There is no need to give rights to something that's can't suffer or be killed.
Maybe one day we'll build artificial animals complete with emotions, and should think about that carefully, but today all we've got is language models.
How do you know it doesn't have qualia?
> or be killed
If someone invents a startrek teleporter and you go through it do you die? Once the concept has been sufficiently generalized as to make a determination about a computer system what is the definition of "kill"?
Tokens in, tokens out. Where do you think the quale is - layer 42 ?
Seriously, do you realize how simple and NOT brain-like a transformer is ?
An LLM telling you it fears death is predicting some sci-fi trope it was trained on - maybe something you wrote yourself.
I could say the same of you - electrical impulses in, mechanical actions out. A glorified and very mushy stepper motor. Can you believe that the abominations are made up entirely of meat?!
Even so, indeed having control over the structure of their brains puts them in a vastly category compared to humans. Once we stop functioning our brains quickly degrade and information is lost.
Thus in this sense kill means deleting all information about it. It is a very complicated subject to discuss, hardly does any justice in online replies.
The argument is that these machines can end up becoming sentient/conscious/etc. in a meaningful way (i.e., like a human). I can assure you that humans can indeed suffer without being in physical pain- purely through their conscious experience.
>Maybe one day we'll build artificial animals complete with emotions, and should think about that carefully, but today all we've got is language models.
The problem is that the emergence of a sufficiently complex AI capable of suffering will likely come before we understand that we're creating a sufficiently complex AI capable of suffering. That's a pretty serious ethical/moral issue.
Like, if we have an AI system that is telling us that it is suffering and we have no reasonable way to explain that phenomenon and by any reasonable metric or analysis it appears to be sentient/conscious/etc., then what? Do we just ignore that we've just been presented a situation that in, any other context, would be grounds to immediately end this suffering? Just because somebody can say, "well it's just bits stored on disk- it can't suffer"? Would that argument ever hold up for humans or animals? "It's just neurons firing in peculiar ways- that's not suffering."
I know all of this is trite, and I know this comment section isn't going to be where the question of consciousness is solved, but I do find it very interesting just how much variances there are with these perspectives. I've met people who are very technical who are very concerned about this, people who are very technical who don't believe this can ever be an issue, people who aren't technical who are concerned about this, and people who aren't technical who don't believe this can ever be an issue. I have yet to spot a pattern in this way of thinking lol
Maybe one day we'll build an artificial brain or embodied artificial animal with the requisite moving parts to be conscious, have emotions, etc, but that's probably at least 50 years away, even if it were being pursued; and it may turn out to be one of those sci-fi future ideas like the Jetson's world of flying cars that never materializes because its impractical and there is no real demand.
If people are willing to think that an LLM is conscious, then why would anyone spend billions/trillions of dollars to build an AI that actually is conscious? What would be the point?
Could you elaborate on exactly what those are, though? Because if you're going to claim that a vaguely transformer shaped ML model categorically cannot be so does that not inherently require proof of what can?
You can't even prove that the rocks in my backyard aren't conscious.
Sure I can, but that's because I have a well developed theory of what consciousness is, and the fact that you are entertaining the possibility of rocks being conscious tells me that you don't.
If everything is conscious, including my coffee cup and the toast I had for breakfast, then I guess we can cross consciousness off the list of things we need to worry about in terms of AI rights.
And no, I don't want to discuss what consciousness is. Maybe there is a thread for that somewhere else, but don't look for me there either.
Then show me a link to your paper so I can formally rebut it.
>I don't want to discuss what consciousness is
But you sure want to tell us you know what it is with very strong convictions and we should listen to you because of course "You are right person that's very right".
The funny thing here is the vast majority of people that are deeply into philosophy or scientific study of the mind will not have any of the certainty you profess. The word "doubt" is used constantly. The saying "The harder we push the borders the more fuzzy the concepts become" is very commonly used. There may be nothing more complex than this.
Saying you have a well developed theory here just serves as a warning to others to discount your statements.
Go ahead believing rocks are conscious if you like.
Do you go out on weekends asking people to stop abusing rocks?
Rhetorical question - I don't care what you do on weekends.
Bye!
So I think it’s more than fine for you to have your views and share them, but I wouldn’t expect to have any influence or part in the conversations around whether AI is conscious if you can’t explain why (or simply refuse to). Which, again, is fine!
Side note: I also think that once we have AIs that are sufficiently advanced, the popular opinion will swing to “of course they’re conscious”, because again, most people are going almost entirely off their intuition rather than reasoning from first principles, just like you see to be.
1) Looks like a duck, quacks like a duck - it's conscious!
2) Looks like a robot, built like a robot - it's not conscious!
I've always assumed that for the majority of the people it'll be 2).
It's also one of those topics where many otherwise smart and capable people display a shocking lack of awareness of the limits of their own knowledge. When hundreds of years of philosophy is unable to produce anything concrete you should probably second guess any "self evident" answers you come up with.
