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If there is one way enforcement (i.e. there is one point where the last SHA1 commit was signed by first SHA256 commit), I think it should be safe ?

The "commit before" might be compromised, but the git commits refer a snapshot of a tree + a list of previous commit IDs, so the "new" SHA256 commit will not have any files altered

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Every file (indirectly) referred to by a SHA256 commit using a SHA1 hash in some tree object can still be spoofed. Fixing that requires rehashing all objects and recreating all tree objects so the tree objects referred to by SHA256 commits are purely made up of object references computed by SHA256.

My reading of the docs is that when fetching/pushing from a SHA-256 repo, all objects are referred to (in the packfile fetched) by their SHA-256 names — then, when fetching, you locally compute the SHA-1 of each object for the translation table.

Presuming there’s some validation that SHA-1 names are unique, then that should be safe — the only way I can see one could do a pre-image attack is either fetching from a SHA-1 server (because then you don’t get the SHA-256 object name), which requires a second pre-image attack on SHA-1 (known to be feasible); or by having a second pre-image attack against both SHA-1 and SHA-256 simultaneously (and SHA-256 is still believed to be secure).

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