"Tahoe-LAFS is a Free and Open cloud storage system. It distributes your data across multiple servers. Even if some of the servers fail or are taken over by an attacker, the entire filesystem continues to function correctly, including preservation of your privacy and security."[0]
TL,DR: Storage nodes can't decrypt your data, so you don't have to trust them.
[0] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs
[1] https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
[2] https://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2012-December/thr...
[3] https://leastauthority.com/
[4] https://leastauthority.com/howtoconfigure/
[5] https://tahoe-lafs.org/~marlowe/TWN27.html (mid-page)
(no affil.)
It's also an interesting question:
How comfortable do we feel relying upon the "principle of least authority" long-term in a mixed-trust environment? i.e., a p2p-style Tahoe-LAFS grid, or deploying it privately using a commercial vendor like Amazon S3 (either directly or through Dropbox for free), on our own servers, and everything in between.
You might not trust companies from certain countries with your data, and you shouldn't be forced to in order to store it* in the cloud*.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_Least_Authority
As a user of a service the client is the only piece that I really care about wrt data security. If I can verify that the client isn't secretly uploading encryption keys to the server while claiming to encrypt my data, it's a massive win for transparency.
The server is a just an abstracted hard disk. Why would I care how it is implemented?