Ledger confirms spy chip implant behind wallet crypto thefts
bleepingcomputer.com
bleepingcomputer.com
Now basically: every single attack that's been described as "theoretical" or "far-fetched" or "only existing in the mind of a paranoid person" did actually happen.
We're talking here about a tiny eSIM implant and a little CPU doing OCR on the fonts appearing on the hardware wallet's screen to read the secrets during set up. So the secure element ain't tampered with.
Not long ago the Coldcard hardware wallet had an issue where it'd fallback to a 32-bit only RNG that could be cracked and so many people got their coins stolen.
Now it's Ledger that sees tampered devices all around the world (in Asia for sure but now there are reports about reseller in the EU selling backdoored/eSIM'ed devices).
For people who own Bitcoin at this point one of the only thing kinda sensible to do is to use multisig schemes, like 2-of-2 or 3-of-3 multisig, where your split the secret over two or three different hardware wallet brands (meaning being able to sign a 2-of-2 wallets requires hardware wallets from two different vendors).
When Ledger hardware wallets came out and people said that seed (the list of words) could be intercepted and relayed by a channel bypassing the computer (here by using an eSIM), people would post explaining that people were nuts if they thought such an attack could be pulled off.
Yet here we are.
And Ledger is responsible for very poor security practices: for example it's impossible to use a Ledger hardware wallet in a fully airgapped/offline way. For you're forced to not only upgrade the firmware but also install the Bitcoin "ledger app" (or whatever that is called) after you entered your seed into the device.
Which is complete and total amateur hour.
In addition to that Ledger offers a service to "backup your seed": what could possibly go wrong with that uh?
I'm betting that we'll soon hear about hardware wallets getting drained due to the seed being exfiltrated through "randomness" in how transactions are built/signed (aka "kleptography").
And it's not just representative about people in the cryptocurrencies ecosystem: people simply don't understand computer security and don't understand the potential attacks nor the length at which attackers are willing to go to steal data/funds/ruin other people's lives.
At this point we've heard about chips' plans being modified before the chips are even built (only to lower the entropy of RNGs) [unrelated to cryptocurrencies btw], a worldwide backdoor attempt in SSH, eSIM sending secrets from hardware wallets with tiny attack surfaces.
You're not anywhere near paranoid enough.
> Now basically: every single attack that's been described as "theoretical" or "far-fetched" or "only existing in the mind of a paranoid person" did actually happen.
Huh? Nothing here is theoretical or far-fetched. Hardware attacks of this sort have been documented for decades and basically part-and-parcel for most intelligence agencies, from the US govt installing backdoors in Cisco hardware to the exploding pagers for Hamas. This is not even the first hardware wallet attack documented on the internet (although it might be the largest-scale one).
It's just that hardware attacks are complicated, expensive, and risky, so they're usually done in a targeted manner. The only news here is that the crypto community painted a gigantic target on their backs by inventing a currency that can be taken from them with zero recourse, broadcasting it to the world that they own a lot of it, and then buying cheap hardware from overseas retailers to "protect" their assets. So all of sudden, it was profitable and relatively low-risk to cast a wider net.
It's fascinating in the sense that we're discovering from first principles why the financial system works the way it does. The damage caused by cryptocurrencies has been really pretty staggering, for little real benefit.
This reminds me of the 2020 case where a union organizer thought there was a spy camera inside a utility pole outside his house. It was in a conspiracy subreddit, so it seemed like the deranged ramblings of a ravingly-paranoid stranger. But they found the addresses of the IP cams and had plenty of evidence to corroborate it.
Now, Flock cameras are just normal.
I think the 2020s will be defined by this trend. "Things which only existed in the minds of a paranoid person" becoming normal parts of daily life.
Here are two sources on the matter:
https://www.reddit.com/r/conspiracy_commons/comments/gin79z/...
https://www.fox13memphis.com/news/activists-find-camera-insi...
In August 2020, this was unbelievable, and it would have been considered reasonable (if wrong) to dismiss OP as paranoid, especially for the subreddit they posted in.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1x46gnh/a_fake_cry...
That poster didn’t even prove the fake wallet app stole his bitcoin (in the sense required in a court of law). Presumably it wasn’t worth the effort because their money was gone and not coming back, but still.
In some ways this is kinda encouraging, because it means that even in cases where society collapses and the government disappears, there are really only two fundamental technologies needed to reboot everything: money and contracts.
The incentives lead us toward the classic "Yes, the planet got destroyed. But for a beautiful moment in time we created a lot of value for shareholders." scenario.
https://www.insidehook.com/culture/story-tom-toro-new-yorker...
You don't need a government backed paper currency, you need a mint making precious metal coins. History has several examples like the mints at the Potosí silver mines or those by the East India Company that enabled trade without effective governments to back them up by just providing reliable coinage that spread to many other polities.
As long as there isn't some crazy inflationary force like colonizers arriving with an unlimited supply, we can use something as simple as beads or seashells for currency quite fine. It just means more labor overhead to create that currency in the first place.
Somalia operated on paper money valued at the cost of producing it
I think it's also the case that hard money is a different kind of phenomenon from paper money reflecting an entirely different philosophy concerning property and what it is. It reflects a natural law perspective in its most earthy and primitive form, which is that gold and silver are money because ancestors from time immemorial saw it as such due to certain intrinsic characteristics. Governments certainly regulated mints, but also marketplaces could and did regulate coinage on their own which is possible because of its physical nature. If a coin is clipped or made into a false alloy, that can be detected and corrected without state institutions.
Paper money by contrast tends to reflect more modern positivist theories of property in which property rights are deemed to exist because the state speaks those rights into existence. In the middle ages and even before, states as we know them now did not exist and could not exist, so positivism would have been absurd on its face, and its most direct application in the form of artificial currency could not be made.
The EIC's first mint was operational in 1643, long before it became a quasi-state. It started to become a quasi-government more than a century later, when it started raising its first major army in the 1750s culminating in the Battle of Plassey and didn't really have the resources to fully become one until the diwani in 1765.
How something comes to be is distinct from how it is used.
Cryptocurrencies have the advantage that they can be spent worldwide, instantaneously, with little friction, while most commodities require that you be physically present to exchange them. They're also significantly easier to store and more resistant to garden-variety theft, as long as they're secured by passphrases. But they exist in the uncanny valley of requiring electricity and Internet. It is fairly unlikely that the government collapses and yet you still retain always-on electricity and Internet. What will you use to pay the electric company, and how do you enforce the contract that they keep providing you power?
There's perhaps an interesting role for a digital cryptocurrency that does not require always-on connectivity, eg. something that can be carried over SneakerNet for local transactions, and then automatically syncs up with the global system when the community regains Internet connectivity. In actual conflict zones today, people seem to get intermittent electrical & Internet connectivity, eg. the electricity will come on for an hour a day with rolling blackouts, and then you try to get everything charged in that one hour. And there are enough solar installations out there that several communities are likely to retain significant power even in the event of a societal collapse. But current crypto's consensus mechanisms aren't built for intermittent connectivity: you'd need to build and design something that is eventually consistent, where a weeks-long fork does not result in two competing cryptocurrencies.
