Also, I would like no DRM, no serial id, no support for device verification, no trusted environments, re-programmable IMEI, no locked bootloaders, no proprietary code and no telemetry in any form or shape.
Also, I would like no DRM, no serial id, no support for device verification, no trusted environments, re-programmable IMEI, no locked bootloaders, no proprietary code and no telemetry in any form or shape.
There are other Android distributions that run on practically any Android phone you have, look for LineageOS. Even your phone is not explicitly listed as supported, using Claude is easy nowadays to adjust the distro to run on your phone perfectly.
Furthermore, sound cryptography isn't dependending on specific hardware to function, with that kind of reasoning we'd never get encrypted communications anywhere. So stop inventing excuses and for once in life look deep into how they are financed, which apparently is OK to be as opaque as possible as to whom is paying them so much money.
Furthermore, Android's ecosystem is structured in a way even the most basic software security concerns, like not running a comically out of date kernel, depend on the vendor's blessing, and sadly most manufacturers, including very desirable ones like Fairphone, hadn't been keeping up with such duties. Porting new kernels to old hardware is an extremely inefficient time-consuming endeavor that will take up most of volunteer time to non-satisfactory results; I can testify to that as a former member of the Ubuntu Touch project, and our standards of security were comically lax.
Again, you CAN lower your standards of security and go for the lesser evil: many people run Lineage or Ubuntu Touch despite known gaps in their security models. But to make that choice, you have to be honest about what you're compromising. If you shut your eyes and plug your ears pretending everything is fine, you'll end up with someone killed because they listened to your uncritical advise.
Also, I struggle to see how it's GrapheneOS's fault choosing the most secure hardware on the consumer market because it might be deemed suspicious to own it. GOS could have chosen the most popular budget Samsung (ignoring the aforementioned security issues) and it would have the same effect. Besides Pixels aren't an obscure unusual hackerphone made in small quantities, shipped from out of the country; it's among the most popular phone brands, advertised from huge billboards I pass on my bus route to university. If they chose something like the PinePhone like Genode, this point would be somewhat defensible.
Finally, what's up with the repeated conspiratorial insinuations about financing? I admit I hadn't looked deeply into this question, even as a one-time small donor, but what are you expecting to find? Is it serious concern about the financial health of a project, or an attempt to manufacture a hysteria around some controversial donor, similar to the Tor Project?
It won't change reality, doesn't matter how many paragraphs you write. The fact is that all that security is useless when using hardware that is compromised from the start. And I will repeat this again: any NSA supplier does bug their hardware and they do this for decades until finally admitting, just need to take a look on the NSA museum.
Stop promoting suspiciously funded Android distributions that run on even more suspicious hardware by groups that routinely promote state-sponsored tools on their social media.