sorry, saying that "it's a matter of taste" whether the earth revolves around the sun is completely ridiculous. making useful predictions is one thing, but actual truth is not a "matter of taste".
Put differently, would you say a heliocentric reference frame is also "wrong" since the sun is actually orbiting around Sagittarius A*?
Taking your argument to its logical conclusion, one would conclude that the [comoving reference frane](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoving_and_proper_distances) is the only "true" one. And at last there is real validity to this claim, since the CMB does pick out a preferred velocity at each point in spacetime. But it is pretty impractical to use comoving coordinates to study problems outside of cosmology.
Ultimately, it stops being a matter of "right" or "wrong" but rather one of picking the right tool for the job you're working on.
That’s another way of saying it’s untrue.
> Judge a model based on its accuracy, not its point of reference.
Something can be both accurate and wrong, in the manner of a model that pinpoints the cause of death from cancer as admission to a cancer ward.
Are you sure there will always be just one simplest theory? Or are you using some other criteria to pick it?
There's a basic principle called Ockham's Razor that I'm sure you're aware of, which proposes that the simplest theory is the most likely candidate, but that's a heuristic, not a rule.
Another relevant concept here is that the map is not the territory. All theories are attempts to express some kind of underlying truth via some sort of formal system. Some of those theories map much more closely to the truth than others, in a way that's independent of accurately predicting observed behavior to date.
All you have is the different theories, so there's no definitive way to assess their closeness to truth other than by their predictive accuracy. If you don't have the physical capacity to leave the room and observe the world, all you've got is the maps themselves and how well they predict travel times and features found along the way.
The only tool you have is the inductive strength of a big pile of observations in which correlations emerge. You can do experiments to prune certain causal stories, but there's never time to eliminate all possible stories. You end up with something that makes sense for you, in terms of the equipment that you have, and the theories that you and your peers use, and it's good enough, so we move forward with it.
I can see how it might be useful to document a particular explanation as "the" explanation, especially if you're communicating why a drug works because it will lead to useful conclusions about who should or shouldn't take the drug.
But when it comes to speculation about whether a given astronomical body will be visible at a particular time, I think science would have progressed much more quickly if we had not held so tightly to the notion that one explanation is intrinsically correct, and we're probably holding ourselves back now in other domains by doing the same.
It's possible to come up with an "unnecessarily complex model" for why someone accused of a crime did the crime, but that has completely no bearing on whether the defendant is actually guilty. If the defendant is, in fact, innocent, then the prosecution's model is, in fact, untrue - no matter how well it fits the evidence.
Are you proposing that an explanation can be true even though there's a different explanation which better fits the evidence?
Or are we talking about cases where both candidate explanations fit the evidence equally, and you have access to some kind of intuition which tells you which of the two are true?
Such a proposition would be correct; compare the concept (and name!) of "overfitting" in statistics.
> you're not incorrect if you pick a frame that puts the moon in the center or any other point
What classical relativity does not allow you to do is place yourself at an arbitrary point and call that the center of mass of the system (i.e. things orbit around you). That's not invariant. It's a very different thing than predicting the motion of objects from your vantage point.
And that's the part that I'm suggesting AI might be unable to solve. Even if it can effortlessly generate theories that are consistent with both evidence and specification, there's still a lot of thinking to do about which ones we should specify for use in different situations.
Even if a "Theory of Everything" can exist, it may not be suitable for all situations for squishy human reasons besides anything having to do with correctness.
> but Ptolemy and Copernicus weren't talking about mass or causality
My critique is that there's a difference between "x is the center" and "motion looks like y when sitting at x".
Those are different claims with very different consequences. You're dismissing this as minutia but that minutia is the critical point. In a geocentric model you need to explain why things revolve around the earth. In a heliocentric model you need to explain why things move around the sun. Predicting the motion of the planets doesn't answer these. But answering these *correctly* allows you to build a generalized model in which you can predict the motion of planets, in any arbitrary system.
I'll also add that I love the geocentric model as a good illustration of why observation alone can't give you causality. There's far more to science than data fitting. In fact, that's why all the mathematicians are getting upset and what Tao has been talking about this whole time
We now bind our physics to our astronomy, but they didn't then. That's what I mean by it being a matter of taste, not of truth.
If you were prompting a godlike LLM for a theory of the heavens in the 1540's you probably wouldn't have used words like "mass" at all, and the theory that it spit out would be similarly absent that concept.