Are cigarettes really currency in this case? Aren't they more like one of many possible barter units? Can't you also price things in ramen packs in prison?
Similarly, I thought the sea shells thing had been sort of debunked. In that scale of society you don't need currency, you know the guy. David Graeber summarizes this rather intuitively. Why would you need to give a guy a sea shell in a "hunter gatherer group"? You're gonna see him every day of your life and everyone is gonna know/remember he owes you one. It would be like giving your sibling a sea shell because you did them a little favor or something. It doesn't actually happen that way because it would be a complete waste of time, just actually return the favor next time. I believe the sea shell thing is more like a gift, rather than a currency. Like you might give someone a flower to tell them you think they're swell. Presumably you think that because they helped you at some point. That doesn't make it currency. People just liked giving each other shells.
I think on most modern theories, currency really comes about from conquest. The idea is as you expand these informal IOUs are not enough. You don't want to have to lug around ramen packs or cigarettes. So at the point of a sword or w/e you say hey take this coin and give us food and then you honor the coin enough and people trust it, not because it's "fungible, tradable, generally-durable commodity that the bulk of society decides to accept as being worthwhile" but because if you don't accept it the government will kill you. And if you do accept it then not only will they not kill you but they'll give things back to you later, which you will end up being a positive incentive for everyone. Now instead of a presiding over a killing field you've created a market. But without the threat of the state, it is not coherent. That's what government is.
That's basically what it says on American money. "This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private". So sure a business can refuse you service, that's a separate issue. But if you have a debt in the United States and you try to give them US dollars and they refuse and say, no thanks actually we demand cigarettes - well now they are breaking the law, aka inviting the wrath of the state. So everyone uses dollars because the last thing anyone wants is to be in debt and think a pack of ramen is gonna work and they just get to say no thanks cigarettes for me please.
And of course, you also don't want to get impaled on a spike by a dude who looks suspiciously like that guy on the coin you probably should have taken.
You actually see this on a small scale today in the functioning of many small communities, eg. you don't actually exchange currency to pay the host of a party, but you are expected to reciprocate and host sometimes yourself if you want to keep getting invited. There's a surprisingly large amount of these unpaid micro-transactions that happen, eg. my wife has gotten free childcare, free advice, free (used) furniture, free baby clothes, etc, all in the heart of Silicon Valley, because she reciprocates and also gives away her old furniture, baby toys, baby clothes, advice, introductions, childcare, etc. But when we have to pay the contractor for work on our house, we need dollars. When we buy a computer, we need dollars. When we buy all those goods that we give away new, we need dollars. That again reinforces the "credit is for people you know, currency is for people you don't" distinction.
Barter is used when a previous currency system collapses. The currency is no longer guaranteed to be accepted, so people want hard goods that they know they can use. But barter is an unstable equilibrium: as you mentioned, currency is just barter where one particular good becomes so widely accepted that people will take it not because they want it, but because it can be traded for other things that they want. There are reports of the Bosnian War [2] that described how alcohol and ammo quickly became pseudo-currencies because they were universally accepted and could easily be traded for what you actually needed.
Graeber isn't wrong, but as an anthropologist he over-indexes on the within-group interactions. There are lots of documented examples of currency emerging spontaneously from trade between groups where the groups all mutually decided that one type of object had value.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49708431
[2] https://www.scribd.com/document/664716931/How-I-survived-a-y...
I'm not sure your in group/out group thing really holds up. I think of your credit/wife examples as not "credit" but something like basic reciprocity, closer to barter.
I think it's just a bit of blurring of terms. In my mind, bullets and ammo are just not currency in the same way a coin is. You can call it a "pseudo-currency" but the pseudo is kind of cheating.
I'm also not sure "There are lots of documented examples of currency emerging spontaneously from trade between groups where the groups all mutually decided that one type of object had value" disproves the point about violence/government. Can't I do the "pseudo" move back at you? What is the mechanism of the "mutual decision"? Would it be unlike the ones that lead to states? It sounds like everyone agrees something has value so we can have a dispute resolution mechanism. The implication being if you don't agree the other choice is violence? What if I say this "spontaneous collective of groups" is a "pseudo-government"?
Where would that leave us?
Kind of like how the local church might traditionally manage birth/death/land records, but that doesn't mean the documents are sacred or a religious observance.
Well I mean technically they are always for credit purposes, even if they are the "default/convenient payment method"? That's part of the advantage, but it's still credit. You get to spend and pay later. It wouldn't be a very good evaluation for credit purposes if it didn't work like credit? Or am I misunderstanding you?
It's just to say that "credit" isn't just about an in vs out group anymore than debt is. Or anymore than "currency" is? I'm not sure how the distinction you make helps clarify that question. The point is why would credit be for people you know, and currency for people you don't? Isn't credit just a particular agreement around said currency?
1. I live in a village. I buy flour on credit from the miller, because I lack funds and they know I'll be able to pay them back after I sell my own textile goods at market.
2. I travel overseas to a store I've never seen before and I will never see again. I transact $100 on my credit-card purely because my debit card won't work for some reason. I leave with the goods, reminding myself to pay off the balance ASAP with funds I already possess when I get back to the hotel and a laptop.
Technically they both involve "credit", but it's not really equivalent. The first case involves a direct relationship in a community, while the second is indirect, a stranger trusting my card-company. In the first, incurring a debt is an intended feature, in the second the temporary debt is just a weird inconvenient quirk that I'd rather skip entirely because it makes more work for me.
In short, just because someone uses a credit card doesn't necessarily mean it's "credit" in the anthropological sense.
You said (emphasis added):
> We should be careful to distinguish when credit-cards are used for credit purposes versus the common scenario where they're just the default/convenient payment method and a debit-card could substitute just fine.
So it wasn't about "credit" in the anthropological sense, as credit cards are never used in such a way. Unless you are going to suggest there is some bifurcated way of using credit cards where one offers a more "direct relationship to my community". In short, my misread wasn't as you indicated - about failing to misunderstand something about credit cards. Rather it was conflating a general sense of "credit" (such as credit cards) with what they had meant, "I'm talking about "credit" in the David Graeber sense, where people effectively just remember who has done good things for them and reciprocate, not in the modern sense of credit cards and bank accounts." - which is what you term the "anthropological sense".
So I appreciate the nudge in the right direction, but I hope you see my point given what you actually conveyed. Thanks, have a good day!
Currency vs credit, as it was used some posts up is more like quantifiable vs not quantifiable. It's not about the exact catering expenses of parties thrown ("they had champagne, we have to invite them twice!") it's about inviting or not inviting. Not about the number of hours taking over the children, it's about being there when needed.
