prison per capita, several European countries would outpace the United States. But American prison stays are much longer, so the total incarceration rate is higher.
> Several specialists here and abroad pointed to a surprising explanation for the high incarceration rate in the United States: democracy.
> Most state court judges and prosecutors in the United States are elected and are therefore sensitive to a public that is, according to opinion polls, generally in favor of tough crime policies. In the rest of the world, criminal justice professionals tend to be civil servants who are insulated from popular demands for tough sentencing.
German judges and prosecutors are not elected but appointed. They're not as prone to political pressure and thus more likely to end up making unpopular decisions. The Metzler/Gäfgen [1] case is such an example: The convicted child murderer won a trial against the state because he was threatened with torture during the investigation. The decision was hugely unpopular.
Company ran prisons are still rare in Germany. If a private company runs a prison (or several) it likes to see it filled...
This seems to be a typical feature of a Common Law based system, and an incidental rather than intentional feature.
By its nature, such a system tends to become more complex over time and resist deep-reaching reform. The complexity then automatically rewards navigation skill.
Perhaps it was originally incidental, but at this late date both prosecutors and defense attorneys know on which side their bread is buttered. They might occasionally countenance a reduction in sentences, but they'll never allow a reduction in complexity and complication to emerge from our legislatures. Our judges all begin as prosecutors [!] so even though their livelihood wouldn't be threatened they're too professionally deformed to even recognize complexity as an issue.
Others, if you haven't had a chance to read many legal journals, they are frequently filled with insightful, closely-researched discussions of interesting topics.
The scope of the law is very broad, and you can learn a lot about topics outside the law by reading legal journals.
The quality of the discussion and scholarship, as well as the level of debate, often puts mainstream journalism to shame.