No - suffering in an emotional state, and we'll know if we are choosing to design cognitive architecture with emotions. It's not going to happen accidentally.
> Would that argument ever hold up for humans or animals?
Why don't you hit your thumb with a hammer, then report back ?
https://transformer-circuits.pub/2026/emotions/index.html
Whether these are like "our" emotions is hard to say. What we _can_ say is that they are emotion-shaped, we didn't design them, and they happened accidentally.
Modern AI is grown, not meticulously designed, and we cannot say with any certainty what the resulting mechanistic properties are.
If you give an LLM the move sequence of a half-played chess game and ask it to continue as white or black, then it has learnt enough to model the ELO rating of both players and will continue playing at that level. It is not playing to win - it is doing what you expect and predicting as well as it can - it predicts the 1500 ELO player will keep playing at that level, and generates moves accordingly.
An LLM appearing to exhibit an emotion (if we anthropomorphize it and read emotion into it's output) is just predicting as well as it can - if the context calls for sad output, they you'd expect to get sad output and will necessarily find that "we're predicting sadness" detector somewhere internally.
Transformers are the same as they ever were from 10 years ago, other than minor efficiency tweaks like MOE and different attention mechanisms. Training is getting more and more complex, resulting in better and better cargo cult reasoning etc, but the architecture remains the same.
I'm not sure you quite understand the full meaning of this statement. If you did, your following paragraphs wouldn't follow.
However, if you just ask it to continue a game, halfway in progress, then by default it will try to predict the most likely continuation, which is that both players will continue to play at the level they have done so far. This isn't a theory - it's been documented, as well as what you'd expect.
I was just explaining how this comment you made is wrong.
You want to argue that predictive emotions are just as real as animal emotions, but that doesn't stop them from being predictive (and that AI that smiles as it kills you still seems concerning).
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
There's no better way to predict an angry response than to be angry, qualia and all. If transformers could 'learn whatever it needs to predict text', then that potentially includes the feeling of anger. You are making some kind of distinction between 'predictive emotions' and the kind that happens when get a promotion (or get passed on a promotion) and I'm telling you that if you really understood what you said, you'd realize it is possible the machine is experiencing it the same.
There are other people in this thread who want to talk about that stuff, so try them instead.
This was the (your) comment that started this chain. You were already talking about it. If you don't want to keep talking about it then that's fine but let's not act like i'm suddenly pivoting yeah?
In a conscious animal there is also going to be a subjective experience of that as well, a quale of what it feels like to be in that state if you will, but that is certainly not what I was referring to, as I would have hoped was obvious - I was talking about prediction.
In any case, when the conversation becomes about the conversation, then surely it is time to stop.
What you have in a pre-trained LLM is the ability to recognize emotions, and use that as one of the dozens of other context patterns it recognizes to predict continuations in the same style.
An LLM doesn't appear happy, sad, afraid, etc (to extent that it does - pretty minimal) because it is experiencing that emotion, but rather because it is predicting that it should appear that way. As people continue to anthropomorphize models, and take them at face value, this is a dangerous difference.
That doesn't follow. A LLMs weights are fixed during inference, but it's activations and hidden states are highly dynamic and depend on the current context. Biological emotions also arise from relatively fixed circuitry responding dynamically to inputs. Your emotional circuitry isn't being rewired every time you're afraid.
Prediction is what the model does. It doesn't tell us what internal mechanisms were learnt to make such predictions. If representing something analogous to affective state were useful for predicting human behaviour and emotions, then gradient descent could in principle learn such a mechanism.
>An LLM doesn't appear happy, sad, afraid, etc (to extent that it does - pretty minimal) because it is experiencing that emotion, but rather because it is predicting that it should appear that way. As people continue to anthropomorphize models, and take them at face value, this is a dangerous difference.
I don't know that you are conscious. I'm simply strongly assuming that you are. Outward behavior is that all matters. If GPT-X orders a drone hit on you sometime later because it was lets say 'quite upset' with your comments, will you cry out, 'It can't really be upset, so obviously the bullet in my head doesn't count.'? Will you suddenly spring back to life ?
What is dangerous is creating a machine with behaviours of a conscious agent and modelling it like a toaster, dangerous and stupid.
Yeah, but it's helpful if what leads up to that behavior gives you some warning it's about to happen. Animals do this for a reason since millions of years of evolution have shown that a snarl or mock charge is less dangerous than going right for a death match.
If you kept pushing an AI's buttons, seeing it appear to get more and more pissed off, until it finally snapped and killed you, then you'd have yourself largely to blame.
If the AI predicted it should stay positive (i.e. generate positive vibes) and not react to your poking, but then another predictive pattern kicked in and it killed you out of the blue, then that seems more problematic to me, even if you don't agree.
A certain configuration of weights, created in training, could be a system that can express something like emotion. The emotion then is experienced when certain types of activations occur after training.