I do think that the development of currency is intimately connected with the development of government. The core problem government solves is dispute resolution, and I would bet that the majority of disputes come from transaction where one side does not hold up their end of the bargain. In small communities you just have the tribal elders adjudicate, but as you start doing more currency transactions between mutually-distrusting groups that can't agree on their authority figures, you need a system in place for dispute resolution. Cue states.
My point is simply that currency comes first. State formation is a consequence of extended trade networks transacting with currency, currency and trade is not a consequence of state formation. To my knowledge this is historically accurate, and there are a lot of examples of currency spontaneously arising without a state to back it.
Hell, cryptocurrency itself is a good example. We now have a viable transnational, trustless, instantaneous currency. We do not have a viable transnational trustless dispute resolution process. And we very much feel the lack, because crime and fraud is rampant in cryptocurrency transactions. Currency creates the problem that government solves. Creating a government that can go along with cryptocurrency is an unsolved exercise left to the reader.
I mean in the sense of, state formation was of such significance that I don't think you can say something like "currency came first" as if currency prior and post state formation is the same thing. It feels like the same sort of "pseudo-currency" with "currency" equivocation.
So if your model is - basic credit in that communal reciprocative sense, then you start trading with more distant outgroups, for this credit doesn't work, so everyone agrees on a currency, someone off in the distance doesn't agree, then states form to adjudicate disputes.
Then it is sensible as a primitive model, but I would just merely suggest that in the same way trying to say currency comes first is kind of a blurring the meaning of currency perhaps to the point of being a stretch, I think in this case to, it will be less orderly. One way this is blurred almost intrinsically in your articulation is via the term dispute resolution process. This could mean anything. It occurs to me that outright conquest and banditry is one way to resolve a dispute. Perhaps in places were there was "spontaneous" centering around a particular currency, this sort of violence was a predicate. I tend to think the need for violence and domination (and mitigations against the same) - what I think of when I think of states "resolving disputes" - was baked into the germ of humanity much earlier than what we might term "state formation". This gets back to the "pseudo-government" point I was trying to make earlier. I think of these things in parallel, rather than in sequence. If at their core humans are violent, such that they make violence, fear violence, and seek tradeoffs to manage violence, then this violence is a driver across currencies and states and trade networks, regardless of a determination of which "came first", if such a determination is even meaningful without greater specificity.
Similarly, I'm not sure if "State formation is a consequence of extended trade networks transacting with currency, currency and trade is not a consequence of state formation" is accurate in the same way. I suppose we have to unblur what "state" means.
I thank you for the back and forth though, which I enjoyed. I feel a need to do more reading on this topic, though I would guess much of these questions are not really falsifiable, as some of the answers are surely lost to history. Thanks, have a good day!
Thank you - brilliant
I don't necessarily buy the idea that someone with a chicken and needed bread wandered around looking for a baker in need of chicken, but their argument does fly in the face of the idea that barter follows failed currencies.
If nothing else you have a chicken and egg problem to unwind there, and barter does seem a bit more basic or simple than currency so I'd have guessed it came first.
You can watch both barter and currency develop in groups of children almost spontaneously.
IIRC, Graeber suggests that debt comes first. Initially it is tracked by memory, then when that gets too complicated, some kind of item is chosen to represent debt, which then in some cases evolves into currency. I believe this process has been observed.
The point is that they weren’t just used within a single group where everyone had access to more for the cost of only labor.
Sure it's evolved, but I don't see anything in your comment that really disputes the tie to force. Of course, taxation is connected to force. Additionally, as I addressed in another comment, a lack of modern "central authority" does not mean a lack of connection to "force" or violence. People can come up with distributed or atomized versions, which nevertheless arise under a similar tradeoff with respect to the fear of violence.
Speaking in terms of U.S. regulation and legislation, crypto is variously regulated as a "commodity" or as a "security" and therefore, cannot be formally considered a currency. The name, "cryptocurrency" is a marketing ploy, which cleverly seeks to dilute the meaning of the term, which is a term of art, and is still reserved, in legal circles, for things which are, in fact, currencies, and function as currencies, and are regulated as currencies, which crypto… is not.
It was rather painful to me in particular, because a few weeks ago, I registered and attended a municipal education session on fraud. And this session was co-hosted by an actual representative of the Arizona Corporation Commission - Securities Division. I can prove that because my prize for the session was an authentic, imprinted, ACC/SD pizza slicer! Anyway, as soon as she mentioned crypto and asserted it is a class of "currency" I tried to call her out, and I asked more than once, and being reluctant to turn the session into a referendum on her legal knowledge, I finally let her win. It was embarrassing.
Anyway, no, cryptocurrency has never been a currency. Not in the USA. Other nations may deem it as such, but I kind of doubt it so far. Please do not conflate real currency with crypto. They are distinct things that are easily distinguished. The consumer should not be deluded into thinking otherwise.
It's pretty restrictive. You couldn't just port bitcoin to a CRDT while keeping CALM. You'd have to rethink the economics around the constraints of what's possible to do in a distributed way. But maybe that would be worth doing anyway.
Also, to the power of modern-day cryptography that rubber-hose and evil maid (backdoors) are the only viable (even if expensive) alternatives.
> the government disappears, there are really only two fundamental technologies needed to reboot everything: money and contracts
Both of which require "governance", but post-collapse, it may be of form that may not benefit the collective.
It doesn't prove the hardness assumption, if it did we could trot forward any toddler and ask if it knows the factors to some RSA product, and "prove" hardness assumption for factoring integers...
I was just thinking about click fraud, and how I'll bet that a significant number of clicks on sites are now being driven by simple (they don't need to be too complicated) LLMs.
[0] https://discworld.fandom.com/wiki/Cut-Me-Own-Throat_Dibbler
A high trust society. Everything else is downstream of that.
I'm not sure. I want to say there's volunteering, charities, clubs, religions etc. But those all need resources (time, energy, money) put into them to remain viable. I suppose if something is unprofitable it means the resources (money or not) are drained faster than they go in, and the entity dissolves.
It's predictable: The ROI of attacking cryptocurrencies in this manner is high enough to make expensive attacks worthwhile. It doesn't make other expensive attacks on typical end-users worthwhile, and they remain far-fetched.
Banking systems exist such as they do with the regulations that they do for a reason.
The difference is that the western attackers go free, whilst the Chinese attackers will very likely be executed.
As long as the cost of sucha single-target attack isn't substantially below its potential upside, you should be safe.
Otoh, it's only meaningful if you have more than just toy assets in there.
There should be a range between those two though that would contain lots of folks comfortably.
Also known as buying a laptop, removing the WiFi card, and putting stock Ubuntu on it.
Yeah, the problem with "crypto hardware wallets" is the same as the problem with "secure phones for drug dealers" - they are an extremely juicy targets, you KNOW that any user of them is your target.
