Willingly getting sued by hostile shareholders is in itself not acting in the best interest of shareholders so while it’s not in code, it’s buried in many decades of case law and in reality it reflects the maligned incentives for companies.
> Willingly getting sued by hostile shareholders is in itself not acting in the best interest of shareholders
Really? So if I am a hostile shareholder demanding massive workforce reductions so I can get a $1 dividend today, even though this action will make it impossible for anyone to get a $10 dividend tomorrow, it is in the best interest of shareholders for the company to capitulate to my demand? What if other shareholders are employees? Whose best interests are served then?
Your own citation is basically an acknowledgement of that. In particular:
> “This dogma drives directors and executives to run public firms with a relentless focus on raising stock price. In the quest to “unlock shareholder value” they sell key assets, fire loyal employees, and ruthlessly squeeze the workforce that remains; cut back on product support, customer assistance, and research and development; delay replacing outworn, outmoded, and unsafe equipment; shower CEOs with stock options and expensive pay packages to “incentivize” them; drain cash reserves to pay large dividends and repurchase company shares, leveraging firms until they teeter on the brink of insolvency; and lobby regulators and Congress to change the law so they can chase short-term profits speculating in high-risk financial derivatives.”
That false pledge certainly suggests that rather than being controlled by the dogma, they perpetuate it so workers and citizens accept turpitude as inevitable and necessary. The carrot is the stock option; the stick is the myth that everyone will get in big trouble if workers refuse to put shareholder wealth first.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_Roundtable#2019_corpo...