> I don't think Copernicus did any explaining why at all.
But Copernicus's enables us to say more. It is more elegant (it was not simpler though). Copernicus was seeking realism. He was the person annoyed with how complex a system was while everyone around him was saying "who cares, it works".
> That's what I mean by it being a matter of taste, not of truth.
As for your second point, it seems we agree. They're orthogonal. Even if a machine can give you one, the other still needs doing.
While you're technically correct, everyone already understood. We could be more technically correct by talking about the galactic barycenter, or even more by talking about the universe as a whole, but the accuracy gains by that added complexity doesn't benefit the conversation
I think that sort of proves the point that the OP was making, which is that you can create a functional model around any arbitrary location and it can be valid (as long as valid means: it can make useful predictions). When you put the center of the Sun at the center of the model, you still need your models to account for the "orbital wobble" happening as a result of the Sun doing a little dance with Jupiter (and all the other masses that orbit it) in the equations for the determining the relative positions of the Sun and Earth.
Using the Sun as the center versus the solar systems barycenter are both somewhat "arbitrary" in that way, and depend on what you're trying to do with the information - how accurate you need it to be, and how complicated you're willing to make the calculations to hit higher accuracies.
Sure, it depends on what you're trying to do. Fit an equation or understand it. Yes, you can use a reduced mass to simplify the equations and make it more accurate, which usually isn't necessary when the new center is at less than 1% of the radius of the Sun (note ellipses have 2 foci from Kepler/Newton). Even Jupiter's center of rotation is at the surface of the Sun, and both have eccentricities <1%.
Of course, if you're using epicycles, you're never going to get Einstein's elliptical precession correction to the orbit of Mercury. Simpler, is usually better for models, even when you need greater and greater accuracy, overfitting is the enemy of explanation (to coin a phrase).
All models are wrong, some are useful. - Box
Dealing with people wanting to do this is story of my current professional life lol I would love to get them onto the same page that chasing down a final <1% improvement isn't (always) worth it
"All models are wrong, some are useful" - this is what I was trying to say, I was just being a bit snarky/pedantic because the commenter above seemed to be trying to pull a "gotcha" saying that the "truth" of something overrides the utility of it.
there is no "actual truth" - there is only what you can measure reliably
Either state your argument coherently so as to address my completely valid objection, or move on if you're not interested in having a discussion.
Arguing by sending bare links to wiki articles isn't productive and doesn't make you look particularly good.
Would you say the continuum hypothesis (or its negation) is "actual truth"? Or does the "actual truth" become something closer to "actually, there are models of ZFC where CH holds as well as models where it doesn't hold, or maybe ZFC is already inconsistent; we don't really know, nor can we."?
Similarly, on the subject of astronomical reference frames, I'd argue the "actual truth" is closer to this:
> Any reference frame that locally obeys Newton's law of inertia is equally valid. Some are more useful than others depending on the problem you are studying. The notion of an "absolute center" is purely semantic, and a meaningless human construct, until one places bounds on the system under study, wherein the center of mass becomes the most reasonable choice at sub-cosmological scales.
a reasonable person would at least peruse the literature before making such strong claims as
> Either state your argument coherently so as to address my completely valid objection, or move on if you're not interested in having a discussion.
i'm not interested in educating you on thousands (literally dating back to plato) of years of scholarship/philosophical discourse on the topic of epistemology. that's not my responsibility because you are not paying me for this - typically people charge large amounts of money for this kind of work (uni professors are well compensated).
lucky for you others have done lots of work making this information available to you for the low low price of "reading". that's why i provided the link.
Like I said in a different thread: thousands of years from now, it might literally not be possible to prove that you ever existed, but that wouldn't change the "actual truth" - the fact that you did exist, and do things. Stuff happens outside of your person, in the real world, without regard for our ability to perceive/articulate/"know" it. It's only possible to say things like "actual truth doesn't exist" if you think your mind is the only thing that really exists.
> i'm not interested in educating you on thousands (literally dating back to plato) of years of scholarship/philosophical discourse on the topic of epistemology.
Cool. Then don't start a discussion with me.
My man forget thousands of years in the future you don't know whether I exist today lololol
> Cool. Then don't start a discussion with m
I didn't? I told you were wrong and that's it (and then you got pissy). I know that's what happened because each of ours responses are recorded on this indelible/irrefutable medium lololol
Predictive power on the other hand, gives you a framework to decide which story is more useful.