4G chips cost nothing and can be super small.
These Ledger hardware wallets are following the best security practices for hardware wallets and still got hacked.
Back in the day, RSA SecurID hardware tokens were completely physically sealed, with no room for a backdoor. Tampering with them in any ways destroys them or makes it physically obvious. That's a physically secure design. This Ledger thing looks more like a consumer toy.
I'd be curious if anyone on HN could confirm whether RSA quietly reissued new keyfobs. The safe assumption was the intruders got access to the TOTP secrets, but strictly speaking that was conjecture, unless that was later confirmed directly or indirectly.
This may have been a different incident, but at some point there was chatter about a possible physical intrusion targeting a TOTP backend server for DoD or defense contract systems (Lockheed Martin?).
I think really serious incidents tend to be more vigorously suppressed, unlike humdrum PII exfiltration, for the same reason that during wartime states don't want the enemy to have unequivocal confirmation about how successful an operation was, e.g. whether the secrets exfiltrated included credentials to specific systems.
I briefly tried to keep a list of these types of hardware-based authentication systems hacks. But it's a chore, especially following up.
https://smallhacks.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/reading-codes-fr...
Don't give out your account numbers, there will be a lot of hassle should an evil person get it. However you have a reasonable change of getting your money back in a couple years. (this is also why you get warning about some countries - a few will not cooperate with traces and so the money is lost)
Is that a US thing? In Europe, companies have their account numbers on their letter heads and websites, and people are quite comfortable giving out their account numbers.
https://www.quelle.de/service-hilfe/bezahlung-finanzierung/k...
1. Something electronic that kicks of the thing where I need to enter the “ID codes” from device or app; 2. Being present at the bank and having been ID’d;
The same attack on every desktop and laptop would be... significantly harder.
I'll give you a little hint - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopoly_on_violence
The only thing they are better is providing security in an easier way.
One example of subjectivity is if, and this happens, a bug is found which can drastically increase the supply of coins beyond the intent of the creators; everyone comes together and removes those state transitions manually despite their objective validity. A more practical notion would be some type of "this transaction was fraud, someone has authority to reverse it." Of course, this is a hard tradeoff, but users should be able to make it.
Yeah, it is totally great to have to set up a different account for every service, then having to do AML and KYC, and then having your account suspended for no apparent reason. So great that international transfers takes days and tens of dollars in fees, if they succeed at all. So great how a large part of the world‘s populace is denied access to the global financial system. Great as well how centralized it is, so things go down when there are technical problems at your bank. Absolutely awesome how Canada was able to freeze bank accounts of people who donated to the ”wrong“ cause.
They totally have it figured out, we should stop looking for alternatives. We already have the perfect system for the ages. Anybody who even tries is delusional.
Is it? The theory and even the implementation is literally a gas station credit card skimmer for crypto. I do agree that anyone dismissing attacks on Ledger was foolish, but mostly because Ledger is an obviously low-quality product on even a cursory inspection, not because we need to become even more paranoid conspiracy theorists.
--------------
From: Vincenzo lozzo
Sent: Monday, July 2, 2018 8:04 AM
To: jeevacation@gmail.com
Subject: Ledger wallet warning
Attachments: image1jpeg; Untitled attachment 00284.txt
In case you hold any coins in it, please don't spread this as they h=ven't released any of the information yet.
As for what is worth, the other wallets seem just as bad
--------------
Links:
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02501...
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02507...
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA008603...
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02505...
I always thought it is stupid to HODL using a hardware wallet. For HODLing, just get a random computer (no mailorder) and run debian13 with electrum (it is in the official repo, not an external package hence protected by standard debian safeties). Once you generated you keys, back them up and either wipe the machine, or at least airgap it.
Extra bonus: Raspberry pi 5 runs debian 13 out of the box.
ewww
Its slow, but it will never have been tampered with and can't be digitally cracked if you have multiple physical copies of the resulting seed.
I bought directly from ledger. I don't know if they were assembling devices in house at the time or not.
Edit: further context, this discussion is somewhat relevant to how confident they were. See the OP's remark about what ledger said: https://www.reddit.com/r/CryptoCurrency/comments/ssycjn/my_l...
Every single time I thought maybe people on the internet know what they're talking about, I've been proven wrong. The internet is for entertainment purposes only.
The only educational exception has been people who weren't exactly posting on the internet, such as the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting videos or Stanford lectures.
There's a lot of grief can come from it, so I try and read this poem often. [0]
This is not a homogenous mass...it also keeps changing. The internet is just a medium. It's like saying people writing books know what they talk about. Doesn't make sense. Anybody can write on the internet or write a book
Nit: did it actually do OCR? Given the implant was embedded in a specific known device that probably used specifically known fonts, you'd think they could just do a lookup a character's block of pixels to read the screen.
What about ignoring proprietary hardware wallets, and implement your 'wallet' as a small, bare-bones, self installed debian system with enough empty disk space to be a full node, that stores the data on a dm-crypt volume? Buy the hardware in cash from a random used computer store. No it won't be as convenient and portable. But if you trust standards-based crypto, you can implement your own ssh tunnel or whatever to it from your other client devices. This also lets you take 1:1 disk clone images of the dm-crypt volume and safely back it up to remote locations at any time you want.
I've worked in payment terminal hardware security and this is not surprising to me at all.
This attack on the Ledger wallets would definitely rate as amateur in terms of sophistication in that world.
I don't have to think about any of this stuff when I am using the payment terminal at Kroger. We have well engineered systems that eliminate the need for being constantly on edge about every monetary transaction. I can lose my entire actual wallet and experience ~zero financial impact, even if a malicious party obtains it.
What happens if my wallet bricks itself due to some misconfiguration or environmental transient? I don't have to keep multiple redundant copies of my payment cards around just in case my physical wallet self destructs.
[1] “Newsnight” on BBC
[2] As in Diffie-Hellman etc https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitfield_Diffie
There are lots of security measures you can bypass if you pretend to be crazy within given bounds or simply stop acting sane.
I refuse to touch anything crypto with a ten-foot pole. I don't know if that makes me "paranoid", but it is certainly very easy. Just stay away from the thing doing drug markets, scams and rugpulls every month.
I think it's good to remember this is always the case. Attacks on tamper evident seals are commonly called "theoretical" or "lacking value" in practical terms, but recent customs evasion using counterfeit seals in the US shows that to be untrue.
Heck, The Wire had an arc about people bypassing customs tamper-seal tags.
That is the only way to ensure no "authority" can undo or correct legally made transactions.
A few years ago, the Canon camera battery supply chain was intermingled with knock offs. The seller I bought from was exchanging for legit batteries or reimbursement when a customer made a claim.
look up german angst
Any random person who can play spot-the-difference with two different pictures and is armed with a hammer could verify it in 15 minutes.
