A depth map from the apple camera (again, signed) would show that the entire image had the same distance from the camera.
This is a pretty standard application of trusted computing and can be done entirely on the iPhone. A server would only possibly be needed for anonymization (while retaining key revocation capabilities if a key does end up leaking), but there are serverless ways to do even that (TPMs have supported these for a while now).
I think a big part of validation for things like these are just "could it have been modified since Z event happened", because Z was not something people paid attention to before.
Nothing prevents anyone from opportunistically pre-generating and timestamping millions of permutations of fake kompromat and then selectively revealing the one that turns out to be useful after the fact.
You could charge per attestation, but the economics of that don't look great; you could demand publication of the image itself before attestation, but that would obviously not fly for most use cases out of privacy concerns.
If you're doing server-side timestamping and someone is sending millions of items, I think you just ban them. Apple accounts are free but not inexpensive.
There are already pretty good depth map generation algorithms (for a decade or so) which works on 2D images.
Generate the image, feed it to a depth map generator, viola.
However, you can't get it signed by the sensor itself. That'd be hard.