I am not saying policy makers have not been responding, I'm saying it's not existential urgent to bring out never before punitive natal tools. It's still not pressing problem for decades, now is feeling out phase, i.e. doing simple things like dropping policies or trying to clean up childcare involution.
> started dropping
This presumes PRC wants to maintain 1.4b baseline - imo it doesn't. Currently only ~800m people are actually productive. Initial decades of population drop will be disproportionately shedding bottom quantiles of old / uneducated / could not be incorporated into modern economy. Bluntly they're useless bodies - there's a reason PRC has 200m farmers... when 20m +machines will do. Or 100m other make work jobs for idle aunties and uncles. If PRC not aiming to maintain 1.4b... frankly considering mainland resource stress per capita they shouldn't, then it's fine and preferable to bleed pop for a while.
> reduction in economic demand.
No, this orthodox economic idiocy. The bottom 2 quantile constitutes like 5-10% of GDP. They are/will never big sources of demand to be begin with. More than offset by generating 100m productive advanced workers who has 10-20 times the income/spending power. Of course not all demand same, but in aggregate better to trade a 4 rural grand parents living on pittance of governance transfer and savings for tier1-2 stem chad who will add more value and out spend lifelong vs turnip eaters. Cohorts are not economically equal, sometimes grossly so. Of course you can't simply liquidate them, but doesn't mean governance will miss them when they expire.
> years from starting to contract
Consider 2 framings:
1. orthodox: PRC workforce decrease by 30%. Line must go down.
2. reality: PRC workforce optimizes to be 100% more productive with 30% less head count, by trimming all the fake work jobs doubling their their productive staff. Line goes up.
Again cohort size less important than cohort profile/productivity/composition etc. On way out - mostly old, unskilled, farmers, informal workers - the who gamut of make work economy that nets single digit percent of GDP that gov BEGRUDINGLY supports because people need jobs - it does not mean state/economy needs those people. Many of these are jobs that policy makers wanted to automate away for years but could't, like PRC agri literally being held hostage for years to cater to small plot armer inefficiency.
The only real labour shortage is skilled bluecollar/vocational, and that's mostly because new gen Chinese kids are too proud to work dirty jobs, hence contradictory youth unemployment problem. There's plenty of domestic bodies to staff workshop and worksites. PRC just in mass tertiary transition cultural adjustment period where grad would rather do flexible gig economy while looking for god job than demean themselves with peasant work. This new phenomenon, scaled to tertiary explosion timelines, they'll eventually give up / come around.
Now of course long term demographic / fertility management important and pop cannot crash too hard. But understand PRC now, all the involution, costs, delay to family formation is because they front loaded talent generation so hard that there is fancy degrees + air conditioned jobs mismatch. In 20-30 years structural forces that converge is pop down, housing cheap from oversupply, wealth transfers, signs of future labor shortage... i.e. all signals that stack up to say, if you have kid now, they going to be cheap to raise and guaranteed job in future by virtue of no competition. Basically inverse of current decision making.
Again that just shifts curve - does not get to replacement, like ultimately countries that don't want mass immigration have to figure out other inducements. But that's too in future to usefully project, i.e. we could be spamming test tube babies in state orphanages.