They don't even have to be technical or understand what the chips do or how the technical aspects of the compromise work, a raw visual check is all you need.
Supply chain attack?
"Can't do shit, not my problem."
If it was that easy to shed responsibility.
"We're talking here about a tiny eSIM implant and a little CPU doing OCR on the fonts appearing on the hardware wallet's screen to read the secrets during set up. So the secure element ain't tampered with."
...is accurate...it's one of the rare times I'd agree there's nothing they can do. And I was all prepared to storm in here saying "convenient excuse!"
The device should have bricked itself after someone opened it up to put hidden stuff inside. Also showing the key phrase to the user instead of keeping it secret to the secure element is a questionable decision.
'You have unexpected components. You may want to have your device inspected or risking compromise of x/y/z. Should we continue or lock it down'?
Jokes aside, keystone wallets are air gapped. And not air gapped but awesome the lesser known but imo best of all, gridplus lattice1.
Heck, even a trezor, despite their mail provider being hacked, is better.
I, however, dont endorse the iPhone idea.
Just don’t buy ledger, terrible company. Many of my friends are getting endless spam because of them. The key backup is a disaster after they promised it was not possible to retrieve it. Their software stack is closed source.
This is imo the last nail in the coffin for them. They should refund all the money lost, and issue a worldwide recall.
Lots to hate about them.
Lattice for example, has strong anti-tampering features.
Then what is the best solution aside from tightly controlling the supply chain?
I'm not even sure a tampering detector would help. If this can happen, I'm fairly sure someone would figure out how to do the ocr by appending components externally.
Maybe these devices could ship in a tamper-detection-only mode, then detection triggered by user to be inspected by the user, then factory installed firmware wiped and reloaded if desired, have user key loaded to the firmware, and the shell sealed back up with electronic and physical detection enabled.
But as the other comment points out, older HDCP is broken wide open so ... easier to just use that. Plenty HDCP strippers on the market.
https://grandideastudio.com/portfolio/security/ledger-hardwa...
They should have posted the weight with and without the device in it.
Also: never leave empty space in a hardware key, pot the whole thing in epoxy.
If need be, just grind and cut till you are back to the one silicon wafer that contains crypto keys, then rebuild the whole lot from scratch, add your evil parts, then re-pot it.
What you’re describing is a different thing. It’s an “evil maid” attack, when you tamper with a wallet that is already set up by the user. Also, it would be ultra difficult and expensive.
What you’re saying is possible. But:
It would probably be cheaper to build a total fake Ledger Wallet, then just replace the new real wallet and deliver a fake with a weak entropy generator. Any case, that’s not what has happened this time.
(The MITM supply chain attack which has happened succeeds because it preserves the original secure hardware but intercepts the secret data at the display interface. But a low-effort mimic of the entire device like I suggested? That wouldn’t work).
And as this workaround leaves the original Secure Element intact, good luck detecting the supply chain attack.
Man can make it, man can break it.
The best I've done is to modify a potted chip by very careful thermal imaging to figure out where the part was that blocked the feature I wanted to unlock (market segmentation) and then drill through the case to a depth just higher than the chip. You'd have definitely been able to spot the difference. This was at the millimeter level. Recently there was a post about a group doing this at the chip level, which I thought was extremely impressive, and again, even with the recipe out there duplicating it would still be very hard.
https://www.xda-developers.com/how-drill-defeated-the-xbox-3...
Sounds like a good approach when you only have a single (or just a few) of the devices so you need to be careful.
With hardware wallets (aka substantial incentive), then the attackers could order a bunch of them for sacrificial zero-ing in the exact places to drill with a CNC/microscope/etc.
Yes, initially I had just the one. But once I had it figured out there were lots of other people that wanted their device 'improved' so that jig got used plenty of times. Even so working on other people's hardware always felt very scary, especially poking around with a drill in a sensitive piece of hardware. Even so, they all worked, it was a neat little trick.
But it was clear what it did: as soon as the channel selector went to a forbidden channel the blob sprung into action to disable the chip underneath. I measured the effect on the pins underneath that were accessible from the other side of the board and noticed that a whole bunch of them got shorted to ground. That was the hint I needed. A friend ran a laser game company and they had a nice little IR camera with built in display, that was used for calibration of the IR beam collimators in the laser guns (the laser doesn't actually do any of the shooting, the thing is basically just a very powerful remote control with a lens that sends out a relatively narrow beam). I set it up above the the blob and set the channel selector to a good channel and let it warm up. Had a look with the camera. Then set the channel selector to a bad channel, let it warm up again and had another look with the camera. The difference was pretty obvious, there was a hotspot right in the middle of the blob. I marked the spot and made a drill jig, then it took me a few days to gather courage and stick the drill in, it worked on the first try. That gave 18 nearly empty channels to play with. Once I had it figured out the second one was a lot easier :)
I'd assume it's not a coincidence and fraudsters made sure there's no easy way to trace anything back from the SIMs.
Even weight difference might not be obvious. He compared weights for one Ledger product but the small variations in weight among genuine devices made comparisons not clear.
Possibly only X-ray would uncover the fake without cracking the case?
https://youtube.com/@MagicalTux
(Warning - MagicalTux is Tibanne or Mark Karpeles. He has a “complicated” legal history, but this looks legit)
https://www.masterbond.com/techtips/tamper-resistant-potting...
The devices we made were put in places where there was a significant risk of tampering and to the best of my knowledge nobody ever managed to break the epoxy bond to the point that the circuit was still functional. But as I wrote above: not cheap.
...frankly, selling one as DIY kit have highest chance for tamper resistance. Tho pretty untenable with small SMD components sadly
(sadly I have not found nice website with newer version photos yet)
If one would make a list of things that can go wrong, starting from the supply chain that delivers parts to the manufacturer, malicious employees at the manufacturer, mistakes the manufacturer can make, attacks on the delivery chain from the manufacturer to the user, to mistakes the user can make creating, using and storing their keys - the list would contain hundreds of points.
Seriously, that's why we have banks, still.
The actual reason to discount this is that account shutdowns are flashy rare events that reliably summon HN outrage, and so the kind of person who posts here overweights how likely they are, at least for people not on the margins of society. (If that weren't the case, the system wouldn't work and normal people wouldn't use it.)
Next is a hold on your suspicious transaction, request additional documents for your own money, basically a lot of AML and KYC before you can use what’s yours.
I understand the reason why they do this but it feels to me you are no longer in control of your money/property and somehow they fail to catch people loading billions from shady sources so I would rather not keep my money in a bank (at least not a retail bank) if I had a sensible option.
Most people don’t care about this until they get trapped just like most people are /were OK with Paypal and other junk services.
Ironically the failure rate when I use the American Visa or MasterCard is maybe 5%.
What do you use to access your bank account online? I use my laptop, or my phone.
