This isn't relevant in this case. The problems occurred at different places. The backup fiber was, separately from the issues with the primary system, cut by a construction crew. It's not two fiber lines both cut at the same spot.
You can get two separate failures in short succession, where the first one hasn’t been fixed. For critical devices that’s why you have tertiary backups, ideally on different technology compel you. For one major event I had diverse fibre and satelite and microwave. Lost microwave and satelite to electronic warfare but the fibres were ok. Ofcom were really pissed about it, but nothing they could do.
No?
Like, okay, monitoring reports what there is no link.
Now what? Somebody gets a hi vis vest, a hard hat and goes along the cable to investigate the reason?
There is nothing monitoring could help, especially if the cable was cut recent enough.
> An RFTS enables fiber to be automatically tested from a central location. A central computer is used to control the operation of OTDR-like test components located at key points in the fiber network. The test components scan the fiber to locate problems. If a problem is found, its location is noted and the appropriate personnel are notified to begin the repair process.
If it's down for more than 15 minutes in country or 2 hours internationally it gets flagged for manual attention. Shorter outages are logged but only looked at monthly as part of the operational report process.
Now sure you can have two independent faults on the same day, but the reports are that they didn't know the backup line was down.
In your case you already have way more than monitoring. You have the infrastructure designed for resilience. You have that design implemented. You have the protocols to do if the things go north. You have automation to disregard minor events and to bring to the attention more serious things. You have way more than monitoring alone.