You should search for the many times where GrapheneOS has stated they won't work with Fairphone
Forking GOS and porting it to a new device is a huge and unreasonable ask for an individual user. Even less so when you include the fact that you'll need to keep it up to date.
I wonder if fable or astra could wire everything up.
You are dependent on Qualcomm for hardware firmware updates and apparently they charge quite a bit extra if you want continuous monthly security updates [1]. This is possibly one of the reasons that smaller OEMs like Fairphone do not update firmware regularly and instead choose to keep their customers vulnerable to many known CVEs.
> It's not as though we're talking about a device with hardware specs locked behind an NDA and drivers that only support outdated kernel versions.
Fairphone 5 and earlier have an end-of-life Linux kernel. Fairphone 6 is approaching the same fate. None of their devices keep up with the incomplete security backports to older releases, let alone the full security updates via new major releases. All of their devices are missing important hardware security features which should be standard. They're repeatedly said they don't consider any of this a significant issue and have no plans to significantly change it.
I didn't realize fairphone was stuck on an EoL kernel. I guess that means that even if the build can be made to work right now (far from certain given an old kernel) it would likely break in the future.
An OS without the core features and updates of GrapheneOS clearly isn't GrapheneOS. It's not permitted to refer to it as such.
> That's kind of the whole point of FOSS, right?
No, the point of FOSS is that you can take all of our code and use it for other purposes. Calling an incomplete port to another device GrapheneOS is misleading users. It isn't GrapheneOS and must have a unique name.
Honestly while grapheneos is a useful thing that I'm glad exists you're being absolutely insufferable.
Device support code updated to new monthly, quarterly and yearly releases of AOSP within several months to provide new security improvements (Pixels receive these in the month they're released)
Fairphone's hardware and software is developed by a Chinese ODM (T2Mobile), who even have difficulty pushing out monthly patches very timely. They don't even do QPR2s, major Android updates are very late (usually almost a year), they rarely do driver firmware or kernel updates. There is no way they could fulfill this guarantee unless they started doing software development in-house and paid Qualcomm for monthly firmware updates.
> Fairphone has said they don't plan to add a secure element. It can be seen from their current devices that they don't fully keep up with privacy/security backports and lag a year behind on shipping yearly OS releases. They skip over the monthly and quarterly releases entirely. They replaced their own non-GMS Fairphone OS with a dramatically less secure /e/OS option in partnership with Murena. They clearly demonstrate that security and even privacy are not the priorities.
it sounds like they are saying that /e/OS is less secure than fairphone's own OS. with all criticism against /e/OS taken into account, i highly doubt that fairphone would have been able to make their own version of android more secure than /e/OS when they are not even interested in working on that.
so, again, how is /e/OS being behind on updates any worse than fairphone's own OS?
However, calling out on e/OS in the same post, seems to me very counter-productive. We need more OS vendors and less infighting. Calling all custom ROMs insecure and claiming to be the only one is IMHO 'drama'. Particular there are contributions of me microG that are helpful if you want to de-Google ones phone. Graphene has a different approach: fair. People will use GrapheneOS if they share their goals.
Fairphone is about sustainability and a bit about not supporting major tech like Google. I don't think this hurts. In an ideal world we could have both. But sustainability seems to be a non-goal of GrapheneOS.
In some ways /e/ and GOS are trying to achieve different things (/e/ is not hardened and does not claim to be), but /e/ is severely lacking security wise compared to AOSP.
This [0] is, in my opinion, a fair review that mentions many of the issues. That Fairphone is ok with these is telling about their position on privacy and security.
[0] https://www.kuketz-blog.de/e-datenschutzfreundlich-bedeutet-...
No, what it is is true. microG lets you de-Google a phone, but the resulting phone is provably less secure. If stating the truth causes "drama", the problem isn't the person or entity saying the true thing. If that truth shakes people, if it upsets them, they should look into the problem that truth has revealed (not created, as truth isn't something that exists only after someone speaks it) rather than blame those who are speaking it.
Can you provide evidence that GrapheneOS is less secure than LineageOS or other custom ROMs? Because GrapheneOS (and even leaked documentation from commercial adversarial phone hacking tools) provide a hell of a lot of evidence that it is, in fact, considerably more secure than just about every other phone OS in existence.
Because of that, instead of refuting the actual argument being made, discussion always swings towards their tone.
What it is, exactly, that is objectionable? Are there personal attacks being made? Yeah. Towards the GrapheneOS developers. It's something I've seen for myself and if you get into these threads on HN early, you can see how the comment deletions pile up. When they say they are the target of organized disinfo and targeted attacks by malignant third parties, it's pretty easy to believe them. It is in the best interests of many, many very powerful people that GrapheneOS is destroyed.
No one who takes infosec seriously cares about GOS' PR filling their communication with tummy rubs and head pats. Infosec is a nightmare, adversaries are everywhere, all anyone should want to know is whatever is as close to the truth as possible.
I want the open source desktop to succeed, but we can only make progress if we accept that there are a lot of security, UX, and UI issues and start tackling them.
When they say they are the target of organized disinfo and targeted attacks by malignant third parties, it's pretty easy to believe them. It is in the best interests of many, many very powerful people that GrapheneOS is destroyed.
Yeah. There it's clear that there is a lot of organized disinformation, probably by government actors and certainly by other open source and phone vendors that try to sell privacy/eurowashed phones (one Volla astroturfer outed themselves accidentally on Mastodon by sharing information only an employee could know).
Most of their criticisms are valid, but they seem to be absolutely unwilling to make any compromise at all.
Not sure if they want to protect their brand, if any of those criticised issues would increase the work needed by them significantly, or why they are like that.
But I would prefer to have a slightly less secure GrapheneOS on many phones, that helps many many more users than just Pixel owners, over the current all or nothing situation.
Making no compromise to security is the entire point of it's existence.