I almost fell for a strange scam a while ago. A Steam user by the same name as one of my existing steam friends added me. I assumed it was his second account and accepted. A few days later, he messages me, asking me to participate in a DOTA2 tournament. I had previously played DOTA2 with this person, he spoke to me in our shared native language which is not English and everything seemed in order. I said I haven't played DOTA2 in years so I'm beyond rusty, he said I don't have to play, they just need me to register so they have a full team for the signups and then they'll find someone else to play before the tournament starts. Sent me a link to a website requiring a signup and I can't remember what it was now but there was something about the signup that irked me. Maybe it was just creating a account, maybe it required a credit card or something I can't remember but I ended up looking at my steam friends list and noticed both the accounts were online. So I sent a message to the other account asking if this is them, he said no and then I noticed the same scammer had added another mutual friend so I messaged them too warning them about it.
That's the closest I've been to getting scammed that I can recall. I'm not sure what the scammer would gain from my signing up but I'm sure they had some kind of profit angle.
For inter-bank transactions involving a scam that causes the customer to “voluntarily” send money it depends on the rail. But US ACH rules cover reversals due to fraud and have pretty substantial rules about it.
Nothing in this world tends to be "the solution", everything has tradeoffs.
Say you want to do self-custody, what is then the best option? "Don't do self-custody" obviously isn't the solution, as the core use case here is self-custody, so what in your opinion is a better way, than hardware wallets?
If there is nothing better today than hardware wallets, then for now, they are "one of the better solutions" for how to do self-custody, even with the current tradeoffs. But again, I'm eager to hear what the alternatives are.
From a bird's-eye perspective, 3 things are needed: Create a key, derive an address from the key, store the key.
Creating a key safely is possible with dice. You would probably create a seed phrase instead of a key directly, but for this discussion it is the same.
Deriving an address from the key is hard and I have not yet seen a good protocol on how to do it. I have read through a bunch of descriptions of how people do it and they are all weak and brittle. The most popular seems to be "I order a hardware wallet and follow the instructions that come with it". But even people who put a lot of thought into it come up with weak and brittle approaches. I would think there is a way to do it safely. But I have never seen a description of one yet. It might involve multiple computers, multiple software implementations and a hell of a lot of work to create a multisig that is not prone to a single attack vector.
Storing the key is probably the hardest. The most popular way seems to be to store it in a drawer or a safe. So now those coins are just as safe as a piece of gold would be. Or they use a multisig and store the keys in multiple locations. Quite painful. As you have the ongoing problem of keeping those locations accessible and safe at the same time.
You're feeling pretty proud of yourself, your coins are super safe.
Then it turns out the RNG in the coldcard mk2 was badly/maliciously implemented and is completely insecure. You need to move your coins right now.
You can probably see the issue
I am still pro crypto and fascinated by the technology but we have to admit the original cypherpunk vision was unfortunately never going to work, we're going to end up with something else
Again, "best solution we have available" for self-custody is hardware wallets, so we're back to square one.
Imagine if I tried to discuss and argue about things like this on a TypeScript submission? "No, this won't actually solve the problems of TS" I say, "What is the solution then?" someone asks me and I reply "There is no real solutions to those problems, just use Clojure, problems avoided!", completely missing the point.
A $5 USB stick with Tails on it. You can make as many clones as you want, so no need for a recovery phrase. It's not specialized hardware, so there's no incentive for anyone to look for money on it (plus it's encrypted). If you want to be extra tinfoil hat, make sure you only plug it into an air-gapped machine and copy any output (address, transaction hex etc.) onto another USB.
The reality is that normal people need to have a simpler solution they can trust. For nerds like us booting up tails and creating cold storage paper wallets is fine but definitely a solution for the general public
If there was one, someone would write down the steps necessary and put them on the internet. But I have never seen a sound description of how to self-custody Bitcoin in a safe way.
The hardest part seems to not even be the one that currently creates all those problems - the hardware and software used. The hardest part is storing the key (for example a seed phrase). If anyone says they know a way to safely store Bitcoin, my first question is: How do you store the key?
With bitcoin nothing is reversible so every step of the process is a huge security risk where you can fall off a cliff and experience financial permadeath of "your" crypto, assuming a sufficiently motivated attacker.
An ordinary MacBook does not have that issue. If you are a high-value target, you can further decrease your risk profile by buying it from a random physical store, further preventing targeted attacks.
In retrospect @gigachad’s summary is worth as much as both articles combined, but for the Clauded technical source (with pictures!) that Ledger’s Claude-release refers to: https://www.tibane.net/research/ledger-nano-x-implant
The ones with hidden eSIMs aren't!
Keyboard traffic is plain. Bluetooth access depends on where you are positioned. DVI is not hard to decode for capturing the entire screen. KVMs are so small now that one could easily be snuck in. Even though the motherboard is very compact, there is space above it and near the batteries.
I always assumed the people buying those crypto gadgets were idiots.
also, if Apple falls to a supply chain attack like this where their laptops are backdoored crypto theft will be problem number #10.
Actually 2FA, hardware biometrics, behaviour based fraud prevention and personal confirmation of suspicious transactions. If you’re using credit they can refund fraudulent transactions, and there is the chargeback mechanism. This is probably banking system dependent, but in AUS there is a refund mechanism for mistaken/fraudulent traditional bank transactions.
BTC has effectively none of the safety net, and humans are fallible. We need the safety net. It’s the hugest barrier to adoption. Exchanges do a far better job of managing the risks than trusting your wealth to a hardware wallet.
Basically, he was now just a safe cracker. He is a a locksmith, but 100% of his full time hours are cracking safes. He didn’t even carry around the stuff in his van to repin a lock. He gave me mates rates but the shop had to do it.
This man was attending multiple callouts, per day, to crack into a safe. Because of, you guessed it, human fallibility.
In a city with with millions of people, basically a hundreds of people needed a single locksmiths service because they had locked themselves out of there own “personal store of wealth”.
I’ve heard zero such examples through traditional banking, with the exception of stolen cards.
In systems with a basis in technology, final means final. If the North Koreans take your money, your money is taken.
This piece from Patrick mcKenzie explains this well https://www.complexsystemspodcast.com/episodes/the-900m-wire...
This seems obviously not true. If someone in New York steals your money then courts in New York can order them to give it back even if it's Bitcoin. If they don't comply then they get held in contempt until they do or the police seize their computer with the keys on it etc.
If the person who stole it is in North Korea then the courts with jurisdiction would be the ones in North Korea, which may not be to your advantage, but how is it any different from what happens after the money was transferred to a bank in North Korea? Or, for that matter, what happens if someone in North Korea has the stolen money deposited into a US account and then spends it before you get around to reversing the transaction?
The problem isn't what kind of technology you use, it's that someone can transfer stolen assets into a jurisdiction that won't help you get them back. Regardless of what payment system you use, they can get the same effect by using the stolen money to buy gold bullion or similar and have it shipped to them in their jurisdiction, and once it crosses the border they're not giving it back.
