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Comment by atiq-ca | Hacker News Reader

Signal still uses proprietary blob and uses google/apple service for notifications. Use molly.im instead which has solved these problems.

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Molly is a security-hardened Signal client only on Android for people unfamiliar. They went through a period of not updating (there were no security updates during that time afaict), but now releases should happen faster on top of Signal.

In Molly there's three options. Google Play Services, WebSocket, and UnifiedPush.

I use the WebSocket and Molly has used >1% of battery since the last full charge so it doesn't seem like play services would improve battery but maybe if I had more apps depending on it..

Google and Apple can't see the notification content but they can see metadata. If you want metadata privacy you should use SimpleX instead anyway.

If you're using WebSocket, how do Google and Apple see metadata? Can someone explain why it's so difficult to make a decent chat app divorced from their ecosystems?

I'm talking about using play services or Apple's version. Signal falls back to a WebSocket if you don't have play services installed.

I tried it and it was fine while it worked, but eventually I had to go back to regular Signal because Molly's updates did not follow Signal's closely enough, and at some point the server code changed enough to where I was unable to use it for an unacceptable amount of time (after checking, it took them weeks to update). Something to keep in mind if you're not using a custom server.

Maybe it's because I use Molly as a secondary device (my tablet) but I never had an issue where it didn't work for weeks.

Can you point where Signal uses proprietary blobs? Also, I'm using Signal without the play services notifications just fine. Notifications that don't contain any message content while transiting anyway. The display of the notification was the issue with iOS bug and that would have affected molly as well (if it was on iOS).

The native Signal android app delivers notifications just fine without Google play services on my degoogled android.

Same!

I was using Silence from F-Droid for a while back in the day because of these issues, but the lack of interop and needing to make everyone move again soured me on the whole thing. I would rather just get people on XMPP or Matrix and not use some sketchy phone-first app at all. For SMS I use Fossify Messages, which I think was a fork of QKSMS. I don't use SMS as primary or sensitive comms, only as needed. Same as email, basically, but less useful.

I really liked silence. I stopped using it when f-droid said the source code was no longer available. Fossify messages is the best replacement I've found.

(I dont bother with encrypted messenging apps. I prefer to assume that anything I do on my phone is doubleplus unprivate. If I want privacy, I head over to my computer.)

GrapheneOS is more well-roundedly private than any desktop OS.

Competition is Qubes but that has usability issues and does not have good hardware security.

I'm not about to trust a google branded device. Even if the Graphene folks are on the up and up, google sure as hell isn't.

That's not based in reality. Why would Google have a hardware backdoor when 99.9% of their users run their software giving them the data they want.

Google Pixels have no evidence of a hardware backdoor when a desktop is proven to be much less secure against remote and local exploitation.

It has been shown through leaks that Pixels running GrapheneOS are the most secure against Cellebrite in AFU. GrapheneOS was the first to implement a reboot timer feature which brings the device to BFU (much more secure) and then Android and iOS copied it (with longer, non-customizable duration).

You can inspect network traffic to see that GrapheneOS phones only connect to GrapheneOS-run services.

Here's a team member's thoughts: https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/10150-not-your-average-why-...

But GrapheneOS relies on a proprietary, black-box security chip from Google... who pinky-promised to open-source it but never did, and that just doesn't sit well with me.

I think it's entirely possible that a compromised Titan module (whether such code ships with the device or is updated at a later point) could leak keys via some covert method, and possibly transmit via the baseband or through some other application/method where the OS is not really aware of what's going on.

The government only gets to use this once, and they probably won't use it on you.

I don't believe that they will use this against me. But I do believe in the right to use devices without backdoors for everyone, so I support something else instead.

Why? They’ll use it as many times as they want while claiming they used something else.

That, or they'll just decline to actually prosecute any targets that aren't worth revealing a backdoor during discovery.

So you'd rather choose a chip with demonstrated weaker security over one with demonstrated stronger security because of a hypothetical risk that has no supporting evidence?

Why would google serve malware and scams in their ad network?

Google is a dodgy company. Placing any trust in them is foolish.

There's insider attack resistance and there's evidence that the chips hold up against real forensics attacks. They perform better than iPhones in Cellebrite (leading digital forensics company) support matrix leaks.

Other options also rely on closed-source security chips or have none at all, and are demonstrated to be much weaker against AFU attacks or are able to be extracted in BFU and then brute-forced if there's a weak password.

The problem for me is writing on a mobile device is a terrible user experience.

When I'm at home I don't wanna use a virtual keyboard on a 6.3" (or 7.9 unfolded). I just want to use my triple monitor PC setup with a real keyboard and a wealth of display space.

Mobile is cool for on the go but a productivity killer.

Qubes can be used together with Heads and a hardware key to verify the boot integrity. Works for me. This is more than good enough for most users, unless you think that your device can be captured while being on by a state adversary I guess. Also it doesn't remove control from the user unlike with GrapheneOS.

I'm also talking about AFU security which is actually a very common threat which GrapheenOS defends against better than iPhones based on leaks.

GrapheneOS is just so easy to use securely.

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