Its a shame that Microsoft ate Netscape's lunch so early on. I still use Firefox and have fond memories of Netscape (v7) when growing up.
After that, open source efforts to rebuild the entire browser and mail client took years as XUL and Gecko were being built as very generic reusable components, opening up the space for competition to spring up. On top of that, Microsoft leveraged the Windows moat, including IE 3.0 and later 4.0 as the basis of Windows "97" (95 something-something) and 98, along with ActiveX push. By the time legal systems caught up with the practice of bundling a browser into a dominant OS, Netscape and Mozilla were toast.
Everything from there on was an uphill battle, and when KHTML was turned into WebKit by Apple, and adopted by Google for Chrome, there was also an open source engine (or two) supported by infinite money.
That's at least how I remember it, but you are welcome to fact-check me on any of those since this is now 20-30 years ago.
Suppose you live in South America, register a domain from a registry in Canada and then have users accessing it from Ukraine. Are we going to give every local government a global root certificate? Have a single one in California or Texas that every other country is somehow forced to use? Or make it so people in Europe can't access sites in Asia and vice versa?
The existing system is more than the usual amount of messed up but that seems like one of the things that could actually make it worse.
Just publish a public key in your DNS TXT records. ACME is just that anyways but with extra (pointless) steps.
The whole SSL certificate grift is just a way to extort money out of nothing.
DNSSEC is probably not even used, though I never checked.
Eg. as a domain owner, you will put a cryptographic hash into your DNS zone so a CA can validate you have control over it, and then issue a different cryptographic hash derived from their private key, and browser will use their public key to validate this cryptographic hash (TLS cert) is valid.
So we could simply push public key into a DNS zone, and browsers could use it to decrypt the traffic encrypted by the private key from the server hosted under that DNS name: no CAs needed, similar to SSH except the DNS-ownership-implied-trust component.
"Extended validation" certificates involved a lot more (in theory, checking true ownership, business address, physical presence, etc), but nobody really cares about these, and with the push to automated renewal and 45-day expiration dates by 2028, it's going to make even less sense.
Edit: I realize now that you may be referring to the fact that MITM DNS server can inject a different public key in there and thus DNSSEC is required — you are absolutely right, and this is a good and important point.