So if I pay cash for something, I can get it back if a judge orders the counterparty to do so.
Why is cryptocurrency not the same? Can I not go to a court and get an order, exactly the same?
Of course I may not know the counterparty's identity or they may be in a hostile jurisdiction, but how is that different to cash that has escaped my jurisdiction?
It's just that incidentally, "entity you do not trust outside your jurisdiction" also includes basically your average crypto peer.
If you wire your money to North Korea, forget about it for a week, and then ask a court to intervene you aren’t getting your funds back.
That’s not an incremental change in risk over a crypto transaction.
Sure...? If you get scammed you probably are. My point is immutable transactions aren't unique to crypto. They're just a lot more difficult to stumble into with real finance.
I have yet to see a single one, not one, that had a system of custody that did not allow any one of hundreds of people, most not even employees, to walk away with all of the funds.
There are no standards for security that apply to crypto custodians and the mostly fail to do the bare minimums.
If you use even a top ten custodian, operate under the assumption that the funds are in multi billion dollar plaintext wallets sitting on AWS servers the whole team has ssh access to from the same laptops they "npm install" random shit to all day.
Honestly if you do not feel confident custodying crypto yourself, you should probably not own any.
Even if you are not hacked, or otherwise lose access to the funds, they are not unlikely to become worthless simply due to the system with the stable coins collapsing.
The liquidity can easily disappear, much more so than with Fiat currency or other assets linked to real economies.
You cannot protect yourself from being scammed in that way, even if you do hold on to your keys.
I mean crypto might seem like such a hedge, comparable to gold. But really it's a wealth redistribution scheme where already the current valuation depends somewhat on trusting exchanges that issue stable coins.
A person that doesn't have anything to hide is happy to leave it's money in a bank where, under EU legislation, it's guaranteed up to 100k euros per account (so you can have multiple accounts in multiple banks so you are safe), that is no matter if the bank goes bankrupt, the money is stolen, or whatever else you will have your money back.
The wipe the device, use any non-debian other linux (or BSD) to generated the 2-of-2 wallet key.
Look back as recently as last year and hardware wallets were held up as the recommended way to do self-custody all over.
Whenever I brought up the issue of losing coins due to hacks or bugs, I was told that hardware wallets had solved this problem.
A hardware wallet is way way way more likely to be backdoored[1] than an off the shelve Intel or AMD CPU.
[1] by people wanting to steal your crypto (unlike the NSA or Intel)
Also, general purpose hardware doesn't really prevent this as much as you might like. You're still subject to supply chain attacks even if Linux (etc) are quite secure. Look at supply chain attacks we've had in the npm and other ecosystems.
At this point, the best is a 2-multi-sig solution where one is some hardware wallet and the second is an iPhone app wallet where the seed is stored digitally only. So even if your offline seed is compromised, you are still covered.
Everyone at ledger has made absolute fools out of themselves.
They want to be certain they have the resources to properly personally verify the operations and trustworthiness of every authorized distributor that they’re vouching for.
Apparently the hacker did remove the battery and replace it with a smaller one, leaving enough room for the tiny eSIM/LTE modem / OCR chip that did recognition of the secret on screen.
They're here. It's wild.
I guess the sweatshop workers would then need to be trained in reballing BGAs if they did that.
Give me a shitty html4 page with the text ffs.
tl;dr Implant is just a little cell phone that does OCR of the hardware wallet's screen during setup to steal the recovery phrases. The implant's design has improved notably three different times before landing on a pretty darn sleek spot-welded overlay that is laminated flat onto the host.
This was already the level of integration 13 years ago: https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/the-12-gongkai-phone/
Observe how the SIM card socket is the biggest part on the board: http://bunniefoo.com/ntw/dozendp_8.png
What would be cool is if someone from Ledger like did some reverse engineering, dumped instructions on how to buy these devices like this and made it so we could use them for hobbyist usage with our own esim. I could for sure think of some use cases for like remote wipe etc.
Eg. https://dangerousthings.com/products/apex-flex?Antenna=Narro...
We're dealing with reasonably sophisticated state actors here in this dark forest; not script kiddies.
Cheap $5 PCB + programmable small FPGA is a very viable route too for hardware implants; but even a microcontroller / ESP32/etc will probably do.
Cellular communications hardware seems very sophisticated and expensive compared to a simple microcontroller.
They did, in fact, appear to mass-manufacture a custom-built flat flex implant with cellular (LTE-M!), eSIM, and everything that hid right inside the Ledger, sniffing the SPI reads to the display to read the recovery phrases it pukes out and send 'em over cellular to the ringleader.
It's an EXTREMELY well built implant. I'm impressed. Multiple revisions, even.
The money's too hot to not build shit like this and slip it into the stream. Even a few thousand in R&D netting a six figure ROI is worth it, getting millions is just the icing.
But yeah, putting a cellular modem and eSIM on there is certainly taking it to the next level
(Not so long ago you could hear them talk with the towers through regular home speakers.)
You need to actively listen at multiple frequencies at the same time (gsm/lte/5g have many different bands, + wifi/bt at 2.4/5/6 ghz and their bands). And you need to remove interference from all other devices to conclude that signal is coming from ledger (so any home isn't an option).
On top of that, you need to be listening at the exact time it exfiltrates data (it might intentionally wait for some time after using device), and you need to have the compromised device (which the hardest part here - you could test 100s of devices and not find anything).
So I think this could only be caught with a large scale, recurring lab testing, far from "trivial to detect".
When enough resources / money is involved, these things are to be expected.
If you can't get to the insides without breaking it, the only devices verified to likely be safe would be unusable too, so the product would in practice be even more unsafe.
If the user first inspects it and then glue it on their own, that would work, but it wouldn't solve this problem. Evil maid attack is something else and obviously harder at scale.
Even if one were to ignore the latest incident, which arguably isn't their fault, the first three incidents make up a pretty bad security track record.
How a French (EU based) company is still in business after all of this, is an indicator of selective enforcement of EU privacy laws (GDPR, etc).
I'd not release them soo easily from their share of responsibility. Tamper-proof hardware is a thing, electronic funds transfer terminals for example already implement ways to detect or prevent physical intrusion into safety-relevant parts of the device. Would probably have cost a few cents in manufacturing to add countermeasures to physical modification into the Ledgers. The fact that there is not even the slightest attempt at securing the device against this kind of attacks is entirely on the manufacturer.
> How a French (EU based) company is still in business after all of this, is an indicator of selective enforcement of EU privacy laws (GDPR, etc).
Surely you can name a dozen of US companies that have been driven out of business by enforcement of EU privacy laws. But I'd be glad if you'd at least name a single one!
You're better off just having a dedicated laptop for crypto transactions.
Actually the only one I know is the Gnosis Safe. Talk about creating a huge risk if it would have a problem.
