The proof(s) of FLT aren’t like that of the four-colour map theorem; despite being heavy on prerequisites, they’re conceptual. In fact FLT is a very nice example of this ‘telescoping’ effect.
Ultimately, you could give a few sentences to summarise the proof of FLT as long as one accepts various concepts and their (also deep and conceptual) proofs. In the case of the four-colour theorem this isn’t true because rather than being amenable to summary in words and fancy concepts it’s just a loooooad of cases to be tediously checked.
I can imagine that AI might be able to produce reams and reams of extremely tedious ‘proofs by a million special cases’ that we’d never be able (or even have thought) to do by hand, but that’s not to say there doesn’t exist an alternate, more conceptual explanation that is compressed.
In fact one might argue that facts that are ‘inherently incompressible’ are by definition uninteresting. The profound statements in mathematics are those that appear to be incompressible, yet turn out to be provable in an elegant way by a change in perspective. In this sense, noting the use of the word ‘appear’, it becomes clear that what is and isn’t interesting (and therefore what is and isn’t to be considered trivial) is entirely subjective and hence mathematics is an inescapably human pursuit. But we’ve known this for a long time.