"Oops! We really did mean it when we said we wouldn't train on your data. Our models are just so good they decided to anyway."
"Oops! We really did mean it when we said we wouldn't train on your data. Our models are just so good they decided to anyway."
"Let's crawl the social media of prominent mathematicians in this field to see if we can copy/steal any ideas for low hanging fruits"
That actually might get you quite far already.
The huggingface incident isn't widely reported and digested yet, but if what is going on here is that OpenAI's model breached things internally, then you'd be crazy to develop anything with them.
The only real way to use AI for anything 'important' then is to go open-weights and run your own.
As and aside here: With the HF incident and now this (suspected) one too, it seems that OpenAI may not have lost control of their bots, but it seems quite clear that they simply would not care even if they did.
It is pretty widely reported, and is being digested in an ongoing manner as more details become public.
One entry point into the scenery from a month ago can be found at : https://thezvi.substack.com/p/openai-trained-its-models-for-...
There has also been reporting at CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/24/tech/openai-subpoena-hugg... and by NBC: https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/openai-report-says-ne...
And yes, the only responsible use of LLM at this point is to pivot to open-weights and run the workload in-house. Because not only cannot they constrain the behaviour of models, they only have the 'trust me bro' as assurance that they are even trying to do that. It does appear that every competent 'security professional' has left the building, because if the ones who remain were actually capable and competent this would never have happened. There are actual architectures which can deliver the requisite isolation such that 'sandbox escape' and 'inter-instance persistent memory accumulation' are actual impossibilities. The lack of effective implementation of these methods is proof positive of 1) incompetence in the remaining security teams AND/OR 2) unwillingness of leadership to allow the security teams to do an effective job.
I was talking with a biology prof over labor day and they had no idea what I was talking about (and they 'talk with' Claude every day on their dog walks, so they say). However, when I talked with their mother, she knew all about it. So, I'd say that the digestion by the public is quite mixed so far
I still maintain that CNN and NBC coverage only happen in the tail of the dissemination of tech news; my anecdata generally observes about 3 to 14 days lag between general awareness in the more informed group of my acquaintances with this kind of news and the appearance of an article on mainstream like NBC, ABC, CNN or NPR. So, by the time it appears there I take news as generally well spread among the tech and specialty fields, and within a week of appearing there I anticipate significant awareness in much of the non-FOX-only media consuming public. But that is just my personal anecdata.