The fact that some people can put million dollars worth of crypto on a device, but can't buy a plane ticket to someone to get the device straight from the factory is crazy.
The fact that puri.sm has better anti interdiction practices than Ledger is crazy : https://puri.sm/posts/anti-interdiction-update-six-month-ret...
> Before Ledger publicly confirmed the hardware implant, former Mt. Gox CEO Mark Karpelès reported examining a suspicious Ledger Nano X device obtained from Malaysia. On October 9, Karpelès described finding an additional electronic component hidden behind the device’s display, inside material normally used to protect the screen.
> He reported that the wallet had arrived in packaging that appeared intact, raising questions about whether customers could identify a modified device through a routine visual inspection. In photographs shared publicly, the component appeared to contain electronic circuitry separate from the wallet’s original hardware
Come on.
Amateur hour all around.
UPD: NL, just like some other few countries in EU, doesn't require mandatory identification for SIM card purchases and activation
Even if you would hand it from the factory straight to a customer that comes physically to your factory to pick it up, then you would still require some sort of ID to know that that person is in fact the customer I suppose. Which removes some of the advantages of cryptocurrencies
> This article was originally published in German. It was translated with technical assistance and editorially reviewed before publication.
Presumably "technical assistance" covers just about everything.
This is some D grade trash writing.
But what I want to talk about is trust. The big selling point of crypto has always been that fiat currencies, governments and the banking system can't be trusted. Your money can be seized. You may be subject to capital controls. Also, you're subject to chargebacks and so forth.
So crypto hasn't really eliminated the trust issue. It's just moved it. Instead of governments and the financial system having to be trusted, you're trusting far less accountable hardware vendors who might be completely trustworthy as far as you and they know but they can still be subject to supply chain attacks. An extreme (non-crypto) example of this is the Lebanon pager operation.
I've always maintained the crypto is largely solving non-problems and it treats things in the financial system as bugs when they're in fact features, such as reversible transactions.
Crypto transactions has significant limitations, such as everything needs to be on the blockchain (ie the so-called Oracle Problem), which is the whole reason we have stablecoins, etc.
People with this hardware wallet were largely very sophisticated users and even they couldn't successfully and securely manage a wallet. What hopes does the average Joe have?
The more time goes on, the more I'm convinced that crypto is a solution looking for a problem.
Is it nowadays a workable defense to say that you had a bunch of AI agents in a sandbox doing experiments and they somehow escaped and you will totally make sure this does not happen again?
There are other elements of the article that are confused: an "eSIM" is SOFTWARE, not a "tiny chip". Perhaps they mean a "realSIM"?? The SIM is of course only needed to authenticate to a cell network. The article mentions an LTE module. So the e/not-e-SIM aspect seems a little by the by. The main meat of the trojan was a regular ARM SoC.
I don't care about cryptocurrencies but I've always been fascinated by the cryptography behind it. I've also dabbled with hardware wallets for non-cryptocurrencies stuff: like U2F auth.
The idea of a master secret that is behind a secure element which I control and which I can duplicate is amazing to me (as opposed to, say, "your" passkeys which Google/Microsoft/Apple can basically backup and transfer to other devices for you).
But really to me in the cryptocurrencies world people have been sold the lie that a hardware wallet was secure: it's not. It could be tampered with (as happened in this hack, where an additional rogue chip reading the screen and then sending it using an eSIM steals the secret) but it can also contain a bug (like the recent Coldcard exploit where Coldcard hardware wallets fell back on a RNG with only 32 bits of entropy and some dark-hat hacker cracked those and stole Bitcoins) and, most of all, the vendor of the hardware wallet itself can do nasty attacks (like "kleptography").
From the very start everybody in the ecosystem should have pushed of "n-of-n" schemes (say even just 2-of-2), where one secret goes on a hardware wallet from one vendor and the other secret goes on a hardware wallet from another vendor.
For years and years the tune has been: "PCs cannot be trusted, use a hardware wallet" but it mislead people.
PCs indeed cannot be trusted but unsuspecting users should have learned how to use 2-of-2 or 3-of-3 schemes, to become immune from hacks affecting one hardware wallet vendor.
The typical, non-sensical, response to this is the idiotic: "but if you have two secrets, if you lose one of them you lose everything". It's totally idiotic for people basically save a list of 24 words (the "seed", which is the master secret). Well, guess what: instead of saving a list of 24 words, you save a list of 48 words. Exact same thing, just twice longer.
That's my take: the entire "your coins will be safe if you use a hardware wallet" was misguided.
2-of-3 allows loss of one key, 3-of-5 allows loss of two keys, etc
The cost is increased complexity, but the alternative is potentially losing everything due to a single mistake. So far people seem to overweigh the complexity of multisig, and to overestimate their understanding of using a single signing device.
Why are theee no legal repurcussions to this?
Nothing like the monopoly on violence to severely discourage bad actors from executing something like this.
Dogs = cryptocurrencies. Fleas = scammed.
(My hardware wallet is made of pleather and holds paper bills.)
Much better than the average crypto gambler.
The cash has been acting as a medium of exchange (something the cryptocurrency industry has given up on, at this point), which is its job, and my wealth is in capital. And capital is what the world runs on. And it's done really well.
Like sure, they're not fully immune... But at least I can call my bank and show them that I didn't suddenly fly from New Mexico to Florida to buy $200 in gift cards from a gas station in the middle of nowhere.
Crypto MUST deal with fraud and hacking if they want to become reliable. At that point, they'll just become another bank with a casino attached.
PNC is so bad they even have “secret question” password reset, last time I saw it, e.g. “what’s is the name of your cousin”
None of these prevent thieves or anybody from knowing you have one worth stealing. The actual solution is to not use fundamentally broken transparent crypto like BTC that broadcasts to the whole world your exact funds and ties them to your identity on every transaction. With monero your funds could be 0,10 or 10 billion and that is nobody's business.
https://www.biblioctopus.com/pages/books/938/u-s-currency/th...
> Data processing by advertising providers including personalised advertising with profiling
> Consent [required for free use]
These people are being suckered into a false sense of security with hardware cryptowallets. I mean, it would be very tempting to sell a hardware wallet with a backdoor inside of it to steal everyone's cryptocurrency, wouldn't it?
Keeping your wallet file on a USB stick (or encrypting it) merely reduces the window of time an attacker can get the information. The attacker with local access could simply replace your wallet software. Or make use of a keylogger, screen capture, memory capture, etc.
In that context a dedicated device is the safer approach, and a hardware key is a minimalist device to do that whilst also being less inconvenient than an airgapped dedicated crypto laptop.
HN will never permit to look into the origin of this criminal action and normies will not even put that possibility on the table because they've been programmed against it. Let's play a game, this is a serious criminal act. I bet this will be quickly forgoten in about 3 weeks without anyone in Germany pointing fingers to the guilty party.